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ABSTRACT

The Fall of Singapore was a significant event in Australia and in Singapore. The
memory of defeat occupies a difficult place in each nation’s history. Since the end of the
Second World War, Australians and Singaporeans have refashioned the event, and
memories of the event to displace the reality of defeat. They have contextualised
memories of defeat and suffering as sacred experiences and infused with ideas of
cultural and national identity, often reflecting broader themes like myths of the nation.
This is because nations from time to time are inspired by the myths forged in a previous
conflict. Myths of a nation influence the way Australians and Singaporeans define their
memories of war because of the sentiments it can invoke in a nation of people. And this
has produced memories that, despite being anchored by a common event, are very
different.

This thesis explores the themes and influences that shape memory of a single event, 15
February 1942, from the Australian and Singaporean national perspective. In the
Australian case, 15 February is intimately linked with the history of the Australian 8th
Division, the experiences of the men, and how their experience is accommodated in
both Anzac and the language of commemoration in Australia. For Singapore, 15
February has strong resonance with the Singapore Chinese community; it has inspired
leaders of the community to preserve and position their wartime memories not only to
ensure that their experience is remembered but also that it is seen as Singapore’s history
of the Japanese Occupation.

Australians and Singaporeans have constantly returned to popular memories of the
event, seldom the realities of it. A study of the influences that shape the language of
commemoration in Australia and Singapore will inform our understanding of the
meanings, myths, and popular memories associated with 15 February in these two
nations.
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PREFACE

15 February

Every year on 15 February, two groups of people gather in public spaces to
commemorate the Fall of Singapore. One gathers at the Cenotaph in Martin Place in
downtown Sydney and another at the civilian war memorial in Beach Road in
downtown Singapore. Both services have their origins in the Fall of Singapore on 15
February 1942. On that day, Lieutenant-General Percival surrendered to the
Japanese. The men under his command, including those in the Australian 8th
Division, laid down their weapons and most were marched into captivity as
prisoners-of-war (POWs). For the people of Singapore, the date marked the
beginning of the Japanese Occupation that would last until 1945. This thesis
examines what that date has meant in both countries but begins with a description of
the two ceremonies observed by the author in 2007 and 2008.

The Cenotaph, Martin Place, Sydney
On 15 February 2007, veterans from the 8th Australian Division Association gathered
at the war memorial at Martin Place to observe the 65th anniversary of the Fall of
Singapore and to honour their comrades who did not return. Battalion Associations
of the 8th Australian Division were represented by veterans and descendants of
veterans. Invited dignitaries included the Governor of New South Wales, Professor
Marie Bashir, and the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant-General K.J.
Gillespie, along with senior officers from the Australian Army, Royal Australian
Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Forces (RAAF). Despite the number of
important guests, the service was not an exclusive or private event. Rows of chairs
were prepared for the public and invited guests. Volunteers handed out program
pamphlets to anyone interested enough to attend the service. Many passers-by were
curiously drawn to the event. A considerable crowd had gathered even before the
service began.
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The service began shortly after 11am with the arrival of Lieutenant-General
Gillespie. A catafalque party drawn from volunteers of the Australian Defence Force
was mounted and the master of ceremony welcomed all guests. A Prayer of
Remembrance was conducted, followed by three prayers: Prayer for Peace, Prayer
of Thanksgiving and Prayer for the Future of Mankind. The Captives’ Hymn was
sung by the Sydney Women’s Vocal Orchestra. Lieutenant-General Gillespie
delivered the Remembrance address and laid the first wreath. He was followed by the
president of the 8th Australian Division Association, Joe Minister, who laid one
wreath on behalf of the association. Dr. Rowley Richards, a former a medical officer
and former POW, laid a wreath in memory of the doctors, nurses and medical
personnel who lost their lives during the war. Senior officers of the Australian Army,
RAN and RAAF laid wreaths on behalf of their respective services. They were
followed by official guests, unit associations of the 8th Division, the Kindred ExService Organisations and individuals who laid wreaths in a private capacity. The
Ode of Remembrance was delivered by two school students, one from Sydney Girls’
High School and another from St Andrew’s Cathedral School. The Last Post was
sounded followed with a minute of silence. The “Lament” was played by Warrant
Officer R.J McMellon from the 1st Health Support Battalion. The service drew to a
close with the sounding of the Rouse, 1 the singing of the Recessional hymn and
finally the Australian national anthem.
The 8th Division Association’s annual 15th February remembrance service holds
special meaning for veterans of the division. The date marks a key moment of their
service records and their role in the defence of Australian and the British Empire
during the Second World War. It marked the end of a campaign where many lost
their mates and it marked the start of their time in captivity as POWs when many
more of their mates would be lost before the war’s end in 1945. The division
association’s remembrance service on 15th February every year commemorates both
experiences. It features elements commonly found in military commemoration
services in Australia like the Anzac Day Dawn Services; the participation of senior
ranking officers from the armed services, a catafalque party, buglers sounding the

1

According to the Australian War Memorial, in the case of the ANZAC Day Dawn Services, Reveille
is played rather than Rouse. Reveille is reserved for ANZAC Day

2

Last Post and Rouse, and laying wreaths at a war memorial. The Captives’ Hymn
performed during the service is unique to the Australian 8th Division. It was
composed by a captured English missionary, Margaret Dryburgh, in a POW camp in
Palembang, Sumatra, and was first performed on 5 July 1942. This hymn captures
the Allied POW experience. Its first verse reads:

Father, in captivity
We would lift our prayer to Thee,
Keep us ever in Thy love,
Grant that daily we may prove
Those who place their trust in Thee,
More than conquerors may be. 2

It reflected the daily struggle of captured Allied POWs in Japanese captivity.
The importance of the 8th Division remembrance service was highlighted a year
earlier by the former president of the 8th Division Association, Dr. Richards, who
said “It’s a responsibility which we owe to our mates that are not here, who didn’t
come back.” 3 Dr. Richards also added that while the division association hold its
own memorial services, it “doesn't denigrate in any way Anzac Day… they’re two
that complement one another.” 4 However, Dr. Richards also pointed out that some
veterans will disagree and they regard the 15th February remembrance service to be
more significant than Anzac Day. 5 Perhaps for these veterans and their descendants,
the 8th Division remembrance service represents for them something that Anzac Day
does not; an experience of war that still sits uncomfortably within the rhetoric of
Anzac.

2

Program Handout, A Remembrance Service and Wreath Laying, On the 65th Anniversary of the Fall
of Singapore, 8th Australian Division Association
3
ABC Online, 15 February 2006
4
ibid.
5
ibid.
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Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, Beach Road,
Singapore

On the early morning of 15 February 2008, a crowd gathered at the Singapore
Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, Singapore’s official
World War Two Memorial. They were attending the 41st memorial service conducted
by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI) for the
civilian victims of the Japanese Occupation. Guests needed to register with the
SCCCI days before the event suggesting that this is no public event: seats provided
for that day were all reserved and labelled with names or for invited groups.
Temporary altars and incense and offering burners were set up along the sides of the
memorial for attendees to perform prayers and for offerings to be made to the
victims.
Guests of the SCCCI’s 41st annual memorial service began arriving at 9am. Of
particular mention were cars bearing state flags of other nations – foreign dignitaries
were invited to the event. The guest of honour, Singapore’s Minister for Information,
Communications and the Arts, Dr. Lee Boon Yang arrived at 9.30am. All guests
were invited to rise from their seats to welcome the minister. The service began with
the SCCCI acknowledging the guests in attendance. It claimed that the some 1400
students representing 58 education institutes in Singapore were in attendance. 6 Most
were primary school children. Also mentioned were the 200 invited guests from the
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Veterans’ League, the Veterans’ Confederation of
ASEAN Countries, Singapore’s National Cadet Corps (NCC), the Singapore Police
Force Gurkha Contingent, and families of victims. The SAF band provided bugle and
bagpipe players for the occasion. The SAF Provost provided a contingent for the
Honour Guard party. Representatives from the Inter-Religious Organisation (IRO),
the official body representing the various faiths in Singapore, were also in
attendance.

6

According to the SCCCI’s report it was 58 education institutes were 2 Polytechnics, 2 Junior
Colleges, 31 Secondary schools and 23 Primary schools
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After the arrival of all guests, the Singapore Civil Defence Force air raid sirens
sounded the “All Clear” signal. After the signal, the SAF Honour Guards performed
the protocols of a catafalque party at the centrepiece of the war memorial, a Chinese
funerary urn. One minute’s silence was observed as ten religious leaders from the
IRO made their way up the steps of the memorial. Each leader conducted a silent
prayer in their respective faiths for the dead. The wreath laying ceremony
commenced with the SCCCI committee leaders laying the first wreath on behalf of
the organisation. This was followed by wreaths from the SAF Veterans’ League,
Veterans’ Confederation of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Countries (a wreath each was laid from a member country of ASEAN), the IRO,
National Cadet Corps and one that represented the secondary schools of Singapore.
All guests were then invited to take three bows in the direction of the war memorial.
The “Last Post” was sounded by the SAF band and a minute of silence followed. The
service ended with the sounding of “Rouse”. Staff from the Japanese Embassy were
also in attendance, but did not lay a wreath. The Japanese ambassador, Makoto
Yamanaka, had earlier sent a funeral wreath to the SCCCI, which was on display at
the memorial.

Immediately after the service, groups of students approached the war memorial. The
curious look on their faces suggests that for many, this was their first to time at the
war memorial. A queue was quickly formed by other students to have their
photographs taken with veterans and members of the SAF Honour Guard. Their
patience while waiting in line, and the eager look on their faces, suggests that this
was the highlight of the event for them. Throughout the entire service, prayers and
incense burning were conducted at the temporary alters, the incense offering burners
seemingly unconcerned with the proceedings of the memorial service. Even after the
service was officially concluded, some members of the public arrived with offerings
to be performed at the temporary altars.

The SCCCI’s commemoration service was reported in the Singapore local Chinese
press the following day. It featured interviews with two fifteen year-old students who
attended the service. The first student said she found the service “special” because

5

prior to this she did not know that there was a memorial here. 7 The second student
said he always wanted to visit the memorial but never had the chance to. When his
school organised this excursion to the memorial, he signed up immediately. 8 Their
responses reflect the attitudes of students after the commemoration service; the
memorial was the focus of their visit, not the service. Furthermore, both students said
that Singapore is now a safe place, echoing a sense of indebtedness that Jay Winter
has identified in his discussion of war memorials; people can “go about their lives in
freedom because of the selflessness and dedication of the man who fell”. 9 The
SCCCI claims that its annual commemoration service is an effort to remember and
honour the Singaporean civilian war dead. Yet, the service is, in essence, a
Singaporean Chinese communal event.

The two services reflect the importance of an event that permanently transformed so
many lives in both Australia and Singapore. They also distil the complexities of 15
February, and its meanings, in both nations for they involve not only an event but
also the experiences and myths that spring from the event.

7

Lianhe Zaobao, 16 February 2008
ibid.
9
J. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, The Great War in European cultural history,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p95
8
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INTRODUCTION

On 15th February 1942 Singapore was surrendered to the Japanese. After over a week
of fierce fighting the battle for Singapore came to a conclusion when LieutenantGeneral Arthur Percival, commander of the Allied forces in Singapore surrendered
Singapore and his command to Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamshita, commander
of the Japanese 25th Southern Expeditionary Forces. The instruments of surrender
were officially signed at a Ford vehicle assembly factory at Bukit Timah. Canberra
had committed and deployed the Australian 8th Infantry Division to the region as part
of its role and responsibility in Britain’s Far East defence policy. Two infantry
brigades from the division were stationed in Malaya and Singapore; the Australian
22nd and 27th Infantry Brigade. The Australian 22nd Brigade was made up by the
2/18th, 2/19th and 2/20th Infantry Battalions while the 27th Infantry Brigade comprised
of the 2/26th, 2/29th and 2/30th Infantry Battalions. They were supported by the
division’s support arms units, like the 2/10 and 2/15 Field Regiment and 4th Antitank Regiment. Australian commitments to the defence of Singapore also saw the
deployment of Royal Australian Navy ships, and squadrons from the Royal
Australian Air Force, to Malaya. The Australian commitments to the British defence
of Singapore numbered 15,279, nearly twenty percent of Malaya Command. 10

During the Malayan Campaign, the Australian brigades were scattered among other
British and Indian formations. It was only from 8 February 1942, during the Battle of
Singapore, that the 8th Division fought as a unified Australian formation. The
division was deployed as the first line of defence on the northwest coast of Singapore
Island. It bore the brunt of the Japanese invasion of Singapore when three Japanese
divisions, the Japanese Imperial Guards Division, and the Japanese 5th and 18th
Infantry Divisions, concentrated their attack on the Australian positions. Fierce
fighting erupted along the entire coastline but, outnumbered and outmanoeuvred, the
Australians were soon overrun. The relentless Japanese advance that followed forced

10

P. Elphick, The Pregnable Fortress, A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion, Coronet Books,
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1995, pp273-274. Total number of Australia troops in Singapore was
uncertain and estimated to be 15,279 with 3550 to 4000 who later arrived as reinforcements
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the entire Malaya Command to retreat within the city limits of Singapore. Unable to
break out of the Japanese encirclement, Malaya Command finally surrendered
Singapore. Over 120,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers were captured as
Prisoners-of-War (POW). 11 Australian losses at the Fall of Singapore were
significant: 2,000 Australian soldiers died in the defence of Malaya and Singapore
and as many as 8,000 more would die as prisoners of the Japanese. Those who
survived returned to Australia with permanent, often deep, physical and mental scars
that would not only affect them for the rest of their lives, but also the lives of their
families. Initially ignored, their experiences and memories of the Pacific War would
become a dominant element in the popular memory of Australia’s Pacific War,
clearly seen in the position of the POW story occupied in Australia Remembers, a
government sponsored project commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of V-P Day in
1995. 12

The Japanese invasion of Malaya and Singapore affected the local people differently.
They played little part in the actual fighting. For them, 15 February 1942 marked a
change in regime from British colonial rule to Japanese Occupation. It was the events
that took place after 15 February that shaped the local memory of the war in
Singapore. Singapore was renamed Syonan-To, the Light of the South, marking its
change from being on the periphery of the British Empire to becoming an
intermediary possession in the Japanese Empire, the conduit between the Japanese
metropolis and its periphery at Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The occupiers
reorganised local social and economic institutions to emphasise Japanese culture and
commerce. Above all, though, is the memory of the massacres of the Chinese
population by the Japanese. Hence, for the people of Singapore, 15 February has
little to do with battle. It symbolises a beginning rather than an end. This is reflected
in popular literature and media representations of Singapore during the Second
World War which focus largely on local experiences during the period of
occupation. 13

11

See discussion in the number of personnel in G. Long, The Six Years War, A Concise History of
Australia in the 1939-45 War, The Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1973
12
L. Reed, Bigger Than Gallipoli, War and Memory in Australia, University of Western Australia
Press, Crawley WA, 2004, p84
13
See discussion and examples in S. N, Yeo and S. A, Ng, ‘The Japanese Occupation as Reflected in
Singapore-Malayan Chinese Literary Works after the Japanese Occupation’, in Lim and Wong
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In 1984, the Singapore government introduced the concept of “Total Defence” as an
effort to encourage Singaporeans to seriously consider Singapore’s military
vulnerability in the region, and to inspire them to ensure Singapore’s survival by
reminding them of the consequences of a past military vulnerability. 14 In 1998, the
date 15 February was gazetted as “Total Defence Day”. Singapore’s deputy Prime
Minister, Dr. Tony Tan best summed up the concept of “Total Defence Day” in
2001:
On the 15th of February 1942, Singapore fell to the Japanese…it is
useful to remind ourselves each year, when we commemorate Total
Defence Day on the 15th February, of what could befall us, what we
would lose, if we cannot defend ourselves. 15

The emphasis on local memories of the Japanese Occupation was further reinforced
in 2006 when the former Ford factory at Bukit Timah was reopened to the public
following an extensive refurbishment. It has since been recognised as a national
monument and museum and it documents the Japanese Occupation of Singapore by
reflecting local, popular memories of the war in Singapore. The museum was
officially opened on 16 February 2006, a date specifically chosen because it was “the
day after the British surrender, exactly 64 years ago…for the people of Singapore, it
marked the beginning of dark times, which was to last 3 years and 8 months.” 16 It
reflects local and popular memories of the war in Singapore. But it is also important
in another sense. The study of the war in Singapore has traditionally been focused on
British and Australian research that renders the local Singapore experience of the war
as secondary at best. The museum can be seen as an attempt by the Singapore
government to reclaim a period of its colonial history, especially one that had
permanently affected the lives of the local people, as its national story.

(editors), War and Memory in Malaysia and Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, 2000
14
Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, “Singapore’s Missing War”, in Koh, D., Legacies of World War II in South and
East Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2007, p.92
15
Transcript of speech by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Dr Tony Tan, at the
Launch of “Total Defence” Carnival 2001, 15 February 2001, National Archives of Singapore
16
Transcript of Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at the opening of “Memories at Old
Fort Factory”, 16 February 2006, National Archives of Singapore
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The literature on the Fall of Singapore reflects these broad differences. For the
Australians, the literature is dominated by narratives of battle and defeat, and the
POW experience. In Singapore, the emphasis lies far more on the experiences of
people during the Occupation.
In Australia, battalion and unit histories of the 8th Australian Division document
Australian experiences during the Battle of Singapore. Some still remain in print.
After the war, published Australian POW narratives like Rohan Rivett Behind
Bamboo, Russell Braddon’s The Naked Island, Ray Parkin’s trilogy; Out of the
Smoke (1960), Into the Smother (1963) and The Sword and the Blossom (1968), Stan
Arneil’s One Man’s War and Betty Jeffrey’s White Coolies continue to remain
popular Australian history and they will be discussed in greater detail later in this
thesis. Hank Nelson’s work on the experiences of Australian POWs presented in
Australian Prisoners of War, Australians Under Nippon, published in 1985, remains
unmatched. Nelson’s subsequent work with Australian POWs, and the place of
POWs in popular Australian history have made him an authority on the subject. His
seminar paper delivered in a conference in Singapore in 2005, “Beyond Slogans:
Assessing the experiences and the history of the Australian prisoners of war of the
Japanese”, 17 for example, positions and examines the popularity of the Australian
POW experience within the wider context of popular histories in Australia. Michael
McKernan’s This War Never Ends cannot be ignored. 18 His book discusses the
politics of return and the social impact of the war on the 8th Division veterans and
their families; it neatly bridges the gap between the unit war histories and Nelson’s
work. Joan Beaumont has evaluated the literature of the Australian POW experience
illuminating the perspectives of Australian POWs and representations of their
experiences featured in their personal narratives. 19 Carolyn Newman’s recent book,

17

H. Nelson, “Beyond Slogans: Assessing the Experiences and the History of the Australian Prisoners
of War of the Japanese”, in K. Hack and K. Blackburn, Proceedings and Papers of the Japanese
Occupation: Sixty Years After the End of the Asia Pacific War Conference, Humanities and Social
Studies, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2005
18
M. McKernan, This War Never Ends, The Pain of Separation and Return, University of Queensland
Press, St. Lucia, 2001
19
J. Beaumont, “Captivity Reconstructed: The Literature of Australian POW of the Japanese”, in 50th
Anniversary Conference of the Australian War Memorial, 12 November 1991, J. Beaumont, “The
Japanese as Captors: Australian Representations”, in K. Hack and K. Blackburn, Proceedings and
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Legacies of Our Fathers, 20 is a departure from previous works on the Australian
POW experience. Newman is a daughter of a former Australian POW and her work
is a collection of experiences of twenty-three Australians whose fathers were
imprisoned by the Japanese. The descendants of former Australian POWs are
beginning to situate their father’s experiences in Australia, reminding us that the
Australian POW experience also has a private dimension and is part of family
histories. Her work and that of Grant Mclachlan’s seminar paper, “What We Must
Learn: My Grandfather’s Prisoner-of-War Experiences in Japan”, 21 is in many ways
a sequel to McKernan’s This War Never Ends.
Seminar papers presented at the 60th Anniversary of the V-P Day in 2005 at the
Australian War Memorial best sum up the history and memory of the 8th Australian
Division and the Australian POW. Papers presented by Nelson and Mckernan, and
Peter Stanley, David Horner, John Lack and Rosalind Hearder explored nearly all the
spaces and themes that the history of the division and the POW experience occupy in
Australia – military history, private memories, public memories, representations in
popular literature and the politics of remembering and forgetting. In 2008, Christina
Twomey’s Australia's Forgotten Prisoners: Civilians Interned by the Japanese in
World War Two 22 expanded the study of POWs in Australia by reminding us that
civilians were also interned by the Japanese during the war. Their story is seldom
told and Twomey explored the reason behind that a year later in a chapter in
Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia. 23 “The absence of civilian internees
from official commemorations,” according to Twomey, “has more to do with the

Papers of the Japanese Occupation: Sixty Years After the End of the Asia Pacific War Conference,
Humanities and Social Studies, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore, 2005
20
C. Newman (ed.), Legacies Of Our Fathers: World War II Prisoners Of Japanese: Their Sons And
Daughters Tell Their Stories, Thomas C. Lothian, South Melbourne, 2005
21
G. Mclachlan, “What we must learn: My Grandfather’s Prisoner-of-War experiences in Japan”, in
Towards a Better Understanding: Reflections on the Experiences of Australian Prisoners of war of the
Japanese, seminar sponsored by the Division of Pacific and Asian History, Research School of the
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University and The Prisoner-of-War Research Network
of Japan, 22 – 23 August, 2006, Canberra
22
C. Twomey, Australia's Forgotten Prisoners: Civilians Interned by the Japanese in World War
Two, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2007
23
C. Twomey, “Remembering War and Forgetting Civilians, The Place of Civilian internees in
Australian Commemorations of the Pacific War”, in Hack, K. & Blackburn, K. (editors), Forgotten
Captives in Japanese-Occupied Asia, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, New York, 2008
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ambivalent legacy of colonialism than it does with the limited languages of war.” 24
The subject of civilians interned by the Japanese is not part of the study of this thesis
but it will examine the latter half of Twomey’s conclusion; the language of war
commemoration is seldom an inclusive one. This theme has been explored by
historians within other contexts, including Joy Damousi, Stephen Garton, Marilyn
Lake, Tanja Luckins and Linda Wade. 25

In Singapore, the memory of the war in Singapore has been traditionally treated
either as a study of traditional military history or as social history. The treatment of
the Fall of Singapore as military history is best presented in Brian Farrell’s seminal
work, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942, 26 a cumulation of his extensive
research and interest in the subject. Ong Chit Chung’s Operation Matador narrows
the study of the Fall of Singapore by examining a key plan in the British defence of
Singapore that was seriously considered but never implemented. Henry Frei’s Guns
of February approaches the study of the Fall of Singapore by focusing on the
memories and voices of one group that is seldom heard; Japanese soldiers who
fought in the Battle of Singapore. 27 However, Frei died before he could complete his
work and Farrell stepped in as editor to complete it. Indeed, Farrell remains the
authority when it comes to studies on the military history of the Fall of Singapore.
Scholars who treat the Fall of Singapore as studies of social history, i.e. the social
effects of the war and the Japanese Occupation in Singapore, are no less represented.
Paul Kratoska’s comprehensive and seminal study on the Japanese Occupation of
Malaya and Singapore in The Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941-1945 28
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continues from where Chin Kee Onn’s brief but personal Malaya Upside Down, 29
left off in 1946. In 2005 Lee Geok Boi’s The Syonan Years, Singapore Under
Japanese Rule 1942-1945 30 would build on the themes found in Kratoska’s seminal
work – the economy, social life and public institutions in Japanese occupied
Singapore.

Recently, scholars in Singapore have begun to examine popular memories and the
commemoration of war in Singapore. Kevin Blackburn’s “The Collective Memory of
the Sook Ching Massacre and the Creation of the Civilian War Memorial of
Singapore” 31 and “Dalforce at the Fall of Singapore in 1942: An Overseas Chinese
Heroic Legend”, 32 which he co-authored with Daniel Chew, for example, examine
popular interpretations of the war in the Singapore Chinese community. By
examining the events, popular trends and cultural beliefs in the Singapore Chinese
community, Blackburn draws out the themes that characterise the popular memory
and commemoration of war in Singapore. Hamzah Muzaimi examined the popular
sentiment and approaches to war commemoration in Singapore. Muzaimi’s argued
that despite the government’s efforts to cultivate a Singaporean memory of the war in
Singapore, a combination of factors like conflicts between cultures, experiences and
religion, and the lack of interest and time, explain why there has been a “lack of a
culture of commemoration in Singapore”. 33 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif’s book chapter in
Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia took this even further by arguing
that the Second World War “has gone missing in action from the politics of
contemporary Singapore”. 34 Latif observed that political parties in Singapore did not
use the memory of war to “influence outcomes in the electoral area”, nor did social
groups “coalesce around their experience of the war”, or “figure in negotiations
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between civil society and the state.” 35 Latif based his argument solely on the impact
and legacy of British colonial rule on the governance of the People’s Action Party
(PAP) in post-war Singapore, but analysis of the legacy of the Second World War in
Singapore in this thesis will show the war was anything but “missing in action”.

This thesis makes a limited use of oral histories when discussing local experiences of
the war in Singapore, and in Australia. The use of oral history, with its advantages
and disadvantages, has been well-debated by historians and these have informed the
interviews conducted in Australia. 36 The Singapore interviews, however, have been
taken from official sources and it is worth noting the issues Blackburn raised about
oral history and its use in Singapore. 37 He argued that although the use of oral history
in the telling and retelling of the Singaporean memory of the war, and the
commemoration of war in Singapore, could potentially shift Singaporeans’
understanding of the war, he also noted the limitations and political uses that oral
history has lent itself to in Singapore. He argued that political elites and state-run
institutions in Singapore have been known to use oral history to create a public
memory with the goal of nation building, citing the Oral History Centre (OHC) as an
example. 38 Since 1979, the OHC has conducted oral history projects to conduct and
collect interviews with Singaporeans on various subjects like the Japanese
Occupation of Singapore. However, Blackburn noted that the questionnaires used
and questions asked during these interviews were highly structured, usually
predetermined, to essentially place interviewees in the role of eyewitnesses to recall
details of specific events. The approach was one of seeking affirmation of a history
35
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being written from above, which altogether undermines the democratic potential of
oral history. 39 Completed interviews were treated as official archival records and
public access is restricted – researchers need to seek permission to access these
interviews. 40 This practice could lead to interesting problems for some researchers.
For example, Runme Shaw, one of the pioneers of Singapore’s film and
entertainment industry, was interviewed by the OHC as part of its “Pioneers of
Singapore” project in the early 1980s. However, any researcher who wishes to use
material from this oral history interview will be out of luck; the interview tapes are
catalogued with the restriction label “Citation/reproduction requires written
permission from interviewee” 41 – Runme Shaw died in 1985. The limitations evident
in the officially collected oral histories by the OHC have been the reason why, as
noted by Blackburn, historians in Singapore, like Kratoska, prefer to conduct their
own oral history interviews rather than using the extensive collection of oral histories
from the OHC for their research on the Japanese Occupation of Singapore. 42

The dangers of seeking confirmation rather than differences or disagreement in
oral histories are evident in the way Singaporean journalists have written the
history of Singapore during the Occupation. Lee Geok Boi’s The Syonan Years is
one example. Lee featured no less than 118 oral history interviews in The Syonan
Years, nearly 36 per cent of the OHC’s entire oral history collection on the
Japanese Occupation of Singapore. According to Lee, “oral history is very fluid
and needs a firm anchor to be useful as history.” 43 Lee’s “anchor” came in the
form of popular views about the years 1942-1945: military occupation,
propaganda, accommodation and resistance. He used the interviews to affirm
these themes; to be “witnesses to history”. 44 This thesis uses some oral history as
part of its evidence but uses it within the context of limitations identified by
Blackburn and others.
39
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The many and varied approaches to the subject of the “Fall of Singapore” in
Australia and Singapore, evident from a survey of the literature, is an indication of
the popularity, but more importantly, of the many interpretations of the event. It fits
Paul Cohen’s “history as myth” argument presented in his book History in Three
Keys. The writing of history, according to Cohen, can come in three forms; history as
an event – a particular reading of the past; as experience – a reconstruction of the
past based on the collective experiences of individuals who made up the history; and
as myth – a selective reading of the past vis-à-vis present concerns. 45 Cohen used
this approach in his study of the Boxer movement in China, but it has provided a
useful approach for this study.

A historical event, according to Cohen, is a coalescence of individual experiences in
the past. 46 A participant’s account or recollection could at best provide a vivid idea
of what the past was like, but it cannot, however, give us the past. 47 A historian’s
role is central in the process of transforming individual experiences into a historical
event. E.H Carr uses a more simple analogy; the historian’s working material is like
“a fish on the fishmonger’s slab [and] the historian collects them, takes them home,
and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to him.” 48 What historians
reconstruct from the “fishmonger’s slab” then becomes a framework; a historical
event that enables other historians to further analyse “what happened”. 49 Once fixed,
historical events, however, can serve many purposes. Other than functioning as
“organising concepts”, historical events can also “acquire lives of their own…as
symbols and metaphors” of a time period. 50

“History as experience” as the term suggests, involves the examination of
experiences of individuals from a particular time period or event. An understanding
of events in history is achieved through analyses of the recollections of individuals,
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giving historians and students of history an idea of “what happened” 51 in the past.
Cohen’s “history as experience” would be a familiar one in Australia. Charles Bean
examined and used the Australian soldiering experiences at Gallipoli and on the
Western Front to reconstruct war narratives in the official Australian histories of the
First World War. Bean’s methodology and characteristic style of writing have been
adopted subsequently by Australian historians commissioned to produce Australia’s
official histories of the Second World War. Bean’s approach using “history as
experience” also bears out Cohen’s third key, “history as myth”.

The framework that Bean used to contextualise the experiences of the first Anzacs
came from other and earlier established traditions in Australia.

This is where

Graham Seal’s research on the Anzac Myth in Inventing Anzac, The Digger and
National Mythology is key to understanding this transformation. 52 According to
Cohen, a mythologised past often begins with an assumed understanding or notion of
the past that is not unlike a romanticised version of a historical event, an individual
or groups of individuals. In other words, mythologisers begin with a conclusion that
they sincerely believe to be “correct” 53 and work their way back to create or recreate
a sequence of events that look like history but may not be necessarily such. In other
words, “history as myth” is a reconstruction of the past, seldom based on the actual
experiences of those who experienced it, but on an assumed idea of the past to satisfy
a reading of the present. 54 Its framework is not too dissimilar to Whig history and
postcolonial national histories that emphasise the contrast between a nation’s
colonial past with political, social and economic achievements after independence. A
mythologised past is therefore a version of the past reconstructed from a set of events
to “serve the political, ideological, rhetorical, and/or emotional needs of the
present.” 55 In comparison, histories written by good historians are done with the aim
of constructing, as truthful and as accurately as possible, an understanding of the past
based on the evidence available. 56 This thesis has used two of Cohen three keys,
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“history as experience” and “history as myth” as a handmaiden to the enterprise. The
“event” has been briefly outlined above.

Other scholars whose work has informed this thesis need to be acknowledged here.
They include Jay Winter, Graham Seal, Alistair Thomson, Hank Nelson, and Kevin
Blackburn. Seal’s research on Anzac mythology and Thomson’s research on the
popular and private memories of the Great War inform our understanding of Anzac,
and where and how Anzac sits in Australia. Nelson’s research informs the discussion
on former Australian POWs in this thesis. He pioneered Australia’s research in the
study of the experiences of former Australian POWs through the use of oral history
and has gone further to examine popular influences on Australian memories of war,
namely the influence of the former Australian POW narratives, and more recently the
influence of Kokoda in Australia, on popular memory in Australia. The discussion of
the popular wartime memories of the Singapore Chinese which informs the
Singaporean section of this thesis is deeply indebted to Blackburn’s extensive
research. The analysis of the language of war commemoration in this thesis is
informed by the works of Jay Winter, and to a lesser degree, George Mosse. Winter’s
seminal work in Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning examined the language of war
commemoration that developed and evolved in Europe after the end of the Great
War. His work is especially important in the analysis of Singapore’s language of war
commemoration. Mosse argued that the cult of the fallen soldier has become, and
still remains, a central part of the commemoration of war in post-First World War
Europe and Australia. 57 This thesis will argue that the cult of the fallen soldier
should not be seen simply in the context of Europe and the Great War. Even in
Singapore, where the Great War had little impact in terms of local memory and
sacrifice, the cult of the fallen soldier had been modified, adopted and centrally
featured in Singapore’s language of war commemoration.

This thesis explores the meaning of a single event, 15 February 1942, from two
different national perspectives – the Australian and Singaporean perspectives. In the
Australian case, it looks at 15 February from the perspective of the 8th Division and
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its history as a POW division, its position in terms of Anzac and its place in the
commemoration of war. For Singapore, it looks at 15 February from the perspective
of the Singapore Chinese community, and how their perspectives have been
positioned to accommodate, and at the same time, dominate popular views of the war
in Singapore and Singapore’s commemoration of the war. It is divided into two main
sections: the Australian case study and the Singaporean case study. The study of
“history as myth” comes first in each component. It is followed by the study of
“history as experience” which examines how historical experiences have gone on to
inform and influence popular wartime myths in Australia and Singapore.

The first chapter briefly discusses the Anzac tradition and myth, looking at the key
themes and players who shaped Anzac from the end of the Great War. Chapter 2
discusses the conflict between London and Canberra over what the public should
know about their POWs during the war. London preferred to hide much of what it
knew from the public to ensure that its propaganda goals geared towards a diplomatic
solution would succeed. Australia was more inclined to publish what it knew but
often could not. Wartime censorship ensured that Australians knew little of the fate
of their men in captivity and gave the returned Australian POWs a sense of
ambivalence as to where their story sat within the military rhetoric on Anzac, an
ambivalence that influenced them and their memories for decades to come. Chapter 3
examines the positioning and repositioning of the Australian POW narrative in
popular memories of the Pacific War into the 1990s. Chapter 4 continues the theme
developed in the previous chapter by examining the political use made of the POW
experience in the language of commemoration in Australia from the 1990s. Chapter 5
examines how the veterans of the 8th Division have positioned their experiences with
their families and how they continue to fight a history that has been written for them,
a history which excludes their battle experience, a key element in the Anzac
tradition.

Chapter 6 introduces the popular Singaporean interpretation of the war, an
interpretation based on “Resistance Literature” which in itself is part of the Chinese
mythology stemming from the Second Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s with roots in
mainland China and in the Chinese Diaspora. Although the genre had gone out of
19

fashion after the war, elements persisted and it was only a matter of time before it reemerged in Singapore with the publication of The Price of Peace in 1995. The
following chapters explore the influence “Resistance Literature” has had on popular
memory of the war in Singapore and on commemoration of that war. Chapter 7
examines the way the story of Force 136, a small unit of Chinese agents, has been
manipulated and transformed to both ignore its history and to reflect something else.
Chapter 8 examines the memories of the Singapore Chinese of the Japanese
Occupation. Central to these was the Sook Ching Massacres, a firm belief that the
Chinese had borne the brunt of the Japanese Occupation (which, in many ways, they
had), bitter disappointment with the results of the War Crimes trials in Singapore and
the notion of a “blood debt”. Chapter 9 discusses plans by the people of Singapore to
erect and dedicate a memorial to the memory of the civilian dead in Singapore in the
immediate post-war period and the agitation by the Singapore Chinese to have a
memorial built to specifically honour the Chinese. Chapter 10 examines the role of
the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI) which returned
to the issue of a Chinese memorial, the problems it struck with Lee Kuan Yew’s
People’s Action Party (PAP), and the compromise finally struck to build an
inclusive, “national” memorial to honour the civilian war dead. Chapter 11 examines
the way that the language of commemoration in Singapore has shifted in emphasis
from the original intention of honouring only the civilian war dead by incorporating
the rituals more commonly associated with the commemorative services of
postcolonial nations like Australia where war and national identity are linked and
affirmed. It will also argue that despite efforts to make the language of
commemoration inclusive, it still resonates with the voice of one particular ethnic
community in Singapore, the Singapore Chinese.

Both case studies will show how, in Carr’s words, the fish on the historian’s slab has
been cooked and served, and that, when served, the fish often drive something else.
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Chapter 1
History as Myth – Anzac

In Australia, the national monument that commemorates Australian POWs in the
Pacific War comes in the form of a chapel built during the war – the Changi Chapel
now in Canberra. Constructed originally by POWs at the Changi prison in Singapore,
much of it was packed up and sent to Australia after the war. This was indicative of
where the focus of Australia’s memory of the war in the Pacific War lay; Australian
POWs. Yet war and memory of the Pacific War in Australia is also shaped by an
even older, larger and established tradition in Australian historiography, the Anzac
tradition.

Origins

The Anzac tradition has been a long standing celebration of Australian values in
Australia and as long as it has been celebrated, its place and role in Australia has
been debated and questioned. The Anzac tradition was forged in the official histories
of Australians in the First World War, particularly by the Gallipoli Campaign of
1915. 58 After the Great War, the attributes of the Australian soldier characterised the
popular Australian memory of the war.

The Anzac tradition emphasised the Australian soldiering tradition to mitigate the
human tragedy that characterised the entire Gallipoli campaign. 59 In the
nomenclature of the Anzac tradition, Australian soldiers did not die, rather, they paid
the ultimate sacrifice in what is now popularly called the nation’s first “baptism of
fire”, had proved their mettle and “had simultaneously established their masculinity
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and Australia’s worth as a nation.” 60 The Anzac tradition would also include all
Australians on the Western Front who were caught up in the brutal world of trench
warfare where, despite the losses and sacrifices, the Australian soldier had emerged
triumphant. It became an Australian soldiering tradition, a testament to the triumph
of the Australian character and was more important than how battles unfolded.

The incorporation of Anzac traditions into Australian military historiography was a
process that began with the work of Australia’s official First World War historian,
Charles W. Bean. Appointed by the Australian government to write an official
Australian history of the First World War, Bean strongly believed that the history of
Australians in the First World War should be told by the men who fought it. 61 He
achieved this by putting the experiences of the ordinary soldier in his official history
and providing names and biographical footnotes to the accounts of some 8,000
soldiers whom he had included in the text. 62 Bean and his official histories would
pioneer a new genre, a war narrative that had been described as “a personalised
history written in a distinctive style”. 63 He steered away from writing an orthodox
and traditional military history of the First World War that was often “shorn of
critical comment, devoid of controversy and describing events from the single
viewpoint of the high command.” 64 Rather then relying solely on the memories and
notes from select military commanders to collectively drive a narrative, Bean would
use the collective memories of soldiers to tell selected narratives of the battlefield.
Bean likened his work to that of a photographer who “must fix certain pictures on his
plate or film, else they will be lost forever”. 65 Therefore, while the camera might be
focused on a particular battle, the film needs to be filled with corroborating accounts
of those who experienced it most intimately; to place and fix their stories on the same
plate or film. “Our endeavour”, said Bean in 1925 “is to preserve for the nation in
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measured narrative, a great episode. Our history is not like that of historians who
deal with events already chronicled.” 66 Bean’s history of Australia in the First World
War therefore weaved together a “front-line history” with him offering readers
“guidance through a narrative as truthful as he could make it…by direct eye-witness
in the front line.” 67 Beginning with the campaign at Gallipoli, Bean’s Official
History of Australia, 1914-1918 would stretch to twelve volumes. Six were written
by him with two covering the Gallipoli Campaign and four the Western Front.

In his official history of Australians in the First World War, Bean presented the
experiences of the diggers in a collective war narrative that could be understood and
appreciated by Australians. His work and efforts, however, did not always meet with
approval. For example, the Australian Military Board did not agree with Bean’s work
as an official history of the war as long as parts that it deemed questionable were not
deleted. At best the Board would only recognise Bean’s work as the “Story of the
A.I.F by the Official War Correspondent” rather than an “official history”. 68 In the
event, Prime Minister Hughes overruled the Board, convinced by Bean and the
Returned Sailors and Soldiers’ Imperial League of Australia, that any form of
government censorship would “rob the history of its value in one blow.” 69 Another
criticism directed at Bean’s work was the accusation that he gave too much emphasis
to the infantry and neglected the staff office and other arms supporting the infantry. 70
As a war correspondent Bean wrote and reported on the A.I.F but he did what few
war correspondents would at the time; venture to the front where the infantrymen
were and report from the trenches. And Bean had his reasons for doing so; at
Gallipoli, Bean did not relish working behind the lines at the staff offices along the
various fronts with his “two bugbears on the peninsula – Turkish flies and Australian
officers; both circulated in his dugout at their convenience and interfered with his
work.” 71 His preferred office on the peninsula was a forward dugout or a shellhole. 72
Bean wanted to convey the experiences of the men at the frontlines and that was
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where the infantry was. 73 The other arms supporting the infantry, like the artillery
and medical corps, were deployed well away from the front lines. And the infantry
was by far the largest arm of the service. However, Bean did not deliberately ignore
the other branches of the A.I.F. He made arrangements in late 1917 to begin
gathering material with the aim of producing a series of “special histories” that
featured the other branches of the A.I.F. 74

Bean’s approach went on to influence future Australian historians writing the official
and unit histories of the Second World War. Gavin Long and Lionel Wigmore for
example, employ nearly the same approach and style as Bean to present the Japanese
invasion of Singapore in the Australian official history of the Second World War. 75
Bean’s style can also be found in the official battalion histories of the 8th Division
like Don Wall’s official history of the 2/20 Australian Infantry Battalion, Singapore
and Beyond. 76 Like Bean’s work, the war in the Pacific was narrated through the
experiences and memory of those who were there with an emphasis on the Australian
as a natural soldier.

Indeed, by turning away from traditional and orthodox military history writing, Bean
had created a new genre that ensured that Australian troops on the ground were
prominently featured in the war and not overshadowed by other nationalities, namely
the British. When emphasizing the Australian identity of the A.I.F, Bean also turned
to a popular and established Australian tradition, the Australian bush tradition.
According to Bill Gammage and Graham Seal, the digger tradition was largely an
appropriation of a romanticised Australian bush tradition made popular by bush
balladists and writers, particularly A. B. Paterson and Henry Lawson. 77 During the
war, that popular tradition was appropriated to create a uniquely Australian
soldiering experience or, as Seal put it, “the swapping of billycan, swag and bush hat
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for the rifle, pack and slouch hat of the digger.” 78 Some of the more popular digger
traditions like larrikinism, anti-authoritarianism (especially towards British officers)
also reflected an appropriation of the Australian bush tradition; the larrikin attitudes
of the digger was a reinterpretation of the bushman’s drinking pastimes, his dislike
for saluting officers was the bushman’s dislike for employers. 79 The digger tradition,
with its irreverence, mateship, nationalism, larrikinism, swaggering arrogance and
anti-authoritarianism, was allegedly born at Gallipoli. After Gallipoli, “the Australian
soldier of legend,” according to Alistair Thomson in Anzac Memories was,
“enterprising and independent, loyal to his mates and to his country, bold in battle,
but cheerfully undisciplined out of the line and contemptuous of military etiquette
and the British officer class.” 80 These distinctions and attributes would make the
ordinary Australian soldier at Gallipoli more extraordinary when compared to
soldiers of other nationalities on the Peninsula. These Australian distinctions were
important because traditional military history celebrates victories. The Anzac
tradition allowed the military defeat at Gallipoli to be reshaped. Despite the failure of
the Gallipoli campaign, the Australian soldier had not failed as a soldier at Gallipoli;
he had instead, according to the Anzac tradition, “proved the character of Australian
manhood”. 81 Therefore at Gallipoli and later on the Western Front, no matter the
outcome of battles, Australian soldiers were seen to have upheld what would become
a central part of the Anzac tradition.

The Anzac tradition is a product of post-First World War Australia. It simplified,
magnified, and highlighted the digger tradition. Although Seal points out that the two
are not synonyms and both have been ‘twined together’ in a sometimes
uncomfortable relationship, they have provided the foundation for a tradition that
Australians saw as being unique to them. Bean’s Anzac tradition also legitimised the
experiences of the veterans, transforming their experiences into a sacred experience.
It has been cast into something resembling what George Mosse calls the “Myth of
the War Experience” that emphasises the individual and collective experiences of

78

ibid., pp.142-143
ibid., pp.142-143
80
A. Thomson, op cit., p.26
81
ibid., p.26
79

25

soldiers rather than the outcome of battles. 82 And the infantryman, not the sailor or
airman, was and still remains a popular and powerful imagination of Anzac. 83 And
other elements identified by Bean mentioned earlier have persisted.

After Dispossession, Australia’s wars have all been overseas military commitments
in distant lands “that are not part of the geographical reality of Australians”. 84 With
the Anzac and digger traditions, Australians could locate a shared and national
tradition across time and space. The literary landscape of Australia’s military past is
therefore marked with placenames where Australians had fought and died: Gallipoli,
Pozieres and Villers Bretonneux, for the First A.I.F, and Tobruk, Crete, Malaya,
Singapore and Kokoda for the Second A.I.F., Coral and Long Tan for the regiments
sent to South Vietnam. The names of these places and their physical geography fill
what Seal has described as the “profound hollowness at the centre of the Australian
experience.” 85 Despite the subordination of Australian military command in the
Gallipoli campaign and campaigns elsewhere in the Western Front, Bean had
reorientated the experiences of the Anzacs in the First World War as distinctively
Australian wartime experiences within the Imperial context. Australian military
personnel have continued that tradition in the military commitments that have
followed. When serving as United Nations Peacekeepers under a large international
command and control framework (the United Nations Security Council), Anzac was
used to reaffirm an Australian national identity within a large multinational
organisation. It provides a military tradition where Australian military forces have
always operated as a contributing member in a larger international force (with the
exception of the International Force for East Timor, Interfet). But at the same time,
the Anzac and digger traditions provide Australian troops with a set of qualities that
they believe set them apart from the other nationalities with whom they are serving,
qualities they believe to be unique to the Australian soldier. As a result of this, the
Australian soldier, his experiences and the Anzac myth continue to reinforce notions
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of Australian identity. From a digger tradition to the Anzac tradition, the process of
mythologising the past has become the enshrined way of how Australians remember
war. 86

As Winter observed, when it came to mourning the fallen soldiers and victims of the
Second World War, there was a tendency to return to the “sombre languages and
forms which derived from the memory of the First World War”. 87 This was no
different with the Anzac tradition. Australians have time and again returned to the
Anzac traditions of the First World War. It was not uncommon, for example, for the
names of the fallen in the Second World War to be added on to existing communal
First World War memorials. 88 The names of the fallen in conflicts like the Second
World War and the Vietnam War were added to the cloisters of the most notable
First World War memorial in Australia, the Australian War Memorial. In both
conflicts, it would have been quite possible to create out of the myriad of memories
and experiences in the Second World War or the Vietnam War a new war genre and
a popular collective memory, like that created for the Anzacs in the First World War.
But it was far better to return to what was already there – Bean’s Anzacs. The stories
and symbols characteristic of Australia’s language of war commemoration would be
familiar and the sentimental value of them had already been well established.

Bean’s official history of the First A.I.F was published when Australia was fighting
in the Second World War. Yet, the Second World War was a markedly different kind
of conflict compared to the First World War. The methods were more sophisticated
and the lines of conflict were less defined during the Second World War. 89
Traditional war histories need to be expanded to include memories and experiences
of many other groups of people like spies, code-breakers, scientists, engineers,
children, POWs, resistance fighters and civilians living under enemy occupation. The
infantryman could no longer be the sole representation of war histories as it often is
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in wartime memories of the First World War. The Anzac tradition could not remain a
product of its times if it was to have relevance for Australians.

The new Anzac legend

During the 1950s and 1960s, Anzac was more often seen as a “boozy veterans’
reunion” on Anzac Day, one that had “little relevance for other Australians”. 90
“Liberal academics and left-wing historians,” according to Thomson, had, during the
1950s and 1960s disassociated themselves from writing about war and the Anzac
legend, and as a result Australian history taught in Australian schools and
universities featured social and political topics that were deemed to be more
“suitable”. 91 Yet the RSL and “conservative patriots” 92 continued to preserve the
legacy of Anzac that had become increasingly conservative and apparently out of
touch with mainstream opinion. But something changed during the 1970s.

Historians began to re-examine and interpret Anzac, and Australia during the First
World War, in a different light, an interest sparked by the fiftieth anniversary of the
Gallipoli landings. Ken Inglis is credited with leading the revival of interest among
Australian historians over the importance of the Great War in Australian popular
memory and political culture. Other Australian historians joined a renewed interest in
1914-1918 including Lloyd Robson, Bill Gammage, and Patsy Adam-Smith. 93
Thomson suggested that the resurgence of interest may have reflected the politics of
war commemoration in Australia. The cultivation of Australian nationalism during
the 1970s under the Whitlam Labor government was beginning to bear fruit in the
1980s. 94 But growing interest may have also reflected another fact, the declining
number of First World War veterans. In 1971, the number of First World War
veterans stood at 34,888. 95 By the middle of the decade, the numbers were down to
28,892. 96 In 1980, the numbers were half of those recorded in 1971; 13,885. 97 The
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work of Australian historians was quickly picked up by Australian filmmakers eager
to explore themes of Australian nationalism and national identity through their work
(helped in part by generous funding from the Australian government). Thomson
highlighted Peter Weir’s 1981 film Gallipoli as the first of such films, a list would
later include other iconic war television dramas and films of the 1980s; 1915, Anzacs
and The Lighthorsemen. 98 These films, according to Thomson, conveyed the main
themes of a “new Anzac legend”. 99

The “new Anzac Legend” represented efforts to make the Anzac tradition relevant to
generations of Australians removed from post-First World War Australia. For the
Anzac tradition of the First World War to remain relevant in Australia and to future
Australian conflicts, it had to be expanded and rendered into something even larger
and even more inclusive, reflecting the experience of the Second World War. For
example, traditional Anzac traits and attitudes like anti-authoritarianism in the
military and larrikinism were simplified in the “new Anzac Legend” into other
Anzac traits of mateship and endurance. 100 Mateship and endurance also highlighted
other Anzac attributes like independence, loyalty, a digger’s cheerful disposition.
Mateship was also further extended to include the unexpected in the Anzac tradition,
like the POWs, and non-combatants in wartime, in the Anzac tradition. Indeed, when
the issue of gender and warfare is considered, the masculine traits of the Anzac
traditions, like mateship, had even been retuned in order to include memories of
Australian women and children held in internment camps by the Japanese during the
Pacific War. 101 Visits to the Australian War Memorial rose during the 1980s. 102
Numbers attending Anzac Day Services had increased dramatically and Anzac Day
was increasingly celebrated as part of Australian nationalism.

Representations of the Anzac mythology in the 1997 Australian film Paradise Road
demonstrate the level of inclusiveness that the Anzac myth had reached. Paradise
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Road was based loosely on the story of a group of Australian Army nurses who
evacuated Singapore onboard the SS Vyner Brooke, one of the last ships to leave
Singapore Island before capitulation. However, the ship was attacked and sunk by
the Japanese. Survivors from the ship made it to the nearby Banka Island, only to be
rounded up by Japanese troops who had captured the island earlier. The Australian
Army nurses were tied up and ordered to wade into the water. Sister Vivian
Bullwinkel (later Vivien Stratham) remembered how her fellow nurses knew that the
Japanese were about to massacre them yet none of them panicked; they “just
marched ahead with their chins up.” 103 The Japanese took aim and fired their
weapons. Male survivors of the SS Vyner Brooke were being massacred at the same
time. Bullwinkel was shot in the hip but the bullet passed through her body; it was
not going to be a fatal shot. She survived the massacre and for twelve days she kept
herself and Pvt. Kingsley, a British soldier who also survived the massacre, alive.
However, both of them concluded that they could no longer hold out on their own on
an island and avoid capture by the Japanese. They waited a few days to allow
Kingsley to celebrate his coming 39th birthday in freedom, before surrendering
themselves to the Japanese. Kingsley died in captivity not long after. 104 Out of the
sixty-five nurses who had left Singapore on the SS Vyner Brooke, twelve were
presumed drowned, twenty-one were massacred, and Bullwinkel together with thirtyone others became prisoners. 105 Their story of survival became the inspiration for
Bruce Beresford’s Paradise Road. 106

The film was released to popular acclaim. The Australian historian Hank Nelson
described it as visually inspiring and as an attempt to present a history of “a memory
of the war generation [that] was not transmitted to many successive generations”. 107
However, Paradise Road was also criticised for its oversimplification of the events
that took place and varying considerably from “what could be expected of a written
history.” 108 It ignored the massacre of the male survivors, 109 looking only at the
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nurses and their efforts to preserve their dignity from the sexual advances and
demands of Japanese military personnel in the POW camp. The emphasis was on the
victimization of the nurses, their collective resistance and eventual triumph over their
captors. 110 But this interpretation was not accidental. Quite often the voices and
experiences of women in Australian POW narratives had been overshadowed by
popular POW narratives that had been traditionally masculine stories. 111 Paradise
Road was an attempt to build upon the already established popular Australian POW
genre by changing its protagonists from Australian diggers to Australian nurses.

Rather than depart from Bean’s Anzac traditions, the “new Anzac legend” found in
Paradise Road and the iconic films of the 1980s and after were, to use a popular term
in the film and television industry, a “remake” of the Anzac myth. Basic elements of
the structure remained essentially the same but the emphasis shifted to make it more
relevant to a different generation of Australians. The Anzac tradition was redefined
within a modern context. It involved a careful process of selection, simplification and
generalisation that distilled the collective Australian war experience of varieties and
contradictions to reinforce the Anzac Legend. This “hegemonic’ process” 112 has
become an accepted way to interpret Australia’s war past. The remaking of the
Anzac tradition was a necessary step to transform the conservative into the popular.
The Anzac tradition was no longer just the recollections of old veterans shared at
reunions on Anzac Day, or an extension of a popular Australian bush or digger
tradition. It had become an Australian tradition in its own right. Seal presents it best
in his description of the reimagining of the Anzac legend as “in its omni-presence
and in its invented but nevertheless resonant aura of always-everness, in its fusion of
sacred and the secular, of the everyday and the official, Anzac is the modern
Australian dreaming”. 113

The constant transference of private memories and experiences to the public sphere
with the new Anzac legend was not without its problems. Memories ceased to be
private as they were reinterpreted to accommodate the way war is popularly
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remembered in Australia. According to Thomson, veterans of the First World War
found that they had to live with a legend that was periodically reinterpreting the war
for them. Some First World War veterans found that negotiating their way between
shifting public perceptions of the war they remembered and their own memories and
identities was difficult. 114 On one hand there was the popular legend of the Anzacs
and on the other hand there were the hidden, painful and troubling “uncomfortable
reminders” 115 of war that continues to the borne by veterans. And this would pose a
problem with private memories that could not be easily reconciled with the Anzac
myth. Australia’s war history has become institutionalised as a popular construct. In
a sense, it is an invented history.

Anzac Pilgrimages

Anzac has become an inalienable part of the Australian cultural landscape. Bruce
Scates’ research into the history and perspectives of Australian Anzac Day
pilgrimages to Gallipoli, and memorials on the Western Front, captured the way that
private memories, an invented history and notions of national identity can
intersect. 116 Up to the late 1970s, Anzac Day ceremonies at Gallipoli were low-key
events, “quite [an] intimate affair…of barely a dozen people”.117 The 1980s
however, marked a turning point with Anzac Day services at Gallipoli. Scates
attributes the change to Australia’s prime ministers who, in the wake of the Vietnam
War, “embarked on much-publicised pilgrimages to war graves overseas…to
Gallipoli for votes and inspiration”. 118 Initially it was thought that with the passing of
the last of the men who fought between 1914 and 1918, the Anzac tradition would
pass on soon after. Instead it went contrary to expectations; “the pull of the Peninsula
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has grown even stronger.” 119 The trickle of pilgrims to Gallipoli since pilgrimages
began has grown into a flood with thousands now attending the Dawn Service. 120

Today the commemorations at Gallipoli have been described as “fashionable” and
what was a “solemn day of mourning” is now “a much vaguer celebration of
nationhood.” 121 But what had motivated the recent masses of pilgrims journeying to
Gallipoli and other memorial services on the Western Front on Anzac Day? In
Return to Gallipoli, Scates offers some suggestions: “wanderlust, a nostalgia for the
past, the search for traditions in ‘a society without rituals’…tourism”. 122 For the
young men and women with careers in the armed forces, going to Gallipoli was
regarded as a “rite of initiation and part of the induction into military service...a
‘Hajj’”. 123 According to Scates,

Not all had gathered there in what officials liked to call “the solemn
spirit” of commemoration…Gallipoli was another experience, another
adventure. And the dawn service was really only a small part of it 124

This is not to say that Australians at the recent Anzac services at Gallipoli were all
adventure seekers or searching for a unique experience in a place of national
historical significant. There were those who undertook the journey with a personal
mission or conviction but they were gradually overcome by the masses and national
pride: “The personal”, Scates observed, “is subsumed by the public, the familiar
displaced by the national and a sense of pride and patriotism all but overwhelms that
restless sense of loss and mourning” 125 – the popular narratives of the Gallipoli
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landings had consumed personal memories. 126 Scates observed that Australian
pilgrims to Gallipoli on Anzac Day were “clutching cameras and water bottles young
backpackers scrambled along trench lines and ridges imagining themselves ‘a part of
the story’.” 127 Their experiences were characterised by the popular notion summed
up by the expression “what they did for us”. 128 They were embracing what they
believed the campaign of 1915 was like; Gallipoli was “Australia’s war”. 129 This
suggests that on Anzac Day the collective memory and private memory had became
intertwined with a “mythic narrative of nation and history.” 130 The mythic national
narrative would continue to pull the huge crowds of pilgrims to Gallipoli and other
sites of historical significant on the anniversary of the Gallipoli landings. Few noted
that Gallipoli was contested commemorative space. 131

While Anzac Cove continues to draw masses of pilgrims on Anzac Day, other Anzac
Day pilgrims arrive at other sites of mourning across the Western Front like VillersBretonneux. 132 A growing number of Australians go to Second World War
memorials particularly in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. 133 Pilgrims have the
choice of travelling from Singapore to Thailand via Malaysia or travelling south
from Thailand and ending their pilgrimage at Singapore. Regardless of the direction
of travel, the focus of their pilgrimage is the war cemeteries and memorials of the
Thai-Burma Death Railway, especially the Kanchanaburi war memorial and Hellfire
Pass. In response to the increasing popularity of Australian pilgrimages to these
sacred sites, some like Kanchanaburi had been transformed into what Kevin
Blackburn described as a “commodified-tourist site”. 134 The Jeath Museum at
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Kanchanaburi for example, is essentially a recreation of the POW experience; long
sleeping bamboo huts contain “gruesome artefacts and pictures to convey the horrors
of the POW experience.” 135 Further up the Thai-Burma Death Railway, the Hellfire
Pass Museum has in its darkened chambers “life-size dummies representing the
POWs as living skeletons move the wooden ramparts of the railway.” 136 These were
created by operators of tourist attractions based on what they believe visitors “want
to experience or what they believe their intended audience thinks might have
happened there.” 137 And this is also generally the case with Anzac pilgrims travelling
the Kokoda Track. Pilgrimages on the Kokoda Track involve the test of a
participant’s physical and mental prowess as one treks up the Owen Stanley Range.
Little had changed since the Australians were deployed there during the Pacific War
and it still resembles closely the difficult conditions that Australian soldiers
experienced during the war. 138 Trekking along the Kokoda Track would not be an
outing that one would call comfortable, but like Anzac pilgrimages elsewhere, it
ranks as a spiritual rite of passage for many Australians. The pull of the Kokoda
Track, Changi and Kanchanaburi, differ little to that of Gallipoli; to intimately feel
what it was like to be “part of a story” 139 ; for individuals to stand on a sacred site,
place themselves in the context of a “digger” and imagine “what they did for us” 140
during the war.

Captivity

The Anzac tradition stemming from the First World War had no place for stories of
surrender and captivity. By the time of the fiftieth anniversary of V-P Day in 1995,
however, the organisers of Australia Remembers positioned the former Australian
POW narrative as a major focus of Australian memories of the war in the Pacific.141
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It was a clear indication of the more inclusive nature of Anzac evident by the 1980s
and 1990s, but it was also indicative of the 8th Division’s attempts to find a place in
the Anzac tradition, one based on the Diggers’ experience, rather than success in
battle, and one that echoed Gallipoli in the way that a military defeat could be recast
as a story of triumph based on the experiences of the men in captivity. Yet, even
though the POW experience was a major focus for Australia Remembers, the place
of the 8th Division within Anzac remained ambivalent.

Australia Remembers was a year-long event to commemorate the end of the Pacific
war. It is also a good example of the malleable nature of war and memory in
Australia. According to Nelson, less than fifteen percent of Australians in 1997 were
aged over fifty-five which meant that comparatively few Australians could draw on
their own experiences and memories for first-hand experiences of the Second World
War, whether in the frontlines or the home front. 142 The majority of Australians, born
during or after that war, had no direct experiences or memories to draw upon and
were instead encouraged by the Australian War Memorial to imagine how it was
like: “Where were you on VP Day 1945? If you were there you’ll know. If you
weren’t [there] you can imagine.” 143 Hence what began as an exercise to encourage
Australians to remember the past became something else. As Liz Reed put it, “the
past was remembered for them…the past was being created.” 144 Essentially,
Australia Remembers was an appeal for the majority of Australians, who had no
direct experience of the Second World War, to engage in the creation of a public and
popular memory of the war and Australians at war based largely on their “formal and
informal gathering of information.” 145 Reed however, also pointed out that Australia
Remembers also inadvertently became the start of “Australia Forgets.” 146 As this
thesis will later argue, the group of veterans that were once positioned as a major
focus of Australian memories of the Pacific war, former Australian POWs, were
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subsequently eclipsed by another group of veterans in public memory of the war.
This shift was captured by a film released in 2006, one that was very different to
Paradise Road – Kokoda.

Kokoda was based on a narrative of a lost patrol of Australian militiamen in the
jungles of Papua New Guinea who had been cut off from their battalion and was
retreating as the Japanese advanced. It portrayed the blood, mud and grit of the early
stages of the Kokoda Campaign as the lost patrol made its way back to rejoin its
battalion. Along the way, each militiaman had to overcome all kinds of difficulties in
their own way. The experiences of each militiaman reflected a particular Anzac trait
so that by the end of the film the lost patrol had covered nearly every trait in the
Anzac tradition, especially the four Anzac attributes that been enshrined on the
Kokoda Track War Memorial; “Courage”, “Mateship”, “Sacrifice” and “Endurance”.
For example, should the patrol leave a wounded mate behind because he was holding
up the retreat? Should the wounded mate, knowing very well that he would be
sacrificing himself, volunteer to stay behind to delay the enemy to allow his mates
time and opportunity to escape? 147 Should they all hold their ground instead and
courageously confront the enemy despite being outnumbered? Or should they stay
together and endure until they reached safety? 148 It was a film that distinctively
portrayed the masculine Digger tradition in a manner similar to that examined by
Thomson in Anzac Memories. 149 The men of the lost patrol were depicted as being
loyal to their mates, independent, brave in battle, cheerfully undisciplined, and out of
line (even if the British officers had been replaced by Australian officers in smart
uniforms). In Kokoda, the entire story was told from the men’s perspectives and by
the men who were caught up in the battles in Papua New Guinea, much like Bean’s
representation of the Diggers who were at Gallipoli and the Western Front. Kokoda
was essentially taking the contemporary Anzac myth back to its traditional and
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exclusive Digger roots. While the Anzac tradition had evolved to become an
inclusive nation building myth, Kokoda reminds us of its masculine and exclusive
Digger origins.

When Scates published his research, the inclusive nature of Anzac was at its height:
the 2006 Australian film Kokoda returned the roots of the Anzac tradition pioneered
by Bean. If the 1997 film Paradise Road, and Scates’ research, discussed earlier
represents the inclusiveness of the Anzac myth, Kokoda, affirms its exclusiveness.
Indeed, interestingly enough, Kokoda used dream sequences to drive the story of the
lost Australian patrol in a manner that mirrored Seal’s description of Anzac as the
“modern Australian dreaming”. 150 It suggests that if Kokoda was to be an indication
of the next step of evolution of the Anzac myth, then the elevation of Kokoda as a
possible heir to the Anzac tradition and legacy would be a step back to the exclusive
digger tradition that Bean had created.
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Chapter 2

Hiding the Prisoner-of-war Story

After the capitulation of Singapore, the Japanese were not forthcoming with
statements and information over the status and whereabouts of Australian POWs in
Japanese camps. 151 This is not to say that the Australian government, or for that
matter the Allied governments had little information, or knowledge, of the treatment
of Allied POWs in Japanese camps during the war. Archival records from the War
Office suggest that they had more than sufficient evidence as to how Allied POWs
were being treated, but the use of that information was subject to policy
considerations at the imperial and international level. 152

The Imperial Context

As the war progressed in the Pacific, Allied governments learned of the Japanese
treatment of Allied POWs through a member of the Swiss Consulate in Bangkok,
Monsieur Sieganthler. Sieganthler was able to obtain information on the treatment
and conditions of Allied POWs “partly from personal contacts and partly from a
letter of appeal written by prisoners at one of the camp hospitals.” 153 The information
was first conveyed to the British government and later to other Allied governments
concerned, namely the United States, the Netherlands, and the Dominions. Since the
information had been obtained privately and through unofficial channels, London
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decided not to reveal how it came to be in possession of such information. 154
However, Sieganthler’s information and name turned up two months later in a secret
report, dated 21 October 1943, for the British War Cabinet. 155 It informed members
of the Cabinet that British and Dutch POWs were working long hours under arduous
conditions in the jungle, had “no housing, sanitary installations or other necessities”
and suffered from “dysentery, beri-beri, malaria, black water fever, diphtheria,
cholera, typhoid, skin diseases [and] anaemia.” 156 Their diet consisted of polished
rice and salted fish, lacking essentials like meat, eggs and vegetables, a diet “totally
insufficient for Europeans living in a tropical climate.” 157 It also reported that the
Swiss government had raised these issues with the Japanese government in July 1943
but that it only “drew an uncompromising and cynical reply” 158 from the Japanese.
The War Cabinet suggested that these findings be disclosed to the public, despite
concerns that it would cause distress and compromise Sieganthler’s position and his
sources. The issue, however, was what to disclose and when.

On 27 October 1943, a secret memorandum with the heading “Publicity Concerning
Japanese Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees” was
circulated in the War Cabinet.159 In the document, the Secretary of State for War,
(Sir) P.J. Grigg argued that the facts be made public. He believed that the British
public already had some “inkling” about Japanese atrocities committed against
Allied POWs, that they were entitled to know more and that they were already
demanding to know more. 160 Information on Canadian POWs was already in the
public domain. After the Fall of Hong Kong on 25 December 1941, nearly 1,700
Canadian soldiers went into captivity. Roughly 1,000 of them had been transferred to
Japan by 1942. 161 Information on their conditions had travelled home via Red Cross
officials supervising civilian exchange missions and the Canadian civilians who had
been repatriated under civilian exchanges. Their experiences had been published in
the press, in books and had been featured on the radio. In India, the British
154
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Commander-in-Chief, General Claude Auchinleck, along with the Viceroy, was
launching an anti-Japanese campaign to counter apathy evident in the civilian
population and the military. One Indian leader, for example, had remarked that the
Japanese “could not be so bad after all”. 162 The need to change such attitudes in India
towards the Japanese, according to Auchinleck, “urgently needs stimulus” and he
believed that the “exploitation of material” that the War Cabinet had on the Japanese
treatment of Allied POWs to its fullest could change Indian attitudes towards the
Japanese. 163 The Secretary of State for War, however, had a different view.

In his memorandum Grigg suggested two courses of action. Allied knowledge of
Japanese atrocities should be used in a full-blooded propaganda campaign that
named individuals and incidents. The alternative was to publicly shame the Japanese
by a general campaign to bring about “an improvement in the lot of our prisoners”
and diplomacy. 164 A limited amount of material would be released to the public to
meet the public’s demand for information whilst the Japanese government would be
presented with a comprehensive compilation of Japanese atrocities that named names
as a form of “veiled intimidation” to press for improvements for Allied POWs with
the threat that if they did not, their “misdeeds” 165 would be fully publicised. Grigg
clearly favoured the latter approach and presented a draft letter for the Japanese
government to the Cabinet. His draft highlighted the “infractions both of the letter
and spirit of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war”, and of the
“gravely deteriorating” treatment of POWs of which Britain had “detailed and
authentic evidence”. 166 He set out his reservations and the potential problems facing
a public propaganda approach that used Japanese atrocities as its base. Such an
approach would leave “no further weapons in our hands with which to try to force
the Japanese into remedying those things of which we complain” and if the Japanese
ignored the propaganda, it would become “blunt with usage.” 167 Grigg also noted
that they should not rule out the possibility that the Japanese government could
counter with a similar shaming campaign using Allied atrocities committed on
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Japanese POWs. He highlighted the case of the shooting of 40 Japanese POWs by
New Zealand authorities in a camp at Featherstone as one example. 168 He warned
that a propaganda campaign could also cause “gratuitous distress to relatives of those
still in Japanese hands”, 169 affecting morale on the home front, and that a campaign
based on atrocities where individuals and places were specified could encourage the
Japanese to deal out harsher punishments and treatment since their actions was no
longer a secret. 170 Finally, he argued that that naming individual Japanese
perpetrators involved in atrocities would very likely drive them underground after the
war, hindering war crimes proceedings. But were these the only reasons for
withholding the details contained in Sieganthler’s information? Probably not.

What really concerned the Secretary of State for War was the fate of an ongoing
diplomatic mission at the time. A year earlier in 1942, about 1,600 civilian internees,
caught on the wrong side of the border since the start of the war, had been exchanged
between the Japanese and Allied governments. Negotiations were going on in 1943
for a similar exchange exercise. Grigg hoped that a further 1,600 civilian internees
could be exchanged and was concerned that a propaganda campaign, with Japanese
atrocities putting the Japanese in a bad light, would prejudice the negotiations for the
exchange of civilian internees between both sides. 171 And there were the Americans
to consider. Chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, (Sir) Alan Brooke,
supported Grigg’s preference for a diplomatic approach by bringing the attention of
the War Cabinet to the instructions issued to his American counterparts by the
President to request the British government not to release stories of Japanese
atrocities because they might compromise similar negotiations for civilian exchanges
being undertaken by the Americans. 172 The United States asked the British to delay
any decision until its chartered repatriation ship, the Swedish ocean liner Gripsholm,
could complete its civilian exchange mission. 173 Winston Churchill also reminded
members of the War Cabinet that it was “essential” that any publicity on Japanese
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atrocities had to be done in consultation with the American government because of
the large number of American prisoners in Japanese hands after the Fall of the
Philippines. 174 (He apparently forgot the Australian and Indian POWs captured by
Japanese in the British Far Eastern campaigns.)

Negotiations and the civilian

exchanges were expected to be completed by mid to late January 1944 and after that
Allied governments of Britain, United States, the Dominions and the Netherlands
could discuss proposals for a coordinated Allied propaganda campaign. 175 In the
meantime, Auchinleck was warned to take a general approach in his anti-Japanese
campaign and that “no mention should be made of Japanese treatment of prisoners of
war”. 176

Auchinleck’s response to the War Cabinet was scathing. He cabled on 4 November
1943:

I cannot understand this desire to conceal from public fact that we
know of appalling conditions and mortality among our p. of w…[the]
Foreign Office seem to have very poor opinion of Britain publics’
capacity to stand bad news. I am satisfied that reactions among [the]
Indian public and troops to publication of facts of Japanese treatment of
p. of w. be reverse of adverse. 177

When the War Cabinet ignored him, Auchinleck fired another broadside a week later
insisting that the “present anomalous situation” of censorship imposed on them was
“not understood in this country”. 178 This time the War Cabinet replied and reminded
Auchinleck that the main concern was not over the public’s capacity to absorb such
information, but to avoid any chance that publicity would jeopardize the Gripsholm’s
mission. 179 The War Cabinet also decided that it would no longer deal directly with
their general in India. It informed him that the views of His Majesty would be
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conveyed to the Viceroy of India who would be “requested to pass this information”
on to him, providing a “full picture as seen” in London. 180

The American Response

By mid-December 1943, the business of British and American civilian exchanges
was concluded earlier than anticipated and the time was right for the anti-Japanese
propaganda campaign. 181 Yet the Allies were still not in agreement over what the
content of the propaganda campaign should be. Should it provide details of atrocities
that named the perpetrators, and conditions in Japanese POW camps or should it
follow the preferred British policy of a general campaign coupled with diplomatic
pressure on Japan? Washington advised the War Cabinet on 5 January 1944 that key
departments in the United States government were divided over the approach to be
taken. The United States Chiefs of Staff, especially the Special Division, were
concerned that any publicity campaign based on atrocities committed against Allied
soldiers and on the treatment of Allied POWs would not produce the desired effect. It
argued that Japanese broadcasting stations had not yet accused Americans of
“atrocities against Japanese prisoners” and feared that the Japanese would launch a
counter campaign. 182 The Special Division also argued that an anti-Japanese
publicity propaganda campaign would be ineffective unless it was launched as part
of “large scale [military] operations against the Japanese”. 183 The British
government, however, was anxious to get its campaign underway because it was
under enormous pressure to reveal to the public the conditions of POWs in Japanese
camps, and the longer such information was withheld, the more difficult it would be
to justify and explain the delay to the public. 184

In mid January 1944, the scenario suddenly changed. Despite the blanket ban on
reporting Japanese atrocities in the American press in place in 1943, the American
180
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press was putting considerable pressure on the Roosevelt Administration to lift the
ban. Without consultation with his allies, Roosevelt lifted the blanket ban on the
publication of stories of Japanese atrocities in the Pacific War. 185 It allowed
individuals and military units to be named. 186 The first story, according to telegram
dispatches from Washington, was scheduled to be released on 24 January 1944 in the
American press, which would be followed by an official statement from the United
States Office of War Information. 187 Thereafter the publication of stories that had
been held up for two years would follow. 188 The American unilateral action
undermined any chance of a common Allied campaign and sent its wartime allies
scrambling to respond.

The War Office immediately requested Washington to delay any publication of
Japanese atrocities so that it could release its own press statement and one on behalf
of the Dominions. 189 London managed to obtain an extension of a few days. After 31
January, American publications on Japanese atrocities would run on schedule as
planned. The New Zealand government responded urgently to London. Via telegram,
it informed London that twelve New Zealand POWs were suspected to have been
executed by the Japanese on Tarawa Island in November 1942, but their next-of-kin
had only been informed that they were “missing believed killed”. 190 The New
Zealand government considered it “intolerable that reference to the cases of these
men should be made before the next-of-kin had been given some general indication
of the position”. 191 Auckland’s responsibilities to its citizens were at stake. Canada
suggested that the Empire mount its own campaign, informing London that stories of
185
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Japanese atrocities were already known in Canada but that Canadian attempts to
ameliorate the conditions of Allied POWs held by the Japanese had “produced no
permanent improvement”. 192 America’s rush to publish nearly two years worth of
individual stories of ill-treatment and atrocities would have little impact on the
Japanese. The Canadians preferred that any imperial campaign concentrate on the
failure of the Japanese to live up to “recognised international standards and their own
specific agreements” with a focus on the Japanese government and military rather
than the Japanese people. 193 The War Cabinet, naturally, concurred with the
Canadian recommendations and agreed to “avoid a campaign of mere
denunciation”: 194 far better to raise the issue at a general level whilst pressing Tokyo
with the threat of full exposure unless the Japanese rectified the problems in its POW
camps. 195 London could not place a direct ban on the publication of Japanese
atrocities in the press. Considering the American decision, that would have been
difficult. But any such publications had to be “well authenticated” 196 and cleared by
the Foreign Office for publication. 197 In other words, London effectively controlled
the publication and publicising of Japanese war atrocities without declaring an
outright ban on their publication.

The Empire’s Propaganda Campaign Launched

The House of Commons was the place from which the War Cabinet decided to
launch the Empire’s propaganda campaign, notifying the House that a statement
would be made on 28 January 1944. To ensure that the Dominions toed London’s
line, the Dominion Office cabled them on 25 January 1944 to expect a summary of
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the statement that would launch the campaign. 198 This was to allow time for the
Dominion governments to prepare a “suitable statement themselves”,

199

especially

the New Delhi government, due to the large number of Indian troops held as POWs
by the Japanese.

Three days before the American press was due to publish its first stories on Japanese
atrocities, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, delivered a
statement to the House on the treatment of Allied POWs held by the Japanese and
Japanese atrocities. He began by highlighting the difficulty of obtaining reliable
information from the Japanese, 200 that even as late as 1944 the names of all Allied
POWs were not known. Even the exact number of POWs held by the Japanese,
according to Eden, had not “yet been communicated to us”. 201 The general living
conditions in POWs camps in Java, for instance, was described as inadequate with
little “protection from malarial infection and lacking in proper provision for
sanitation”. 202

Camps near major cities like Changi in Singapore and others in

Bangkok and Saigon were reported to be “at least tolerable”. 203 Other POWs camps
in Hong Kong, Formosa, Shanghai, Korea and Japan, according to reports by
“neutral inspectors” were considered generally “tolerable”. 204 Eden described the
conditions of POWs along the Thai-Burma Railway by quoting an eyewitness
account, “They were skin-and bone, unshaven and with long matted hair. They were
half-naked.” 205 The POWs “wore no hats or shoes” and Eden reminded members of
the House that local resources were very scarce and could not “provide medical or
other material relief.” 206 Eden also described to the House in detail three cases of
Japanese atrocities committed against Allied POWs, yet the closest Eden came to
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naming a perpetrator was the use of the term “Japanese gendarmerie”. 207 In his
summation, Eden informed the House that London had “repeatedly made the
strongest possible representations to the Japanese Government through the Swiss
Government” 208 but Tokyo’s responses had been “evasive, cynical or otherwise
unsatisfactory.” 209 It was a clear public expression of British policy on the issue.

Questions from members of the House that followed Eden’s statement echoed issues
raised by War Cabinet earlier in October 1943. MP (Sir) John Wardlaw-Milne
wanted London and Washington make a joint statement to the Japanese that “every
atrocity” would be verified by neutral nations and the facts made public to the world
to “force the Japanese to alter the existing conditions” of their POW camps. 210 MP
Arthur Molson asked Eden for some reassuring words on the conditions of POWs to
cushion his statement because “these revelations may cause a very great deal of
anxiety to those who have relatives who are prisoners of war at present in the hands
of the Japanese.” 211 MP (Sir) Godfrey Nicholson pressed for a “more formal national
expression of our horror” 212 to impress upon the Japanese government “the
seriousness of the effect on the future of their nation.”213 Eden, however, responded
that his statement to the House concluded the issue. 214 From here on, London would
await Tokyo’s response.

The Dominions took their cue from Eden’s statement in the House of Commons and
issued their statements to their houses of parliament. A copy of their statements was
later sent to the Dominion Office. Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King released
his statement to the Canadian parliament a day after Eden’s statement. Like Eden,
King also mentioned that his government had only general indications of the
treatment of Canadian POWs held by the Japanese. Yet, the “evidence of Japanese
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brutality and organised sadism”, said King in his statement “is so horrible and
overwhelming as to be almost incredible.” 215 After summarising Eden’s statement to
the House of Commons, King also emphasized that, like the British government, the
Canadian government was dealing with an uncooperative Japanese government.
King also took the opportunity to suggest the possible whereabouts of some 1,600
Canadian POWs held by the Japanese. Finally, King’s statement also provided the
opportunity to highlight Ottawa’s previous efforts with the International Red Cross to
gain access to Canadian POWs held by the Japanese. When pressed by the leader of
the Opposition to state the government’s current efforts to ameliorate the conditions
of Canadian POWs, King replied that the Canadian government was still working
closely with the International Red Cross. 216 In South Africa, no official statement
was made in its parliament. The Dominion Office was informed that Eden’s
statement to the House of Commons was instead reproduced in the local “progovernment press” papers with a “negligible amount of editorial comment”. 217 The
Dominion Office did not receive a copy of Auckland’s statement from its parliament.

Holding the Line

Eden’s statement did not meet with universal approval in Britain. Some saw it as
“pure propaganda”, 218 and others asserted that the British government was not doing
its best to ameliorate the conditions and treatment of Allied POWs in Japanese
hands. MP Lady Davidson launched a petition in London. 219 It read, “The fate of our
men in Singapore and Malaya is, to date, unknown” 220 and it appealed to the
government for the release of any information on the men who had been missing in
Singapore and Malaya since 1942. The petition was presented to Eden, reportedly
“signed by some thousands of people” 221 including eight Members of Parliament. 222
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Throughout the entire course of the war in the Pacific, information on Allied POWs
in the Pacific had remained scarce and Eden’s statement had raised the hopes of the
families of the POWs. They had received, at best, only two postcards from their kin
in Japanese POWs camps. 223 The situation was no different for Australians. Former
Australian POWs of “A” Force in Burma were given at best three postcards to send
back to Australia, but not before they passed through strict Japanese censors. 224
Australian POWs in Batavia were allowed a limited number of letters that they could
write home and the ones that actually arrived at their intended address were of the
“we are being very well treated” 225 type.

Less then two weeks after Eden’s statement to the House of Commons, key
departments of the British government met to review the anti-Japanese campaign. 226
The meeting concluded that the policy pursued since October 1943 “had not been
without effect upon the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs and to a lesser extent
upon the Japanese military.” 227 It reported that the death rate of Allied POWs had
reportedly fallen between October 1943 and February 1944 after “all excessively
heavy work” 228 had ceased. Rather than see the fall in the death rate as a result of the
completion of the Thai-Burma Railway, the review board attributed it instead to
British diplomatic pressure. Although it noted that the general orders issued by the
Japanese government forbidding atrocities on Allied POWs were “not being obeyed
[and] atrocities still continue in Burma” 229 and that the Japanese government
continued to frustrate attempts and requests by the Swiss government and the
International Red Cross to inspect all POWs camps across the Japanese Empire, it
concluded that the current policy should remain unchanged. Its primary purpose was
to put pressure on the Japanese government and that the best way to achieve its goal,
the amelioration of conditions in the camps, was to avoid individual atrocity stories
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where units and individuals were named. 230 And it reiterated that Foreign Office
approval was needed for the publication of any stories of Japanese atrocities
committed against POWs. 231

Five weeks after Eden’s speech, on 5 March 1944, New Delhi cabled the War Office
informing them that a press message, which had recently been dispatched from India,
accidentally contained the names of Japanese officers who were responsible for
atrocities committed on Allied POWs. 232 The War Office immediately cabled New
Delhi reminding it that if the names were published, the Japanese might react
adversely towards POWs in the camp in question, and might even frustrate post-war
attempts to locate and arrest these men. It sternly reminded New Delhi that the
release of such information not only contravened policy but was also “considered
impolite”. 233

Canberra

Unlike Canada, Australia had not always been a willing player in London’s antiJapanese policy. It had several thousand men in captivity and was the base for the
Allies’ Pacific War. Canberra already had a taste of what London’s and
Washington’s civilian exchange missions actually meant. During the 1943 civilian
exchange negotiations, Canberra was pressed to release 500 Japanese fishermen for
repatriation, 234 but the negotiations did not include any Australian civilians as part of
the exchange. 235 The Japanese remained uncooperative over the repatriation of
Australian civilians in its occupied territories. 236 But Canberra was more concerned
about its POWs than the civilian exchanges. Canberra reminded London that it was
currently in the process of pressuring the Japanese government, and to use London’s
own words, “for a general amelioration of conditions [in Japanese POW camps]
through the recognised channels and for obtaining permission from Japanese
230
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Government to send relief supplies and food parcels to all camps.” 237 More
significantly, in June 1943 the Queensland Supreme Court judge, Sir Willian Webb,
had been appointed to investigate atrocities or breaches of the rules of warfare
conducted by the Japanese. 238 Its report was expected to be finalised in late January
as the American press began to publish its stories on Japanese atrocities. 239 The
Webb Report would become a major problem between Canberra and London. And
unfortunately for the War Cabinet, it could not simply brush off Canberra as it had
Auchinleck in India.

In the instructions issued to the Dominions before Eden made his speech in the
Commons, Canberra received specific instructions. 240 Concerned that the Australian
government would publish the findings of the Webb Commission due that month,
London insisted that the British Empire and Dominions “avoid a campaign of mere
denunciation… [and] take the line that the Japanese know what proper treatment of
POWs is in order to give them an opportunity to improve treatment without losing
face.” 241 The Dominion Office also informed Canberra that Washington had been
notified that “no cases of atrocities perpetrated against Dominion nationals will be
quoted without the permission of the Dominion Government concerned.” 242 New
Zealand pointed to the flaws in the argument. The American press could not “be
legally restrained” and could even publish details of the Tarawa Massacre if it
chose. 243 However, Webb was running behind schedule and with no report yet in
their hands, Canberra fell into line. 244

Canberra informed the Dominion Office on 2 February 1944 that Prime Minister
John Curtin had delivered a statement to the Australian parliament on 28 January and
even gave them a copy of it. 245 It is worth reproducing here in its entirety:
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Facts are so horrifying that they surely speak for themselves, and reveal
to everybody the nature of the enemy whom we have for more than 2
years been resisting.

To relieve prisoners of war in Japanese hands who include not only
members of the fighting forces but also civilians of our own race and
peaceful citizens of other races calls for the earliest termination of war.

Resolutions of protests and expressions of horror, are insufficient. The
best view point Australia can have of this matter is to work all (sic) out.
It must be clear that the Protecting Power 246 in this matter is not able to
accomplish much. Only the Allies themselves and their own strength,
can effect a change, and the only change will be by the earliest
realization (sic) by Japan that she will be defeated. 247

Curtin’s concluding sentence made it quite clear that Canberra was not in agreement
with London on the entire issue. Unlike those in Washington and London, Curtin did
not see the Pacific as a secondary theatre in a global war. As will be discussed in the
next chapter, he had made that point clear from as early as December 1941. Again,
Curtin was urging the Allies to bring an end to the war sooner rather than later
because the sooner victory was achieved, the sooner the atrocities and brutal
treatment would end. 248 Curtin’s statement also reminded London that previous
efforts to improve the conditions of Allied POWs via the Swiss government had been
futile. He was clearly indicating his reservations about current imperial policy. He
wanted more than “'resolutions of protests and expressions of horror”. London’s
willingness to publish only scant details of Japanese atrocities without mentioning
the names of perpetrators, or even the names of the regiments involved, would hardly
intimidate Tokyo. But it did create an unexpected backlash in Britain. But, as noted
earlier, London would not budge and after the policy review in February 1944,
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Canberra was specifically instructed to keep any findings of the Webb Commission
under lock and key. 249

As the War Office was dealing with New Delhi’s accidental disclosure in March
1944, the Webb Commission reported back to the Australian government on 15
March with a compilation of evidence of the Japanese breaching the rules governing
the conduct of war and war atrocities. 250 It named names and units. 251 Since
Washington had lifted its ban on the American press, and reports of Japanese
atrocities had entered mainstream media, there was little reason for Canberra to
continue withholding the information contained in the Webb Commission report.
Canberra cabled a copy to London on 30 May, highlighting eleven specific cases of
Japanese atrocities committed against Australians, New Zealanders, British prisoners
and local people, and requested permission to publish a summary of its findings. 252
Canberra clearly informed London that the Webb Commission was “able to identify
individuals or units responsible”. 253 Again, London would not budge. The
Directorate of Prisoners of War in London reaffirmed in a meeting on 20 June that
“no steps should be taken at present in furtherance of anything like an atrocity
propaganda campaign” and Canberra’s telegram of 30 May was singled out three
times with the recommendation that the Australian government withhold publication
of its findings. 254 On 4 July, London officially replied to Canberra advising the
government not to publish anything from the Webb Commission, 255 arguing that
Britain’s approach was bearing fruit, or, in London’s inimitable words, “[The
Japanese] have not shown themselves unwilling to attempt to improve the conditions
of prisoners of war and internees”. 256 London also argued that publishing material in
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the Webb Commission report would “merely cause distress to relatives without
achieving any compensating benefit to prisoners themselves.” 257

A month later, London reiterated its instructions to the Dominion governments over
the management of stories relating to Japanese atrocities:

Present U.K policy on atrocities is to avoid any official Government
statement, but to release suitable material to press if Foreign Office
approves… we consider publication of names of responsible Japanese
officers [for atrocities] not repeat not desirable… such publication may
adversely react on treatment and supply in PW Camps renders postwar
arrests of [war] criminals concerned more difficult. 258

London’s concern with the Webb Commission was turning into an obsession. Time
and again, the Australian government was specifically instructed not to publish its
findings. And each time Canberra complied. But there was a loophole.

Although the government could not publish the findings or evidence from the Webb
Commission Report, banning publicity concerning Japanese atrocities not covered by
the report was only implied. Frank Forde, as Acting Prime Minister, used this to
make an official statement to the House of Representatives on the Japanese treatment
of Australian POWs on 17 November 1944. His source was a repatriated Australian
POW. The United States Navy had recovered Australian survivors from the Japanese
transport ship, the Rokyu Maru, which was attacked and sunk by a U.S submarine in
September 1944. The Rokyu Maru at the time was transporting 716 Australian and
600 British POWs. 259 Forde made his statement for two reasons; there were
mounting rumours circulating about Japanese atrocities in the region, and Forde
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anticipated that other Allied governments would make official statements in the wake
of the rescue of the Rokyu Maru survivors. 260

Forde told the House that Australian POWs held by the Japanese on the Thai-Burma
Railway had been subjected to bashings, starvation, and had been worked to death. 261
As many as 2,000 Australian POWs might have died on the Railway, he said. 262
Forde also informed the House that at present Canberra had no information on other
POWs camps and that they should not assume that the conditions on the Railway
were characteristic of treatment in Japanese POWs camps elsewhere. 263 The
Australian press published Forde’s statements in the evening papers on the same day.
Forde’s statement to the House of Representatives in 1944 stirred the Australian
public and caused considerable worry for the families of Australian POWs held by
the Japanese. 264 Yet, Forde had adhered to imperial policy in part by refusing to
speculate on conditions in camps away from the Railway, and he had avoided
naming individuals, but he had cleverly used the Rokyu Maru rescue to make a
statement on the treatment of Australian POWs, something the Australian
government had been anxious to do since May. The government already had that
information with the Webb Commission but could not release it. London, however,
saw Forbes’ move as a clear violation of the War Cabinet’s policy and, as with New
Delhi’s accidental disclosure in early 1944, it informed Canberra that what Forde had
done was “impolite”.

Less than two months after Forde made his statement in Canberra, London reviewed
its policy again. Around this time, Tokyo responded unexpectedly via the Swiss
government in February 1945. The Japanese government informed London that it
would now permit Red Cross officials to inspect POWs camps in Siam, Singapore
and the Philippines. 265 But the Japanese offer came with a condition – that the United
States reciprocated by allowing Japanese inspections of American POW camps in
260
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Saipan, Tinian, Guam and New Caledonia. 266 Predictably, Washington refused to
accede to the request. London however, offered Japan an “unqualified acceptance of
the proposal on behalf of the British Commonwealth Governments” despite
American remaining obdurate. 267 And Tokyo’s diplomatic overture in February had
the effect of convincing London that its current propaganda policy had worked. The
review process was quickly wrapped up with the decision to maintain the status
quo. 268

Months after the review, it was Canberra’s turn to do something unexpected. Despite
its agitation to publish the findings of the Webb Commission and Forde’s statement
in the House that seemed to break the spirit of London’s policy, Canberra now fell
into line. On 24 May, it declared in a telegram to London that a campaign based on
atrocities was “not yet desirable.” 269 Why the change of Canberra’s stance at this
juncture? There were two possible reasons for this. Four days earlier General
Douglas MacArthur had written to Canberra informing the government that Britain
would be given responsibility over the regions south of the Philippines in the SouthWest Pacific and “in that event undoubtedly all Australian formations would come
under British Command”. 270 In other words, the British were returning to the region
in earnest and Canberra was reaffirming its commitment and loyalty to the British
Empire. But there was also another possible reason. With the surrender of Germany,
Canberra could now expect the Allies to devote their resources to the war in the
Pacific. It would no longer be a secondary front and this was what Curtin had urged
in his statement in February 1944; the suffering of Allied POWs held by the Japanese
could only be alleviated when the Allies focused all efforts to bring about the
“earliest termination of war” 271 against Japan. The metropolis, it would seem, was
finally shifting its focus to fight the war on its periphery.
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The End of the Campaign in Australia

Except for Forde’s brief statement in 1944, Canberra had been restricted by
London’s policy to keep the Webb Commission, a comprehensive report on Japanese
atrocities, under lock and key. However, when the Pacific war came to an end, an
increasing

number of stories on Japanese atrocities, along with photographs of

men who had become living skeletons, began appearing in the Australian press. 272
Canberra faced a dilemma. The Australian government not only had knowledge of
Japanese atrocities and the ill-treatment of Australian POWs, it had investigated and
documented a number of cases with the Webb Commission. This would provide
important evidence in the war crimes trials to come, but Australians knew nothing of
it. 273 And the men who had been POWs were about to come home. Canberra chose
12 September 1945 to begin releasing the findings of the Webb Commission, two
days before the first batch of repatriated POWs was scheduled to arrive back in
Sydney. The timing of it was clearly calculated, just as the selection of the first batch
of Australian POWs to be repatriated was calculated.

One hundred and thirty-two liberated Australia POWs were carefully selected to be
on the first seaplane back to Australia. This first batch was chosen from “the fittest of
the recovered prisoners,” because, the reasoning went, they had to “withstand the
rigours of a long flight.” 274 But there was another issue in the repatriation of the
POWs. Canberra required that all liberated Australian POWs be fit before their
return. Former Australian POWs had to step off their transports with dignity to
demonstrate for their families that they were safe, and for the camera to show that
they survived the horrors of Japanese captivity. If the transports had brought back the
groups of walking skeletons seen in photographs taken by Australian journalists at
Japanese POW camps immediately after Japan’s surrender, Canberra would have had
a lot to answer for because the government had withheld information on Japanese
atrocities committed on Australian POWs throughout the war period. But Canberra
did have to be too concerned over this; after living in a constant state of hunger for
more than two years in captivity, liberated Australian POWs did not have to be
272
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ordered to eat. Indeed, many felt the need to get in good shape before returning to
Australia. Some, like Elliot McMaster, recalled that while waiting to be repatriated,
he and has mates ate until they “put on weight rapidly and really looked
respectable”. 275 Rowley Richards recounted that by the time he and his mates had
returned to Sydney they had “regained a lot of weight and condition, more than
enough to take the edge off our formerly frightening appearance.” 276 And as each
batch of healthy looking repatriated Australian POW stepped off their transports they
were given a cheerful and in many instances, a hero’s welcome. 277 In Melbourne, the
men were showered with confetti and handed flowers, fruit, chocolates, money, even
beer. Elsewhere, strangers invited the returned Australian POWs into their homes for
meals. 278 The Australian nation was in a celebratory mood. Canberra finally got on
with the business of presenting the findings in the Webb Commission as evidence for
the war crimes tribunals. And it went one step further to recommend Webb as a
judge for the international war crimes tribunal in Japan. 279 By the end of the war,
Webb’s experience with war crimes investigation and reporting during the war made
him well qualified and he was appointed president of the tribunal. 280 The Allied
management of information regarding publicity over the Japanese ill-treatment of
Allied POWs and wartime atrocities, however, was neither questioned nor
challenged.
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Chapter 3

History as Experience: Positioning the Prisoner-of-War Experience
in Australia

In his memoirs, Sir Robert Gordon Menzies described the formation of the 2nd
Australian Imperial Force this way:

We then called for volunteers for a Second Australian Imperial Force
[after the declaration of war], and got them in great numbers. We
dispatched to the Middle East under General Blamey the famous 6th
Division, which was to fight with great success at Bardia, Tobruk, and
Benghazi. We raised and sent the 7th Division, under Laverack, which
earned fame in Syria, and later the 9th Division which, under
Morsehead, was to play a great part in the defence of Tobruk and later
in the crucial battle of El Alamein. 281
The 8th was missing. Perhaps Menzies could not count, or perhaps Menzies chose to
highlight only Australian contributions in a successful British-led campaign rather
than a campaign that saw thousands taken as POWs.
The difficulty of positioning the history of the 8th Division in Australia’s military
history began soon after the men were taken as POWs following the Fall of
Singapore. The British surrender at Singapore included the surrender of all
Commonwealth forces under its command. However, the commanding officer of the
8th Division, Major-General Gordon Bennett had other plans. On the evening prior
to the ceasefire on 15 February, the men of the 8th Division received orders to remain
at their posts until further orders were issued. 282 And when the official order to cease
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fire and end hostilities was given at 1600 hrs on 15 February, it came with the
instruction that “all officers will be warned of their responsibility to their men and no
organised attempt at escape will be countenanced.” 283 However, Bennett, together
with a handful of Australian officers, commandeered a motor launch and left
Singapore to escape to Australia. 284

News of his escape preceded his return to Australia and upon his arrival in Sydney
on 1 March 1942 he was greeted by “dozens of photographers and pressmen”. 285 He
was however, coldly received the following day in Melbourne when he arrived at
Victoria Barracks. The Chief of General Staff, General Sturdee, informed Bennett
that his escape from Singapore had been “ill-advised”.286 Bennett established his side
of the story by publishing his narrative as commanding officer of the 8th Division in
Malaya and Singapore. Published in 1944 with the title Why Singapore Fell, it is a
broad narrative of the 8th Division and his experiences as its commander and offered
his reasons for the fall of the naval base. He attempted to defend the performance of
his division by blaming the Fall of Singapore on the “lack of aggressive spirit” 287
that the British system did not emphasize and poor British leadership, especially his
commander Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, who Bennett described as “faircomplexioned, with features which were intellectual rather than dynamic.” 288 His
most lengthy chapter, however, was devoted to his twelve-day escape from
Singapore. This chapter also spelt out his reasons for escaping Singapore:

I felt impelled to get to Melbourne as soon as possible in order that I
might tell the Prime Minister and Cabinet the full story of Malaya, of
how well our men fought, and give our military authorities the full
benefit of the lessons we had learned so that Australia would be better
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prepared to meet a Japanese invasion. That was the main objective of
my escape…I did not relish the idea of cooling my heels in a Japanese
POW camp while fighting was to be done. I felt that I could give
valuable service, especially now that I had learned Japanese methods at
first hand. 289

He further justified his escape claiming that his information on fighting the Japanese
published later in military circles in Australia laid the foundation of methods that
“evolved to turn the retreat along Kokoda Trail towards Port Moresby into an
advance to Buna and Gona.” 290 The length and attention to detail in the chapter on
his escape is disproportionate to the chapters in the rest of the book. It suggests that
Bennett’s book was essentially not about why Singapore fell, but why he returned to
Australia.

Immediately after the war, a commission of enquiry was convened to investigate if
the Australian general “was justified in relinquishing his command and leaving
Singapore.” 291 The Royal Commission’s report noted that Bennett did bring back
valuable information which was used to fight the Japanese and that his decision to
escape was “inspired by patriotism and by the belief that he was acting in the best
interests of his country”. 292 Yet, it determined that Bennett should have remained
with his men until the surrender was completed. The commission accepted the
recommendations of Percival that Bennett had “voluntarily and without permission,
relinquished the command of the A.I.F [in Singapore] on February 15, 1942, the date
on which the capitulation of the British Forces in Malaya took place.” 293 The
commission defined that the men of the 8th Division, which capitulated in Singapore,
“were not prisoners of war until they marched through the gates of Changi camp.” 294
Therefore, Bennett was not yet a POW when he escaped and had acted contrary to
289
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his duties and responsibilities as commanding officer. The commission concluded
that he was “not justified in relinquishing his command and leaving Singapore”.295
Once he became a POW, of course, he had every right to attempt to escape. Although
the findings of the commission were challenged three years later by an eminent
military lawyer, Lieutenant-Colonel Fry, Bennett’s military career was effectively
over; he retired from the military and became an orchardist. 296

Bennett’s successful escape had not endeared him to the men he left behind. His
senior commanding officers who survived the war as POWs, like his Chief of Staff,
Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Thyer and his Chief Administrative Officer, Colonel Wilfred
Kent Hughes had “made a pact…never to mention Bennett” 297 again. The men who
were left behind by their commanding officer were marched into captivity. During
that time, information about their whereabouts and welfare had been contained by
imperial policy discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike Bennett, who escaped and
told his story, the men had three and a half years of captivity that lay ahead before
their stories would be told and their stories would be very different to Bennett’s story
of a daring escape. Indeed, Bennett’s book on his escape and the controversy over it
in post-war Australia would have far larger effect on the memory of the 8th Division;
he had tarnished the reputation of his division.

Emergence of Australian POW Narratives
The battalions of the 8th Division, having been broken down and split up during
captivity, did not maintain war diaries or official records to document their time as
POWs. All battalion war diaries end in February 1942. The only exception was the
Australian 22nd Brigade’s war diary that continued until May 1942 before all
remaining personnel of the brigade were shipped out from Changi as part of a

295

L. Wigmore, op cit., Appendix 3, p.650
A. B. Lodge, “Bennett, Henry Gordon (1887 - 1962)”, in Australian Dictionary of Biography,
Volume 13, Melbourne University Press, 1993, pp.165-167
297
P. Stanley, “ ‘The men who did the fighting are now all busy writing’: Australian Post-Mortems on
Defeat in Malaya and Singapore, 1942-45”, in B. Farrell and S. Hunter (eds.), Sixty Years On, The
Fall of Singapore Revisited, Eastern University Press, Singapore, 2002, pp.293-294. Both senior
officers had conflicting opinions of their commanding officer. Gen. Bennett often clashed with Lt.Col. Thyer and other ranking officers like his brigadiers. Col. Hughes however, was a supporter of his
commanding officer
296

64

Japanese Special Working Overseas Party. 298 Any history of their war would have to
come directly from the men themselves after the war.

Many returned Australian POWs were surprised by the excitement over their return
to Australia. 299 They were relieved that their fellow Australians had not branded
them as dishonourable or traitors for surrendering at Singapore, or for helping to
build the enemy’s war infrastructure when they were POWs. 300 On the home front,
anxiety and distress over the whereabouts and status of Australian POWs was
strongly felt during the war; families had “suffered grievously during the war from
the lack of news, from the fear of death or horrible beatings befalling their loved
ones, from anxiety about rehabilitation and adjustment.” 301 The thousands of
Australians who lined the docks in anticipation to welcome back each batch of
former Australian POWs reflected relief. 302

Immediately after Japan’s surrender, Australian journalists rushed to visit Japanese
POW camps for news. What they brought back was report after report of Japanese
atrocities committed on Australian POWs along with images that would appal and
anger Australians. And for the war correspondents, there was no shortage of stories
of atrocities and survival. In the contest for POW stories to fill the pages of their
papers, Australian war correspondents used horror and tragedy as benchmarks. 303
However, for some, these war correspondents pushed it too far. Letters to the editor
of the Daily Telegraph claimed that readers had had “enough” 304 of such stories. But
that was not true. Australians were eager to find out more. Furthermore, by this time
some repatriated POWs, like Rohan Rivett, had begun to explore other means to tell
their story without a war correspondent middleman. Rivett believed that some war
correspondents were “winning fame and fortune” by writing the stories of Australian
POWs. He strongly felt that he needed to publish his story “before it was
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scooped”. 305 Rivett quickly wrote a personal account of life in captivity under the
Japanese and in 1946 it was published under the title Behind Bamboo. It became a
best-seller and has never been out of print. 306

With the success of Behind Bamboo, other former Australian POWs also began to
write and publish their POW experiences. Two more Australian POWs narratives
published in 1946, by officers: Wilfred Kent Hughes, mentioned earlier who refused
to talk about Bennett’s escape from Singapore, published Slaves of the Samurai, and
Irvine Summons published his POW experiences in Twice Their Prisoner. 307 Russell
Braddon’s The Naked Island was published in 1952 and it was praised for its “stark
realism”. 308 The London Independent newspaper claimed that “many regarded it as
possibly the finest war book ever written.” 309 In 1954, Betty Jeffrey’s White
Coolies 310 would remind Australians that the POW experience also included the
experiences of Australian nurses captured by the Japanese; the POW narrative was
not strictly a men’s story. 311 POW narratives continued to be published and they
remained popular well into the next decade. In 1963 Hugh Clarke published The Tub,
a fictionalised account of his experiences as a POW. Ray Parkin’s remarkable trilogy
was published in the sixties; Out of the Smoke (1960), Into the Smother (1963) and
The Sword and the Blossom (1968). As Joan Beaumont argued, published narratives
on the experiences of former Australian POWs captured the popular imagination of
post-war Australia. 312

305

R. Rivett, Behind Bamboo, Penguin, Ringwood, Victoria, 1991, p.379
The first print of Behind Bamboo included a review by The Sydney Morning Herald dated 18 May
1946. The most recent reprint of Behind Bamboo held by the National Library of Australia is 2003
307
W. K Hughes, Slaves of the Samurai, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1946 and I. Summons,
Twice Their Prisoner, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1946. Wilfred Hughes was a Colonel and
Chief Administrative Officer of the 8th Division. Irvine Summons was a Lieutenant and intelligence
officer of the 2/2 Pioneer Battalion that was captured in Java.
308
“Obituaries Russell Braddon”, by Jamese Whitehand, The Independent (London), 30 March 1995
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituaries-russell-braddon-1613338.html)
309
ibid.
310
See B. Jeffery, White Coolies, Eden Paperbacks, North Ryde, Auckland, London, 1954
311
See also H. Nelson, “A Map to Paradise Road: A Guide for Historians” in Journal of the
Australian War Memorial, No. 32, March 1999, Australian War Memorial, 1999
312
See J. Beaumont, “Captivity Reconstructed: The Literature of Australian Prisoners of the
Japanese”, conference paper presented to the 50th Anniversary Conference of the Australian War
Memorial, 12 November 1991
306

66

The Sword and the Blossom marked the end of the first cycle of Australian POW
narratives. These narratives, along with an interest in the broader military literature
genre in Australia, declined during the 1960s and 1970s. Hank Nelson argued that
the mood is best expressed in Alan Seymour’s 1962 play, One Day of the Year,
where the antagonism between a veteran father and his son reflected of the attitudes
in Australia at the time. 313 The son was openly contemptuous of his father and his
war experience, seeing his father using his war experience to excuse his drunkenness.
Antagonism to the Vietnam War in that decade also brought with it doubts about war
and the international alliances that entangled Australia in conflicts overseas. 314 By
the mid 1970s all things related to Australia’s military past were no longer a
fashionable topic; they had reached their nadir. A decade later, however, there were
clear signs of the resurgence of interest in Australia’s military past which began with
a revived interest in the First World War.

In 1974, Bill Gammage’s The Broken Years was published, bringing a fresh
approach to understanding Australian wartime experiences. While Charles Bean had
woven the experiences of Australian soldiers into a sustained narrative of the First
A.I.F, Gammage presented the voices of individual soldiers and their attitudes
towards fighting a war in the days of Empire. Indeed, Gammage’s major point of
departure from traditional attitudes to Anzac was his presentation of Australian
soldiers questioning and even challenging notions of Empire. 315 It gave the
experiences of the first Anzacs a nationalist slant. The Broken Years was followed by
a flood of similar publications in the 1980s which shows no sign of abating as
interest has moved from the First World War to personal narratives of men and
women from the Second World War and Vietnam. The field of literature, perhaps
unconsciously, echoed the major characteristic of the POW narrative where the
personal experience had always been paramount.
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Growing interest in individuals’ narratives of war spilled over into POW narratives,
producing a second cycle. Stan Arneil’s One Man’s War was published in 1980,
Edward Dunlop’s The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop was a bestseller in 1986, and
Rowley Richards’ A Doctor’s War was published in 2005, amongst others. 316 It also
spilled over into popular culture with the production of films like Blood Oath and
Paradise Lost, and the television series Tenko and A Town Like Alice. 317 And it
spilled over into the 8th Division’s military history. Before the 1980s, the 8th Division
had only one battalion history to its credit, the unit history of the Australian 2/19
Battalion, The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F (1975). The 1980s saw the
publication of five battalion histories and another four were published in the
1990s. 318 And the revival of interest in Anzac and Australian military history created
the ideal climate for a landmark research project conducted by the historian Hank
Nelson and the ABC journalist, Tim Bowden.

Nelson and Bowden

To record the experiences of former Australian POWs in the Pacific War, Nelson and
Bowden invited many former POWs to be interviewed. Unexpectedly, many
accepted their invitation and came forward willingly to share their experiences. 319
Nelson and Bowden believed that were “by accident the beneficiaries of two factors”
and one of them was a “national readiness to hear and to locate those experiences in
Australia’s national history.” 320 This “national readiness”, Nelson argued were
linked with developments in the 1970s including the promotion of Australian
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nationalism in the early part of the decade and the revived interest in Australian
military history.

The second was the fact that former Australian POWs were now ready to tell their
story. By the 1980s, many of these men had retired. They were no longer subject to
the demands of making a living and rearing a family. They had both the time and
inclination to talk about their experiences, clearly evident in the fact that some of the
transcripts recorded from the interviews ran to a remarkable 200 pages. 321 They were
also no longer dominated by the imperative to forget the war and their wartime
experiences. Indeed, when former Australian POWs revisited their memories of the
war in the 1980s, they were also revisiting an enduring legacy of the 1940s.
Although the repatriation of Australian POWs after the war marked the end of the
anxiety and distress that confronted many in Australia during the war, it also marked
the beginning of another for the men and their families. After their return, the men of
the 8th Division were discharged from the military, resettled and became caught up
with the rest of the nation’s efforts to rebuild, to move on and leave the past behind.
‘Moving on’ became the accepted way of dealing with a situation where there was no
precedent or context for accommodating the experiences of these men. There was no
rehabilitation specific for former POWs or their families’ wartime trauma and
anxiety. Newspapers had switched from horror stories of the POW camps to stories
showing that these men were all right. Wives and parents of returned POWs were
advised not to ask too many questions. Even if they had, former POWs were
reluctant to share their stories with their families; they did not want their suffering
and sacrifice to become a source of pity. 322 The net effect was that families and
friends of a former POW became burdened with repressed emotions in one form or
another. The 1980s offered these men the chance to revisit their memories of the war
in a manner they could not have done so before. 323 They no longer needed to repress
their stories.

The Nelson-Bowden collaborative research on the experiences and memories of
former Australian POWs became an ABC radio series in 1984. It attracted a large
321
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following. Sales of tape recordings of the series were also surprisingly good. 324 To
meet the high demand the series’ tapes was duplicated several times and the series
was remastered on audio compact disc when audio cassette tapes became obsolete.325
Following the success of the ABC radio program, Nelson published Australian
Prisoners of War, Australians Under Nippon in 1985. It presented the experiences
and memories of former Australian POWs in a manner that was characteristic of
Gammage’s approach in The Broken Years with the use of individual stories, yet still
sat within the tradition pioneered by Rivett in Behind Bamboo. 326 Indeed, Nelson and
Bowden’s methodology has also spilled over into the 8th Division’s approach to its
history: the Australian 2/30 Battalion Association recorded many hours worth of
interviews with veterans of the battalion that were published in four digital compact
discs in 1994. 327

Tim Bowden went on to collaborate with George Aspinall, a veteran of the
Australian 2/30 Battalion. Aspinall, was an avid photographer and his photographs
offer a unique visual narrative of one man’s experience as a POW as it unfolded.
Throughout the war, he used a carefully concealed folding type Kodak 2 Camera to
photograph the life of Australian POWs during the two and half years of captivity. 328
With negatives and chemicals stolen from a Japanese captured godown 329 in
Singapore, Aspinall processed and developed his photographs into prints. They were
then stored in a tobacco tin and were well hidden from the Japanese. Most survived
the end of the war. Aspinall’s book begins with him signing up as a volunteer in
Australia, then follows his unit’s deployment in Malaya, fighting the Japanese and
finally surviving as a POW. There were photographs of his hometown in Wagga, his
unit’s barracks at Bathurst, the docks and troopships during his voyage to Singapore
and then life as an Australian soldier in Malaya and Singapore before the war. It does
not feature any photographs of his unit in action; Aspinall was a soldier, not a war
correspondent. The photographs that represent the period of fighting showed
324
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damaged buildings in the immediate aftermath of the British surrender to illustrate
the extent of the battle in Singapore. During the early days of their captivity at a
POW camp in Selarang Barracks near Changi, Aspinall took photographs of his
mates preparing and eating rice. 330 Some looked visibly unhappy with their new diet
but otherwise they were all healthy looking. Aspinall was transported out of
Singapore with “F” Force to Burma where his photographs began to capture the
harsh reality of the lives of POW working on the railway line. They show men
suffering from dysentery, washing themselves in a cholera-infected river, and men
suffering from the early stages of tropical ulcers. Two photographs featured a parade
of Australian POWs at Shimo Sonkurai No.1 Camp. The men, dressed in rags, are
clearly no more than skin and bone. 331 The caption reads, “‘Fit’ men at Shimo
Sonkurai No.1 Camp”. 332 The use of the noun “fit” is clearly an ironic comment on
Japanese definitions of fitness for the work required on the railway. Aspinall
photographs captured the terrible process that transformed these men into the images
that Australian war correspondents would capture at the end of the war.

By the late 1980s, the POW experience as Australia’s Pacific War experience was
well established. Although Ken Inglis argued that two place-names characterised
Australia’s memory of the Second World War, “Tobruk for a time and Kokoda
entirely”, 333 Kokoda had, in fact, largely slipped from public memory. Paul Keating
would change all that.

The Rise of Kokoda

In 1992, Keating flew by helicopter to the Owen Stanley Ridge on the Kokoda Track
on Anzac Day. Immediately after it landed on the grounds of the Kokoda Track
memorial, Keating stepped off the helicopter and in an unscheduled act, knelt and
kissed the ground. 334 It was an act that the RSL later criticised but Keating was
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confident that his gesture would “long outlive the criticism.” 335 However, it was his
Anzac Day address that year that would have a far greater significance. “The
Australians who served here in Papua New Guinea fought and died, not in the
defence of the old world, but the new world,” said Keating,

…that is why it might be said that, for Australians, the battles in Papua
New Guinea were the most important ever fought...

On the Kokoda Trail it was again the young and inexperienced militia
men - this time of the 39th and 53rd battalions - later reinforced with
soldiers of the 7th Division, who fought gallantly - and eventually
won.

When it seemed that Papua New Guinea would fall, when it seemed it
would be another Singapore, another Rabaul, these troops gallantly
held out and finally drove the enemy back to the sea. These were the
heroic days of Australia's history. 336

In Keating’s interpretation of the order of events and battles that unfolded during the
entire course of the Pacific War, mid-1942 was the decisive year, providing an
imaginary line that divided the Pacfic War between defeat and victory. His speech
was also part of a longstanding question in Australia; should Gallipoli remain solely
the focus of national commemoration in Australia? Humphrey McQueen had
suggested, as early as 1973 that Kokoda was where the Australian nation was really
born. 337 Keating was a latecomer but so, too, was McQueen. That idea had been
established nearly forty years earlier. Keating’s efforts to shift the emphasis of the
Australian memory of the Pacific War to Kokoda echoed the powerful voice of John
Curtin decades earlier.
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John Curtin, Britain and the war against Japan

Prior to the outbreak of the war in the Pacific, British military planners and
politicians had promoted Singapore as the fortress that would protect Australia and
British interests in the Far East. After the First World War, Australian defence
planning, the military and the arms industry had been geared towards British
requirements with promises that Australia’s security would be assured by the
strategic British naval base in Singapore. 338 When Japan commenced hostilities in
December 1941, it prompted Australia’s wartime Prime Minister John Curtin to
reconsider Australia’s traditional crimson thread of kinship and the security of the
Australian people. In Curtin’s New Year’s message published on 27 December 1941
he famously declared that the Australian government

Regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States
and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the
democracies’ fighting plan.

Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia
looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or
kinship with the United Kingdom.

We know the problem the United Kingdom faces. We know the
constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of
strength, but we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still
hold on. 339
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The main thrust of Curtin’s speech emphasised that the security of Australia would
not be compromised by London’s wartime decisions and interests that had yet to
treat the Pacific War as a high priority;

We refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated
as a subordinate segment of the general conflict… Australia asks for a
concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at the Democracies'
disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back.

After the Fall of Singapore in February 1942, Canberra became disillusioned with
British political and military leadership. Indeed, the British debacle at Singapore was
later called the “great betrayal” by the historian David Day. 340 The Fall of Singapore
prompted Canberra to issue a press release further emphasising Curtin’s earlier
message in 1941; “The protection of this country is no longer that of a contribution
to a world at war, but the resistance to an enemy threatening to invade our own
shore…it means the same for Australians in the defence of Australia.” 341 After
Singapore, the string of Australian defeats that followed in Rabaul, Timor and
Ambon drove home Curtin’s message to the Australian nation.

The swift loss of the Netherlands East Indies left Australia facing a real threat to its
safety including the possibility that the Japanese might attempt an actual invasion of
Australia itself. 342 Few in Australia at the time would have predicted that the
security of Australia would be decided on the Kokoda Track. 343 The defence of the
Kokoda Track was fought principally by the locals and Australian militiamen. One
of the earliest contingents of Australian militiamen to arrive in Papua New Guinea
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was the Australian 39th Battalion. 344 It was deployed to hold Kokoda and it would be
involved in most of the fighting in the Papua New Guinea campaign. It went into
action against the Japanese at Kokoda in late July 1942. By early August, it was
overwhelmed by the Japanese and was forced to retreat.

This would be characteristic of the battles fought at Kokoda. The side with the larger
force, air support and better supply lines would decide the outcome of the battle. The
Australian defences during early battles for Kokoda were time and again
overwhelmed by the Japanese who had those elements on their side. For example, on
26 August at the battle of Isurava, the Australians had, on paper, four battalions
deployed – two were militia battalions, the Australian 39th Battalion and the 53rd
Battalion, and the rest were A.I.F battalions, the 2/14 Battalion and the 2/16
Battalion. None of them, however, were battle ready at Isurava. The badly mauled
and exhausted 39th Battalion formed the front elements of the Australian defence.
The two A.I.F battalions reinforcing it had been quickly thrown into battle, arriving
at Isuvara without their mortar and carrier platoons. 345 The Japanese, in contrast,
began the battle with three fresh battalions, reinforced later by two more battalions,
and could call on heavy fire support from their artillery and air force. 346 The
Australians were overwhelmed by superior numbers and firepower that they could
never match. 347

The tables were turned a month later on 28 September when the Australians began
their push from Imita Ridge to retake Kokoda starting with Ioribaiwa. The swift
Japanese thrust weeks earlier had isolated their forward units and badly stretched
their supply lines. The two Japanese battalions defending Ioribaiwa had been
exhausted and depleted, and were without their artillery and air support. 348 This
time, the Australians had the advantage of numbers in the form of four fresh
battalions – the 2/25, 2/31 and the 2/3 A.I.F Battalions, and the 3rd Battalion of the
344
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Australian militia, air support and short supply lines. In the entire Kokoda campaign,
Australia lost 2,165 men, the local Papuan New Guineans 500 and the Japanese
nearly 12,000. 349 It was a campaign that left lasting impressions on both sides. The
defence of Papua New Guinea was hailed as a victory that stopped the enemy at the
gates and Kokoda had become an iconic place name. The Australian defence of
Papua New Guinea was also significant to Australians because it was achieved
largely independent of direct Allied support; the Australian militia did not fight as
part of a Commonwealth contingent, nor under British leadership. The Americans’
role in the campaign was minimal.
It was to Curtin and Kokoda that Don Watson, the “historian-speechwriter” 350 who
prepared Keating’s speech, turned. Australia’s early defeats during the Pacific War
were interpreted as a result of conflicts of interests between Australia, Britain and
the United States in the region; a telegraph war “fought out in Canberra and London
and Washington”. 351 But Curtin defied the leaders in London and Washington by
putting Australian interests first. 352 Curtin made it clear that the war in the Pacific
was not “a subordinate segment of the general conflict.” 353 What Curtin did in 1942,
according to Watson, was to take “the Anzac legend to mean that Australia came
first.” 354 And when it came first, Australia’s security was evidently preserved and
ensured. Curtin’s now famous December 1941 New Year’s speech was quoted but
conflated by Watson; “after the fall (sic) of Singapore, Australia looked to the
United States - free, he [Curtin] said, ‘of any pangs as to our traditional links of
kinship with the United Kingdom’.” 355 Singapore fell to the Japanese in February
1942, more than a month after Curtin’s speech, but putting the two together cleverly
emphasized Keating’s point – Australia must look after itself because it was in a
region that was often outside her Allies’ priority of interests. This was a powerful
message that Keating appropriated sixty years later as part of his “big picture”;
Australia must be more aware of its place in Asia. But Keating had also returned to,
349
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and affirmed, an older tradition, that the Papua New Guinea campaigns had “saved”
Australia. 356 He also privileged the militia over the A.I.F. His reinterpretation of the
events and battles of the Pacific War – “the heroic days of Australia's history” 357
would have an impact on contemporary and popular memories of the war in the
Pacific.

Kokoda and contemporary and popular memory

Popular Australian narratives on the Papua New Guinea Campaigns, like the 2006
film Kokoda and Peter FitzSimons’ book Kokoda, 358 have followed Keating,
highlighting the role of the Australian militia in the campaign. They do so by
emphasizing the differences between the A.I.F and the militia. 359 The latter were
seldom held in high regard as true regular soldiers, a label that was once tagged on
to the first Anzacs prior to the Gallipoli Campaign. 360 Indeed, the Australian
militiamen in the defence of Papua New Guinea remind one of the First A.I.F in
Anzac. Young Australian militiamen were not unlike the first Anzacs who were
briefly trained, put into an Australian military uniform and sent overseas to represent
Australia in a global conflict. 361 They were untested troops going to fight a foreign
enemy. The Gallipoli campaign was characterised by setbacks, defeats and
frustration, often attributed to questionable British political and military leadership.
Yet the A.I.F endured and salvaged its reputation with a flawless retreat from the
peninsular. Keating’s interpretation of the Papua New Guinea campaign borrowed a
similar notion that poor British political and military leadership had led to the Fall of
Singapore. This time however, the A.I.F was cast in the same lot with the British; it
was the Australian militia that endured and salvaged the situation in the Pacific at
Kokoda. As noted in Chapter 1, Australian director Alister Grierson presented this
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best in his film Kokoda when he depicted A.I.F officers in smart uniforms at Kokoda
looking and behaving like British officers were alleged to have behaved at Gallipoli.
It was perhaps no accident that Grierson killed off the A.I.F lieutenant and section
commander of the Australian militiamen protagonists early in his film; to
demonstrate that Australian soldiers performed best when not under professional
military leadership – a trait that resonates in Anzac.

Yet it was not in the Papua New Guinea battles where the militia first made their
presence felt in the Pacific War. It was at Rabaul. A contingent of Australian
militiamen at Rabaul, together with the A.I.F’s 2/22 Infantry Battalion, formed Lark
Force. 362 The first shots fired in anger in Rabaul against the Japanese came from
anti-aircraft batteries manned by Australian militiamen. 363 On 4 January and 16
January, they brought to bear accurate anti-aircraft fire on enemy planes when the
Lakunai aerodrome came under Japanese air attack. Their action resulted in “hasty
and inaccurate [enemy] bombing” 364 saving the lives of many ground troops
defending the aerodrome. The Japanese returned, this time in force to overwhelm the
Australian defenders.

The Japanese invasion of Rabaul commenced on 20 January 1942 with a massive air
raid. The island’s two aerodromes, Lakunai and Vunakanau, as well as the primary
harbour facilities in Rabaul were collectively targeted for bombing by a massive air
armada of 127 bombers. 365 A token force of eight Australian Wirraway fighters of
No. 24 Squadron, RAAF was scrambled to intercept the Japanese. They were met by
twenty Japanese Zero fighter escorts. In the air battle that ensued, only one
Wirraway made it back undamaged; three were shot from the sky, two crash-landed
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and one landed with a shot-out tailplane. 366 Of the sixteen pilots who flew to
challenge the Japanese, only five returned unscathed. 367 The Japanese proceeded to
bomb Rabaul with impunity. Three days later, Japanese ground forces hit the shores.
A famous line was uttered over the radio before the battle began, “We who are about
to die, salute you!” 368 It was spoken by Wing Commander John Lerew, commander
of No. 24 Squadron, RAAF after he received his orders from Australia to defend the
aerodromes of Rabaul with the army. His words reflected the dire situation of Lark
Force. Badly outnumbered, Lark Force was overwhelmed and all Australian lines of
defences were quickly broken days later. Survivors of Lark Force split up into small
parties and withdrew to the north and south coast of the island awaiting
evacuation. 369 The northern parties of some 174 soldiers and sixteen civilians were
evacuated to Cairns on 28 March. 370 Evacuations along the south coast took a longer
time because they maintained strict radio silence. 371 The last group of some 150
Australians to leave Rabaul were evacuated to Port Moresby as late as April. 372

Despite the impressive showing of the Australian Militia with Lark Force and No. 24
Squadron, RAAF, Rabaul did not receive the same emphasis either then, or fifty
years later in Keating’s speech. Rabaul was located on the wrong side of Keating’s
imaginary line where the Australians were defeated time and again by the Japanese.
It did not belong to the “heroic days of Australia's history”. Keating’s influence was
reflected in the Australian government gazetting the first Wednesday of September
each year as the Battle for Australia Day. This particular day was chosen to
represent “the first defeat of Japanese forces on land in the Battle of Milne Bay.” 373
It was not without its controversy. A man who had been stationed in Darwin
maintained that the Federal Government had “gone haywire and they’re doing it on
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the wrong day.” 374 He argued that the Japanese raids on Darwin on 19 February
1942 should mark the real battle for Australia instead. But according to the Minister
for Veterans Affairs, Alan Griffin, the Battle for Australia Day would
“commemorate the service and sacrifice of all those who served in defence of
Australia in 1942 and 1943 when we faced the gravest threats to our nation.” 375 The
Battle for Australia Day would not include those who served in the defence of
Australia before 1942, like Lark Force and the 8th Division. The name itself was
taken from Curtin’s speech on 16 February 1942 when he declared that “the fall of
Singapore opens the battle for Australia,” in the same manner that the Fall of France
had heralded the Battle of Britain. 376 Although originally coined with reference to
the Fall of Singapore, six decades later it would exclude the veterans who served in
the defence of Australia from 1939 up to the Battle of Singapore. Keating’s 1942
imaginary line had become quite a real one.

Kokoda as an affirmation

The Kokoda narratives also suggest a strong link between the original Anzacs and a
continuation of Anzac. 377 The Kokoda narratives reflect popular Anzac traits like
mateship, sacrifice, and endurance, stressing the uniqueness of the Australian
soldiering experience and suggesting that the battles in Papua New Guinea were
fought in the finest traditions of Anzac. Australians have since recognised the
Kokoda campaign for “extraordinary performances of bravery, endurance and
compassion.” 378 When compared to Australian POW narratives, Kokoda seems like a
more natural successor to Anzac and the story of the Australian nation; if Gallipoli
had been the point when Australians began to believe in the concept of a nation,
Kokoda was where the Australian people defended the concept of the Australian
nation, even the new birthplace of the Australian nation. 379 Indeed, a persuasive
argument could be made that Kokoda not only continued, but added, something new
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to Anzac. At Kokoda, the men began to adopt jungle green uniforms that were loose
fitting, wore a jungle hat with its brim down and a sub-machine strung across their
chests, providing a visual conduit to post Second World War conflicts, especially the
jungle conflicts in the Malaya Emergency, the Indonesian Confrontation
(Konfrontasi) and the Vietnam War. 380

In 1995, during the Australia Remembers campaign, the image of Australian POW
remained a central story in Australia’s Pacific War but was no longer the central
story. Kokoda was there as well as Australians “imagined” the Pacific War. 381 And
the elevation of Kokoda and 1942 as a key episode in Australia’s military history
and, by extension, national identity as expressed through the rhetoric of Anzac,
inadvertently emphasized Australian defeats and losses until early 1942. The
journalist Cameron Forbes, writing a commemorative article on the 8th Division in
2005, reflected this when he wrote, “Australian troops made new legends at places
such as Buna, Milne Bay and Kokoda. So in captivity, did their 8th Division
comrades.” 382 The 8th had been relegated to last position. Yet Forbes also reflected
another aspect of the 8th’s place in Australian military history: although Inglis may
have argued that the experience of Australian POWs had been “difficult to graft on
to tradition”, 383 by 2005 it was clearly an accepted part of Anzac. The next chapter
looks at how a Division, whose battle history was short and tarnished by its
commanding officer, and whose men went into captivity have been grafted
uncomfortably on to a tradition.
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Chapter 4
The Experiences of the Men of the Australian 8th Division and Anzac

The emergence of popular myths of Kokoda since the early 1990s during Paul
Keating’s government seems to have overshadowed the Australian POW experience
as a focus of national commemoration. Kokoda narratives have been interpreted to
reflect popular Anzac traits like mateship, sacrifice, and endurance to persuade
Australians to reconsider Anzac. It raises the question; if Gallipoli had been the point
when Australians began to believe in the concept of a nation of people, could
Kokoda be where the Australian people defended the concept of the Australian
nation? Has Kokoda nudged the Australian POW experience, once the focus of
national commemoration of the Pacific War, out of Anzac? Indeed, where do the
experiences of the men of the 8th Division sit in Australia in terms of Anzac?

Returned Australian POWs in Commemorative Space

In August 1945, Ned Hanlon, the premier of Queensland, proposed a national
holiday to welcome home the 8th Division because the men of the division had
suffered hardships “which were worse than anything suffered by the prisoners who
had been held in Europe” 384 – Australian POWs deserved a special place in
Australia. Indeed, since their return, on every 15 February, the veterans have held
private memorial services at St. Andrew’s Cathedral and at the Cenotaph at Martin
Place in Sydney to honour their comrades who did not return. This date
commemorates something that touched the lives of veterans in the division, the
anniversary of the Fall of Singapore. The first 15 February commemoration service
was held in 1946. It was held in the evening “by the officers and men of the Eighth
Division Association, accompanied by nursing sisters” and was described as a “short
service”. 385 By 1948, the 8th Division’s commemorative service was no longer
simply a “short service”. Veterans of the 8th Division marched pass the Cenotaph
384
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before the memorial service began at 0830hrs, the hour when the decision to
surrender Singapore was made. 386
In 1970, the 8th Division would have its own official memorial in Bathurst. It was a
column made of local pink granite in the form of a blade with a broken top. The
figure 8 and a sword-cross are incised on the blade symbolising the 8th Division and
its history. 387 The bronze plaque at the base of the column read “From this district
where most of its units assembled and trained for battle, A.I.F Malaya and the Eighth
Australian Division, A.I.F., went out to long years of tribulation in Malaya and
Southern Asia. In battle courageous, in captivity its spirit remained unbroken.” 388
The memorial was dedicated on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the Pacific
War and the ceremony was attended by over 300 veterans of the division and several
Army Nursing Sisters. 389 The wife of a veteran described it as a “soul-stirring
occasion.” 390 The annual commemoration services of the 8th Division, however, did
not shift to Bathurst but remained at Sydney and with the symbol of Anzac, the
Cenotaph.
Perhaps for these veterans and their descendants, the 8th Division remembrance
service at the Cenotaph continues to preserve for them a place in Anzac. Yet, the
place of the 8th Division within Anzac lies in the POW experience.

Not just POWs
The 8th Division is unique in the sense that it does not have its own published official
history. This is because the division has two histories – one as a traditional military
history and another as POWs reflecting Anzac. The former has been the focus of
commemoration with the men of the 8th Division. This is best reflected during the
60th Anniversary of V-P Day conference in Canberra where Richards reminded us
that
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When considering the members of 8 Division, the emphasis has usually
been on their life as prisoners of war. But we must always remember
that they were first and foremost fighting soldiers and that they upheld
the highest traditions of the Anzacs – both in action and in captivity. 391

Richards had not been alone with these sentiments.

Since the end of the war, former Australian POWs have used published personal
narratives to tell their wartime experiences as POWs. This was because it had been
difficult to accommodate the POW experience into Anzac, yet at the same time, and
as discussed in Chapter 3, former Australian POWs did not want their wartime
experiences to be forgotten. Despite the popularity of Australian POW narratives,
Hank Nelson has pointed out that the veterans of the Australian 8th Division also
gave “every indication that they want their fighting record known, not avoided.”392
Battalion unit histories of the Australian 8th Division reflect this. They typically
devote space in their narrative to the short operational history of the battalion. And in
that space, the battalion’s two months of fighting in Malaya and Singapore are
described extensively and in detail. In many cases, the battalion’s unit history could
even have stopped after Singapore’s capitulation, as did the official war diaries of the
battalions. 393 The rest of the battalion’s unit history is devoted to captivity and is
based largely on oral history. There is a disproportion between the space devoted to
the weeks of combat activity and the years spent in captivity, 394 suggesting that the
men continue to regard their soldiering experiences as paramount to their wartime
experiences. For example, the official battalion unit history of the Australian 2/30
Battalion, Galleghan’s Greyhounds, published in 1949 runs to 404 pages – the
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history of the battalion until its surrender at Singapore ends at page 223. 395 More
than half its history was devoted to the battalion’s and the men’s fighting record. By
the 1980s, however, as the trend of Australian military history and Anzac shifted to
reflect personal stories of former Australian POWs, so did official battalion histories
of the 8th Division. In 1983, the Australian 2/29 Battalion official battalion history, A
History of the 2/29 Battalion – 8th Australian Division A.I.F, published that year was
the last on that emphasized on the men’s soldiering experience. Its authors indicated
at page 117 in this 223-page unit history where Part II begins; the men’s years of
captivity that began from February 1942. 396 Two years later, the official battalion
history of the Australian 2/20 Battalion, Singapore and Beyond was published
reflecting the “new Anzac legend” 397 ; the history of the battalion until the Fall of
Singapore runs to 121 pages but the period of captivity was covered in twice that
length at 243 pages. Don Wall, the official historian of the 2/20 Battalion Association
and author of the battalion’s official history, devoted an entire chapter to document
one labour force. 398 The division’s support arms’ unit histories, however, did not
follow the pattern evident in the infantry unit histories. Their unit histories tended to
give more time to the POW experience. For example, in Through, The Story of the
Signals 8 Australia Division and Signals A.I.F. Malaya, and TID-APA, The History
of the 4th Anti-Tank Regiment, 1940-1945, the men’s three and half years of captivity
constitutes more than half of the unit’s official history. 399 This could be due to the
role of support units in a division; they are seldom in the frontlines participating in
direct combat. Their operational history as a result, may be told in a different style
with different emphasis when compared to combat infantry units. More importantly,
what the 8th Division’s infantry battalions and support arms’ official histories
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indicate is that while at different times different emphasise have been placed on the
men’s experiences, there have always been two aspects to the history of the 8th
Division. And in 1994, Elliott McMaster’s unpublished personal war narrative would
remind us what the two aspects are. In My Experience as a Prisoner of War on the
Burma Thailand Railway, McMaster devoted half his narrative to his short time in
service and action in Malaya and Singapore, and the other half to his three years of
captivity. 400

One Division two memorials
The emphasis on remembering the men of the 8th Division as Australia soldiers is
best reflected in the language of war commemoration used by veterans of the 8th
Division in a rededication ceremony of the Broken Blade memorial in 2009. In May
2008, the 8th Division Broken Blade memorial mentioned earlier was destroyed. A 20
year-old man had jumped and swung on the memorial. The anchor pins of the
memorial buckled causing the memorial to smash into pieces on the ground. 401 A
year later, a memorial modelled on the same features of the original Broken Blade
memorial was rededicated to the 8th Division. Richards was to deliver a
commemorative address but he was unable to do so due to illness. The current
president of the 8th Division Association, (Col.) David Ross delivered Richards’
address. Richards reminded the audience that the original memorial was inspired by
the late Brigadier Sir Fredrick Galleghan, the former commanding officer of the 2/30
Battalion, 402 who famously told his men when the war ended that “you are not going
home as prisoners…you will march down Australian streets as soldiers.” 403
According to Richards, Galleghan was “aware that the emphasis, when discussing
[the] 8th Division, had been on the Forces which fought in Malaya and then on [to]
400
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their POW suffering and deaths.” 404 This excludes the units of the 8th Division that
did not serve in Malaya and Singapore, or became POWs, like the 23rd Infantry
Brigade (made up by the 2/21, 2/22 and 2/40 Infantry Battalions) which served in the
islands north of Australia. Galleghan believed that “there should be a memorial to the
whole 8th Division…he and many others believed they were, first and foremost,
gallant fighting soldiers who [except for the 23rd Brigade] happened to become
POWs. 405 The original Broken Blade monument unveiled in 1970 was that
memorial. In 2009, Richards not only reaffirmed Galleghan’s belief, he expanded it.
The rededicated memorial of the 8th Division also remembers other Australian
servicemen and women who fought with the 8th Division:

The heroic participation of the Royal Australian Navy which protected
convoys and inflicted heavy losses on superior forces, and the Royal
Australian Air Force, who, equipped with obsolescent aircraft,
fearlessly engaged greater numbers of superior Zero fighters. 406

Richards’ words would remind us and situate the Battle of Rabaul, mentioned in the
previous chapter, with the 8th Division’s operation history. The men’s POW
experience was mentioned by Richards but not emphasized. This is because there is a
difference between the experiences that former Australian POWs want to preserve
and present, and Anzac.

Australian Ex-Prisoners of War Memorial

While the Broken Blade memorial in Bathurst mentioned earlier commemorates the
8th Division’s soldiering and fighting record, the men’s POW experiences are
represented in another war memorial in Ballarat, Victoria. In 2004, the Victorian city
of Ballarat unveiled the Australian Ex-Prisoners of War Memorial. The memorial
features a sixty-metre long black granite wall which contains the names of some
35,000 former POWs from the Boer War (200), the First World War (4,000), the
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Second World War (30,000), and the Korean War (29). 407 It is a memorial where all
former Australian POWs, regardless of the conflict, were honoured at one national
memorial. 408 And in keeping with the tradition of war memorials in rural Australia,
obelisks were the main feature of the memorial; six sand-coloured basalt obelisks
and a seventh fallen obelisk to represent POWs who did not return. 409 One of the
main architectural features of the war memorial was its footpath that curiously
resembled railway sleepers in popular Australian POW narratives.

According to the memorial’s designer, Peter Blizzard, he was invited to a meeting at
the Ballarat Botanical Gardens in 1996 to participate in discussions about plans to
replace the existing small stone plaque and flagpole dedicated to local POWs with a
new war memorial. During his research, Blizzard came across the national memorial
dedicated to former Australian POWs at the Duntroon Military Academy in
Canberra; the reconstructed Changi Chapel. Blizzard felt that the Changi Chapel was
“only really relevant to those ex-prisoners who were held in Changi”410 and therefore
came up with the idea in 1997 that there should be one “appropriate national
memorial for all Australian ex-prisoners of war.” 411 The Member for Ballarat,
Catherine King, concurred with Blizzard’s idea; the Changi Chapel in Canberra
commemorates exclusively the memory of the Australian POWs of the Japanese.
King pushed for the construction and dedication of a former Australian POWs
memorial in her constituency because of a large group of former Australian POWs
who had been “extremely dogged” over the last ten years in seeking a national
memorial to recognise all former Australian POWs in “all conflicts and all camps in
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which Australians were incarcerated.” 412 King supported this group of former
Australian POWs because despite their determination, progress on a war memorial
has dragged on and some in the group were “not living to see it built.” 413
Construction of a memorial began in 2003 and a year later the Australian ExPrisoners of War Memorial was unveiled as a war memorial dedicated to the memory
of all former Australian POWs. 414 It would be another four years, however, before
Canberra accepted King’s argument that “the Australian Ex-POW Memorial is not a
local memorial for Ballarat ex-POWs but a memorial for all Australian ex-prisoners
of war.” 415 In 2008, the Australian Parliament recognised the Australian Ex-POW
Memorial in Ballarat as a national war memorial, a first for a local war memorial
outside Canberra.

As noted in Chapter 3, since the 1940s and through to the 1980s, publications of
former POWs of the Japanese had entered into the popular imagination of the
Australian nation, 416 but the experiences of over 8,000 Australian POWs of the
Germans and Italians had been largely ignored and neglected. 417 For them, Australia
had only recently begun the slow process of incorporating them in its national history
to have their names etched an Australian war memorial dedicated in their honour.
The motivation to create an inclusive former Australian POW memorial suggests an
increasing need to acknowledge and recognise other Australian POWs beyond the
war in the Pacific, and even beyond the Second World War. It was in some ways
politically incorrect for the expression “ex-prisoners” in Australia to be synonymous
with Australian POWs of the Japanese. Blizzard had correctly identified that the
popular memory of Australian POWs was characteristically the story of the prisoners
of the Japanese. Yet, his design for a universal POW memorial featured a footpath
that resembled railway sleepers as its main architectural feature. Australian historians
412
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have pointed this out, even suggesting that Blizzard’s design was inspired by the
iconic Thai-Burma Death Railway of popular POW literature. 418 Blizzard explained
that the choice of design for the footpath as a central feature of the memorial was a
“reference to the iconic journeys” 419 of all former POWs. King however, confirmed
the connection between the footpath and railway sleepers when she told the
Australian House of Representatives that the “pathway, long and straight,
interspersed with shapes like railway sleepers [was] a reference to the [Thai-]Burma
railway.” 420 Despite the motivation to acknowledge all, and broaden the Australian
POW experiences, a familiar icon featured in POWs narratives of the Pacific War
remained the symbolic, if not stereotypical, representation of Australian POWs.

The Australian POW experience and Anzac
Jack Varley, a lieutenant in the 8th Division’s 2/19 Battalion wrote to a Sydney
Morning Herald journalist that his battalion, having fought in Singapore and lost half
its men, 421 was “one of the most distinguished and yet unrecognised A.I.F battalions
in World War II.” 422 But whenever questions are raised about the A.I.F in Malaya, in
schools or with the public, the popular response is “they became POWs and built a
railway line for the Japs.” 423 Varley’s sentiment was shared by other veterans from
the 8th Division. In his summation of his wartime experiences, Stephen Jared from
the 2/20 Battalion said he wanted “to be remembered as a soldier…a soldier who did
our job and we did what we were told”, 424 not as a former Australian POW. Patrick
Darling’s experiences of the war in Singapore and Malaya was characterised by the
memory of his mates and unit, the 2/30 Battalion, “We were just proud of ourselves,
we were a proud battalion.” 425 Their voices echoes the experiences of First World
War Australian veterans discussed by Thomson in his Anzac Memories – returned
servicemen and women have had to negotiate their personal wartime experiences
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with contemporary interpretations of Anzac. 426 Since the end of the Second World
War, the experiences of returned Australian servicemen and women in the war in
Singapore are typically cast as POW narratives. This is because these narratives have
been cast to reflect something else; “Anzac memories”.427

There is one key element in the Australian POW experience that naturally ensures its
place with Anzac. The Australian defeat at Singapore resonated strongly with the
defeat at Gallipoli. And defeat in battle is at the root of Anzac. The foundation of
Bean’s Anzac rests on the notion of triumph in the aftermath of a defeat. If the
Anzacs had been victorious at Gallipoli, there would have been less need to interpret
the campaign using a distinctively Australian soldiering tradition. An Australian
victory could better negate the suffering, loss and sacrifices of the Anzacs. Major
military defeats like ones at Gallipoli and the Fall of Singapore on the other hand,
required something else. In the Gallipoli Campaign, the first Anzacs’ tenacity,
resourcefulness, resilience and mateship during and after the campaign ameliorated
the fact that the campaign ended in defeat for Australia and the British Empire. A
similar process had transformed the defeat and loss of the 8th Division in Singapore
from a tragedy to triumph with stories of tenacity, resourcefulness, resilience and
mateship in captivity. Sanctifying the Australian digger and linking the digger to the
cult of the fallen soldier helps Australians make sense out of a nation’s tremendous
sacrifices. 428 It connects the Fall of Singapore with Gallipoli. The Fall of Singapore
encapsulates what other Australian campaigns like Kokoda could not; a great
military defeat in the battlefield but in the aftermath, a spiritual and moral triumph
over the adversities that accompanied the defeat. The Fall of Singapore and the POW
experience therefore would naturally have a place in Anzac. But it found other
resonances in Anzac through both the Anzac tradition and the digger myth that
allowed the POW experience to be seen as part of Anzac. Simpson and his donkey
was one.
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The higher survival rates of former Australian POWs in the Pacific War have been
attributed to a group of dedicated personnel in Australian POW camps, Australian
Army medical personnel and their orderlies. During Anzac Day in 1998, former
Australian Prime Minister John Howard highlighted the memory and legacy of
medical personnel in Japanese POW camps:

Albert Coates, Bruce Hunt, Roy Mills, Weary Dunlop and every one
of their colleagues. The compassion of medical orderlies who risked
their own lives in cholera wards tending the sick and the dying. 429

In his extensive experience interviewing former POWs in the Pacific, Nelson noted
that they would often “reserve their highest praise for the medical officers” 430 and
they would add to Howard’s list the names of Lloyd Cahill, Ian Duncan, Kevin
Fagan, David Hinder, Alan Hobbs and Rowley Richards. 431 Sister Vivian
Bullwinkel’s story of survival and those of her fellow nurses on board the SS Vyner
Brooke, as noted in Chapter 1, were also cast in similar light. 432 The skills, labour
and dedication of medical personnel and orderlies in POW camps was often cited as
a major contribution to the survival of Australian POWs during their time in
captivity. Indeed, in most narratives on the Thai-Burma Death Railway, former
Australian prisoners-of war recalled how Australian medical personnel in their
camps often pushed the limits of their medical and healthcare knowledge to aid the
sick and displayed an extra-ordinary level of humanity, endurance, self-sacrifice and
mateship. 433 They also highlighted the fact that Australian medical doctors in their
unit were often “the buffer between the sick and the Japanese”;434 shielding prisoners
who were too sick to work by “haggling” with Japanese supervisors over who could
or could not work. 435 In A Doctor’s War, former Australian POW and medical
officer Rowley Richards recalled one such haggling session:
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Haggling commenced with my initial offer.
“This man, Malaria. No duty, five days.”
Invariably the guard by my side would disagree: “No. One Day.”
I would shake my head. “No. Very sick. Four days,” holding up four
fingers.
If I was lucky, the guard would come back with another counter offer:
“Two days.”
Then quickly I would offer “three days”, with fingers held in the air.
Bang. Sold! 436

The process would be repeated with nearly every man on sick parade. And if the
numbers on sick parade began to pile up, it was not uncommon for guards to abuse
the doctor for failing to provide at least eighty-five percent of the men for work. 437
“The medical officer”, recalled one former POW in a work camp at Burma, “got
beaten up every day because he had so many sick in the camp.” 438 Medical personnel
and orderlies continue to be an integral part of the Australian POW narrative because
of the Australian values they allegedly reflect. Indeed, when former Australian
POWs highlighted the legacy of medical personnel and orderlies at their POW
camps, it echoes the tradition of one of the most enduring icons and narratives of
Anzac, John Simpson Kirkpatrick’s one man ambulance service, a story often
regarded as “the embodiment of the Australian values”. 439

The lingo used by former Australian POWs harks back to the language of the
diggers, a central theme in Bean’s Anzac. The language of the diggers, according to
Graham Seal, is characterised by expressions showing “a sense of coherence and
self-identification as members of a social group”, in particular the “digger group”. 440
The language, or lingo, of the digger group sets it apart from other groups, especially
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other troops of the British Empire. 441 The language is also uniquely Australian,
consisting of terms and expressions from nineteenth-century rural occupational
speech, larrikin street-slang and expressions commonly used by Australian troops in
the Middle East and in Europe during the First World War. Contributions to The
Anzac Book like this one on a Turkish sniper are a good example:

Johnny Turk sat and sniped from a hill,
And he might have been sniping from there still
If a ‘Queen Lizzie’ shell
Hadn’t blown him to…well,
Where, in time, he will meet Kaiser Bill. 442

Johnny Turk and other nicknames like Abdul were created by the First Anzacs for
their enemies, the Turkish soldiers. By the time of the war in the Pacific, the
Australian digger vocabulary was expanded with more nicknames like “little yellow
men”, “japs”, “jeeps”, “nips” or “little yellow bastards”, 443 this time for their
enemies the Japanese. Indeed, Australia prisoners of the Japanese during the Second
World War quickly developed their own language with expressions like “jappy”
which referred to men thought to be too accommodating towards the Japanese, and
those who collaborated with the Japanese were called “white Nip” or “white Jap”. 444
And

familiar

unhappiness

445

themes

–

larrkinism,

anti-authoritarianism,

discontent

and

- were also there, even if the location and the officers had changed.

Two examples make the point. In Changi Photographer, George Aspinall shared his
account of a Japanese lieutenant who could speak English warning Australian POWs
against pilfering goods from the warehouses where they worked. According to
Aspinall, big crates would “always seem to slip off the slide” 446 and crash to the
ground, and not all the contents would find their way back into the original container.
441

442

ibid., p.24
G. Seal (ed.), Echoes of Anzac: The Voices of Australians at War, Thomas C. Lothian, Melbourne,

2005, p.40
443

ibid., p.201
ibid., p.201
445
ibid., pp.200-201
446
T. Bowden, Changi Photographer, George Aspinall’s Record of Captivity, ABC Enterprises,
444

Sydney, 1984, p.58

95

One day a Japanese lieutenant assembled Aspinall and his men, stood on a crate and
addressed them,

“Now you Australian soldier, I am going to speak to you in your own
language. You think we Japanese stupid people, that Japanese soldier
not know what Australian soldier steal. You think we know f***nothing what happens here. Well you are wrong Australian soldier. We
Japanese know f***-all!!” 447

In another example, the popular digger expression during the First World War
expressing discontentment, “wouldn’t it root ya?!” had by the time of the Second
World War has became “wouldn’t it rotate yer?!” or “wouldn’t it rip yer?!” or
“wouldn’t it rock yer?!” or simply “wouldn’t it?!” 448 A cartoon featured in a
battalion’s bulletin published in 1941 in Malaya shows the expression in use in the
Second A.I.F. 449 It features many discomforts that the men in Malaya faced to
challenge the popular notion back home that Malaya was a relaxed backwater Allied
station. The caption that ran with it read “If I could lay my hands on the woman
journalist who said soldiering in Malaya was a round of dinners and dances, I’d
wring her neck, wouldn’t it?”

450

(See illustration at the end of chapter) Chapter 5

later in this thesis will show that even today, when challenging the RSL over the
interpretations of Anzac, veterans of the Australian 8th Division still use the language
of the diggers. It goes back to Seal’s thesis in Inventing Anzac; there is a difference
between the digger and Anzac.

One powerful theme in Anzac that characterises the Australian POW experience in
the Pacific War is mateship. It was a trait that veterans of the Second A.I.F shared
even though there is “relatively little mention of the subject in their songs, yarns or
verse”. 451 According to Seal, a survey was conducted by John Barrett on the popular
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memories of Second World War soldiers and of the 3,700 veterans surveyed, sixty
percent of them said that “mateship” ranked “first or highly favoured” about the
things they liked about life in the A.I.F.452 For example, before Rowley Richards was
captured as a POW, he was a medical officer in the Australia 2/15 Field Regiment,
8th Division and he remembered that mateship in a regiment such as his was,

Laid shortly after the regiment was formed when the men were
allocated to a gun crew or other small group…then they become
identified with a gun crew or other small group in which they learnt to
be part of a closely-knit team who trained together, ate together and
lived together…thus was born mateship that endured many future
hardships. 453

Indeed, it was not uncommon for A.I.F units to be raised with volunteers from the
same regional districts. For example, with the battalions that formed the 8th
Division’s 22nd Infantry Brigade, the Australian 2/18 Infantry Battalion was raised
with volunteers from Northwest New South Wales, the Australian 2/19 Infantry
Battalion from the Monaro and Riverina districts of New South Wales, and the
Australian 2/20 Infantry Battalion from the North Coast of New South Wales.
Mateship with the veterans of the 8th Division, like nearly other A.I.F units, was
reinforced with bonds of regional identity and kinship.

Mateship in the Australian POW experience had its origins in the veterans’ active
service but it was expressed more strongly while in captivity. From April 1942,
Allied POWs interned at Changi were transported to other parts of the Japanese
Empire in large contingents as labour “Forces”. All former Allied command
structures were broken up as each labour “Force” was mustered; the Japanese
regarded all POWs as one huge pool of slave labour. The first of such labour
“Forces” transported out of Singapore was “A” Force, which left Changi for Burma
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on 14 May 1942 with three thousand Australian prisoners of war. 454 Only a
rudimentary administrative battalion command structure was used to organise the
men in each of these “Forces”. 455 “A” Force was organised into three groups
consisting of a thousand men each. “B” Force was raised with nearly 1500 Australian
POWs and they departed Changi for Korea on 8 July 1942. The A.I.F in Singapore
was systematically broken up. The Australian 2/20 Infantry Battalion, for example,
was split up with men going with “A Force” to Burma, “D Force” to Thailand, and “J
Force” to Japan. 456 After arriving at their destinations, the labour “Forces” were
further reorganised into Japanese administrative groups. In Thanbyuzayat in Burma,
Australian working parties were reorganised into Japanese kumis, a group of fifty
men under the charge of a kumicho, usually a junior officer with the rank of
Lieutenant. 457 By the end of the war, the men of the 8th Division were scattered all
over various parts of the Japanese Empire.
The battalions may have been disbanded but the “group strength” 458 of mateship with
Australian POWs had kept the men together, even becoming a survival skill in its
own right. Many former Australian POWs were equipped with survival skills
developed whilst growing up in the bushland of regional Australia but they did not
put their skills to use solely for their own individual survival. At “Cholera Hill” at
Songkurai along the Thai-Burma Railway there were a number of “country coves” 459
from rural Australia who were regarded as pillars of strength because with them
around “it doesn’t matter what conditions you’re living in, in the bush; you’ll be
OK.” 460 Lloyd Cahill for example, remembered an Australian POW called Edwards
Ringer who could start a fire “within about five minutes” in a pouring monsoon rain
to warm other fellow mates during breaks on forced marches. 461 Other Australians
could set up kitchens and latrines for the welfare of fellow Australians – skills and
initiatives that were seldom displayed by their British counterparts who had “never
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been out in the bush or anywhere at all.” 462 References to mateship as an expression
of “group strength” could even be found in the personal recollections of Australian
POWs after the war. For example, during his time at a labour camp along the ThaiBurma Railway, Richards recalled that unlike the POWs of other nationalities, he
could not see any Australian digger who was alone:

I can’t recall any Australian that was ever in a position where there
was just himself. But I can recall plenty of occasions with, say the
Dutch or even the British where a man would be dying and he
wouldn’t seem to have any mates. He would just die on his own. I
don’t recall a single Australian dying without somebody to look after
him in some way. 463

The display of mateship was often seen as a visible trait that distinguished Australian
POWs from the other groups of nationalities in Japanese POW camps. And despite
the terrible conditions that affected all POWs the rates of survival of former
Australian POWs were by much higher when compared to other nationalities.464

Yet, mateship raises the problems identified by Thomson earlier in this chapter.
Whilst integral to the POW stories, it was only part of the story of survival in
captivity. Former Australian POWs recalled that throughout their time in captivity,
other factors kept them going despite the difficult times. The hope and powerful
desire to return to loved ones back home in Australia was one.465 Malnutrition,
starvation, disease and acts of brutality were overcome with the former POWs’
“dogged determination to return to their families and loved ones.” 466 Aid was given
by local people who helped captured Australian soldiers survive the terrible
conditions in Japanese prisoner of war camps. Richards in his memoir on the Pacific
war had described how in Japan the local Japanese risked their personal safety to aid
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Australian POWs; a Japanese doctor shared his lunch with POW patients, 467 and his
friend a butcher secretly reserved portions of horse meat for Australian POWs to take
to patients at a prison hospital. 468 At times guards would even shield Australian
POWs from physical abuse. Richards recalled

On one occasion a Korean guard, reported to be a Christian, was
ordered to bash me by a drunk Japanese officer, whom he detested. He
took me out of sight, but within hearing, of the officer and proceeded to
shout abuse at me and hit his open hand with a clenched fist to make
the noise of a thorough bashing. 469

The experiences of former Australian POWs are diverse but they also negotiate their
personal memories to include Anzac as most First World War veterans did in
Thomson’s discussion in Anzac Memories. 470 However, the personal experiences and
narratives of former Australian POWs could also be appropriated to reinforce a
popular, and national, narrative by political leaders.

John Howard and the Australian POW experience

During Anzac Day in 1998 when former Australian Prime Minister John Howard
paid tribute to the former Australian POWs of the Japanese, he said:

Although eclipsed by their valour in captivity, the achievement of these
men [of the Australian 8th Division] in the opening battles of the Pacific

467

R Richards, op cit., p.253
ibid., p.259
469
Seminar paper presented by R. Richards, titled “A Medical Officer’s Experience including his
voyage to Japan and time in Sakata Camp”, at a seminar Towards a Better Understanding: Reflections
on the Experiences of Australian Prisoners of War of the Japanese, sponsored by the Division of
Pacific and Asian History, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National
University and the POW Research Network of Japan. Richards’ account of this incident is also found
in his memoir, A Doctor’s War, p.141. His account differs a little, in A Doctor’s War, the Japanese
officer, Naito, had ordered a Japanese guard give Richards a good beating. The guard led him away
but an older Korean guard had arrived and told the Japanese guard that he would carry out the order
instead. Richards then described that ‘the Korean screamed loudly at me and proceeded to punch a
fist into the palm of his own hand repeatedly…right next to my face, creating the impression that I
was being thoroughly beaten: flesh on flesh
470
A. Thomson, op cit., p.206
468

100

war was equal to the finest of military traditions. In small savage
actions, an unstoppable enemy was fought to a standstill. 471
Howard made no references to the Australian 8th Division in his Anzac Day
speeches in 1998. So closely linked are the 8th Division and POWs that Howard felt
no need to name the division specifically. Howard’s description of the 8th Division is
also odd history. Although Howard was paying tribute to the men of the 8th Division
in Malaya and Singapore, he was more accurately describing the 39th Battalion in
Papua New Guinea in 1942. The opening battles of the Pacific war in Malaya and
Singapore could be hardly called “small savage actions”. Rather, they were
traditional large textbook military manoeuvres. 472 And if the 8th Division had fought
the “unstoppable enemy…to a standstill”, there would have been no need for the
Australian militia to hold the line in Papua New Guinea, and the Papua New Guinea
campaigns would not have been important to the defence of Australia in 1942. What
Howard had described were actually Australians in the defence of Papua New
Guinea where the Japanese were fought to a standstill by pockets of Australian
defences in small savage actions. Howard had conflated the battles at Papua New
Guinea with the early Australian campaigns of 1941-42. Howard was echoing his
predecessor’s legacy with Kokoda in 1992.
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What was more problematic with Howard’s interpretation was his appropriation of
the Australian POW experience. According to Howard, Australian POWs had their
mates:

…who would carry a man’s pack or his body when pain or fatigue
became too much, mates who would break all the rules or give up
their own meagre rations to a friend in need. Mates who listened to
last words whispered from dying lips – it’s been said that no
Australian was allowed to die alone. Mates who contained their fear
but freely shared their courage and strength… Indeed, in the care
given to the sick and injured, the Anzac legend found a new form. 473

By emphasizing mateship in the former Australian POW experience in the Pacific
War, Howard affirmed the 8th Division’s place in Anzac as a story of captivity. In
doing so, he not only ignored other factors that helped the men survive but
overlooked one element that the 8th also saw as vital in securing its place in Anzac –
its battle history. And that was clearly evident in November 2003.

On Remembrance Day in 2003, Howard dedicated the Australian War Memorial in
London. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs had a named list of forty-seven
Australian battle sites from the two World Wars chosen by the Services, the
Australian Department of Veterans’ Affairs and the Australia War Memorial etched
on the walls of the memorial. The placename “Malaya” was not featured.
“Singapore” was. It reflects Howard’s efforts in 1998 to reaffirm the Australian
POW experience as part of Anzac– “Singapore” represents the collective Australian
POW experience. “Malaya” would represent the 8th Division’s fighting record, and
one that has been cast aside years earlier by Keating and “Kokoda”. The Department
of Veterans’ Affairs justified the selection of placenames arguing that its list was
“not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to reflect the geographical spread of the
service and sacrifice of Australians during the two World Wars.” 474 Di Elliot, who
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lost a relative in the 8th Division during the war, disagreed. She wrote to the
Department of Veterans’ Affairs stating that she and others found “the omission of
Malaya offensive to the men of the 8th Division A.I.F.” 475 The choice of featuring
“Singapore” and omitting “Malaya” is an interesting one because it reflects the
meanings and interpretations that may have been tagged on them in Australia today.
Elliot demonstrated this when she argued that the omission of “Malaya” was
“anything short of yet another slur on the history of the 8th Division who [sic], for
some reason, are seen by today’s historians as nothing more than ‘those who became
prisoners of war’.” 476 “Malaya” and “Singapore” were previously seldom considered
as separate campaigns. Today, however, they seem to reflect the way politicians and
veterans view the 8th Division’s past. It echoes the way two national war memorials
in Australia, the Broken Blade at Bathurst and the Ex-Prisoners of War Memorial at
Ballarat, represent the collective, but at the same time the seemingly mutually
exclusive wartime memories and experiences of the men of the 8th Division.

Kokoda or Changi?

As discussed in Chapter 1, the names Malaya and Singapore have become
placenames in Anzac that connect Australians in a shared and national tradition
across time and space. The power of myth, as Cohen argues, comes from its ability to
simplify events or experiences to convince. 477 Its ability to convince is further
multiplied when certain events or experiences have been simplified with icons and
traits already familiar in a nation’s popular history. The emphasis on key themes in
the Australian POW experience discussed earlier that also reflect Anzac was a
necessary step to ensure that the Australian POW experience could be
accommodated in “a niche within the chain of Anzac memory”. 478 And the
mythologisation of Australian POW experiences was a necessary process to ensure
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that Anzac could continue to run like a “collective story” 479 in “a single line
summary” 480 that ran from the Anzacs at Gallipoli, the Western Front, Tobruk,
Changi, and on to Vietnam and East Timor.

The immense popularity of Kokoda narratives and the elevation of the campaign as
an important event in Australia’s history – the “Battle of Australia Day”, as
discussed in the previous chapter, have suggested that Kokoda could be elevated as
the birthplace of the Australian nation. 481 What Keating had done was to rescue
Kokoda from a language of war commemoration that had been grounded on the
Australian POW experience. Howard on the other hand, reaffirmed a popular
narrative and established tradition that seems to have been eclipsed by Keating’s
“Kokoda”. With the passing of First War veterans, Keating and Howard have, in
their affirmation and reinforcement of Anzac, suggested two groups of war veterans
who could inherit Anzac; former Australian prisoners-of war in the Pacific War and
veterans of the Kokoda Campaign. 482 Both former Prime Ministers offered the
possibility that either Changi or Kokoda, could be trajectories for the continuation of
Anzac. The dichotomy however, is a false one. Changi and Kokoda both belong to
the politics and language of war commemoration in Australia. Both have elements
that are central to Anzac. Keating’s and Howard’s interpretations of key events in
Australia’s wartime past instead suggest efforts to position themselves as “inheritors
and articulators of the true Anzac spirit”. 483 As both former Australian leaders
promoted different aspects of Anzac with Changi and Kokoda, they introduced a
false dichotomy into the legacy and the continuation of Anzac. Beyond the politics
479
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and language of war commemoration, however, where do the personal memories of
the men who returned from Changi, and their families, sit in Australia today?

Giving you the picture: A cartoon featured in the 2/20 battalion’s bulletin published in 1941 in Malaya using the
language of the diggers to challenge popular notions back home of serving in Malaya – “Wouldn’t it?”
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Chapter 5
The 8th Division Today

In the home of the late Ray Brown, a former Australian POW and veteran the
Australian 2/30 battalion, and former president of the 8th Division Association, are
albums of photographs that he had taken on his social visits back to an adopted
family in Malaysia living near the site of his battalion’s greatest battle, the ambush at
Gemencheh Bridge. Brown would travel to Singapore and Malaysia with his wife, or
at times with his mates who survived the war, but his photographs do not capture any
of his children with him. Brown was unusual in the sense that he retained links with
Singapore and Malaysia, yet typical in the way that his children were somehow
excluded. This chapter asks how former Australian POWs and their families regard
the 8th’s place in the war, and their personal experiences of it, after more than sixty
years have passed. To answer that question, two formal interviews were conducted
with former POWs. (The difficulties of finding more veterans to be interviewed will
be discussed later in this chapter). More importantly, information was gathered
during informal conversations with former POWs and their families this researcher
met during Anzac Day commemorations, especially members of the 2/20 and 2/30
Battalion Associations. It is a story of silence, discovery and of defiance.

The “Associates” and “Originals”
Every year on Anzac Day, veterans of the 8th Division continue to march in honour
of their fallen comrades. In 2006, the division was represented by its infantry
battalions; the Australian 2/18, 2/19, 2/20, 2/26, 2/29, 2/30 Battalions, and its support
units, the 2/15 Field Regiment and the 8th Division Signals. Despite their age, some
in their early nineties, veterans marched with their battalion colours. Other veterans
who could not march because of ill-health were represented by their descendants
who wore their medals, in accordance to Anzac Day protocol, on their right breast.
They were also joined by others wearing the medals of their deceased veteran family
member. After the Anzac Day march, most battalion associations retire for lunch or
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drinks. The 2/30 Battalion Association traditionally organises a reunion lunch at the
City Tattersall’s Club in Sydney. The 2/15 Field Regiment Association also have
their reunion lunch at the Tattersalls Club in Sydney. In another function room just
next door, the 2/20 Battalion Association has its annual Anzac Day reunion and their
Annual General Meeting.

The 2/20 Battalion Association’s 2006 reunion lunch was attended by thirteen
veterans from the battalion. The battalion association makes a clear distinction
between its members; ordinary members of the association like family members are
known as “Associates” while surviving veterans of the war are given the distinctive
title of “Original”, indicating that they were the original members of the battalion
association. Many “Originals” came with their families but the majority of the
guests at the lunch were “Associates”. A number of them brought along their fathers’
(in some cases mothers’) medals and in some instances even a portrait.
Conversations with the “Associates” and “Originals” tell us how their memories of
war sit in Australia today.

Dad’s Silence

Carolyn Newman, the daughter of a former Australian POW and editor of Legacies
of Our Fathers, 484 a collection of the experiences of twenty-three Australians whose
fathers were imprisoned by the Japanese, recalled that after the war her father “came
home but was never really home.” 485 She commented that in her conversations with
other descendants of former Australian POWs that “it is clear they [our fathers] kept
something inside, hidden away from us all.” 486 But they had shared it with outsiders.
Patrick Darling, a former Australia POW and veteran of the 8th Division interviewed
for this research, reflected that: “I have [shared my experience] with other people but
I never did with me family much”, 487 he recalled. And when asked why, he replied,
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“Oh I don’t know but it was something that I often wondered why.” 488 Darling was
probably puzzled why he needed to give reasons for doing what he and many others
like him felt was the right thing to do after their return from captivity. As noted
earlier in this thesis, coping with their POW experiences included not discussing it
openly with their families. They therefore often found their own ways to deal with
their experiences. Although Ray Brown credited his wife, Marion, for being there
(“she was my backstop”, he said), 489 it did not include talking about his experiences.
When it became too difficult, Brown would get on his motorbike and ride out to a
river and “just sit there a couple of hours… [and] that it’d be it. I’d come back and be
alright again.” 490 He found out later that his friends were doing similar things to cope
with life after the war. 491 Brown also recalled that if some misfortune had stuck him
or his mates, they would contact each other and “by sharing our experiences before
the war and tramping over the hills at Bathurst, Don’s of Tamworth (sic), getting
drunk together, all that sort of thing”, 492 – they helped each other to get back on track.
His experience was common in the Pacific War former POW community; in the
years that followed the end of the war, as difficulties grew between the former POWs
and their families, many retreated to their close circle of mates who had survived the
war together. 493 There they found group-strength, comfort and understanding in the
reminiscing of personal and collective war stories. Rowley Richards often used the
analogy that unless we have supped from the same cup, we can never know the
experience. 494

The constant sharing of their experiences within a trusted group has established an
interesting group behaviour in the former Australian POWs circles, the appointment
of their own unofficial battalion historian, usually former Australian POWs, or a
descendant of one, as a custodian of, or surrogate, for their memories and
experiences. Recently, invitations to Australian former POWs for interviews tend to
488
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be answered with recommendations to contact the custodian historian veteran, or a
descendant of one, who has kept up to date with the men’s wartime experiences, the
broader war literature and information about the battalion’s history. For the 2/20
Battalion it is Bart Richardson and for the 2/30 Battalion it was Ray Brown. Such
group behaviour has the side effect of reinforcing “Dad’s silence”.

The silence between former Australian POWs and their descendants and family kin
has even been presented in the popular media in Australia. In the Australian
television series, Changi, the first episode of the series was devoted entirely to the
theme of silence between one former POW and his supportive wife. The title of the
episode was “Seeing is Believing” and it tells the story of David Collins (played by
Charles “Bud” Tingwell) a property developer and a former Australian POW in
Singapore. Collins was returning to Changi after a work detail and was stopped and
badly beaten up by a group of Japanese soldiers, leaving him with a concussion and
temporary blindness. After the ordeal, he was found and picked up by another group
of Japanese soldiers who were transporting a group of locals to an unspecified
location. Collins was tied up with the group of locals. His eyesight recovered a little
just in time to for him to catch a blurry vision of a freshly dug grave in front of him.
The Japanese then opened fire with their weapons. They were conducting a
massacre. Collins fell into the grave. He was not shot but he heard the terrible cries
of those who were shot and bodies falling into the mass grave. Collins survived the
massacre but he carried with him the traumatic memory and experience of it. In his
old age, when Collins was having trouble with his eyesight after an operation that left
him temporarily blind, it brought back memories of the massacre. As he struggled to
come to terms with it, his wife Kate (played by Jill Perryman) supported him but was
increasingly frustrated by his refusal to speak of his experiences. Appeals from Kate
to open up were met with silence from Collins. Collins and his wife are fictional
characters but the story resonates with families of former Australian POWs.

Descendants of former Australian POWs are unsure as to the reasons why their
fathers would want to withhold information about their past from them. It has been
frustrating for the “Associates” but they accept it. They were also quite unanimous in
the belief that their father had good reasons for doing so. Some “Associates” felt that
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because the war in Malaya and Singapore was a defeat and surrender, it was not
something to be discussed in the family, and hence their silence. Other “Associates”
felt that the prisoner of war experience was a personal story to be shared only with
their mates who survived under similar conditions. Some also reasoned that after
their return from the war, their fathers were encouraged to move on with their lives
and not be overly burdened by bitter memories of the war. With little government
assistance and the reluctance of the Australian government to recognise that former
Australian POWs under Japanese captivity needed special assistance, they were
simply encouraged as noted earlier, to “tough it out” and leave the war behind. 495
Yet, if the men were reluctant to talk, and their descendants were willing to offer
explanations for the silence, it did not necessarily follow that their descendants do
not want to know. They do.

Searching for Dad’s Story

In October 2001 the National Archives of Singapore (NAS), conducted an interview
with an Australian veteran and former POW, Lieutenant Penrod Dean for material to
feature in a heritage centre. Dean hails from Western Australian and during the war
he was an officer in the 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion, Australian 8th Division. The
focus of the interview was on Dean’s experience during the Battle of Singapore. This
was a marked departure from traditional oral history interviews conducted with
survivors and veterans of the war in Singapore that traditionally focus on the POW
experience rather than their battle experience. Dean’s interview with the NAS was
also the first time that his daughter had heard a complete account of his wartime
experiences. Interestingly enough, the NAS followed up with an interview conducted
with Dean’s daughter and her husband in 2002. During her interview (the NAS did
not record her name, indicating that the emphasis was on Dean’s story) she was
overwhelmed with emotion when describing how she felt after she had heard what
her father had experienced during the war as an Australian soldier and officer.
According to her, “my father spoke very little of what he been through…rarely
would he ever discuss it or speak about it…and it is so important that we his family
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know and appreciate what he suffered, and I just wished he talked sooner.” 496 She
put particular emphasis on the last part of her sentence.

The experiences of other descendants of former Australian POWs were similar to
those of the Dean family. The “Associates” of the 2/20 Battalion Association are
keenly aware of their fathers’ role in the war and they yearn to know more. But they
often spoke of “Dad’s silence”. One descendant remarked at the 2/20 Battalion
Association’s 2006 reunion lunch said she had “collected so much stuff on Dad” and
added “but they are all in pieces here and there.” 497 This was because “Dad only told
us a bit here and there and I would write them down on bits of paper and keep
them.” 498 There was also a sense of frustration in the way their fathers were, like
Dean, ready and happy to talk to people outside the family circle about their
experiences but not to them. As one remarked, “Dad would tell strangers he just met
about the war and would not tell us anything.” 499 In their efforts to document their
father’s wartime experiences, the “Associates” would admit to eavesdropping on
their father’s conversations with his mates during social gatherings. The descendant
of one veteran recalled that “when dad is telling them stuff, I would go and listen and
then take down what he just told them.” 500 This appeared to be a popular method
amongst the “Associates” when it came to seeking information about their fathers’
personal wartime experiences. 501 But Dad's story was never a complete one.

In their desire to learn about their father’s wartime experiences, descendants often
turn to published works on the war in Malaya and Singapore to supplement their
research. A battalion’s official war history and published POW narratives are popular
sources of information for descendants eager to reconstruct their fathers’ wartime
experiences to learn about their role in Malaya and Singapore. During the 2/20
Battalion Association reunion lunch in 2006 copies of the official 2/20 Battalion
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history were on sale but James Keady, the association’s secretary, quickly found out
that he had not brought enough copies that day; they were sold-out as soon as they
were put on display. There had also been enquiries about future publications on the
history of the battalion and the division. Conversations with the “Originals” and
“Associates” that day also brought up recommendations of recently and previously
published POW narratives. This suggests that the “Associates” consider published
wartime literature to be a good representation of the “Original’s” wartime
experiences. However, it also indicates that there is a problem with the transmission
of memories from father to descendant. Until their father was ready to share his story
directly, family members could only turn to what had been readily available;
published POW narratives and official unit war histories. And until the men would
talk unreservedly to their families and descendants, their descendants would depend
largely on indirect sources of information in their attempts to understand their
fathers’ wartime experiences. The descendants’ knowledge and memory of their
fathers’ past, then, are often peripheral and reconstructed from external information,
a collection of stories told by other veterans that they take as a close approximation
of their fathers’ wartime experiences.

For some descendants whose fathers had died during the war, external information
was the only means to understand their father’s role and experiences in the war. A
daughter of a 2/20 Battalion veteran had collected considerable information about her
father’s wartime experiences but did not know how to position his experiences. 502
She and her sisters knew that their father was sent to Singapore as part of a
reinforcement battalion, “They were quickly sent to Malaya and Singapore because
they needed the numbers. It looked nice on paper but these men were not even
trained to be soldiers.” In the event her father was sent to reinforce the Australian
2/20 battalion that fought against the Japanese in Singapore. He was listed on the
battalion’s honour roll as “killed in action”. However, she ended the conversation
with a question that raises fundamental issues with the 8th Division like its place in
Australia’s history and the unit associations’ emphasis on the battalion’s operational
history; “Can you call Dad a soldier?”
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Two Decades after Nelson and Bowden

When working with former Australian POWs in the 1980s, Nelson noted that only
one declined his invitation to be interviewed. 503 This researcher’s experience,
however, was very different. During the battalion’s 2006 Anzac Day reunion lunch,
many of the “Originals” were intrigued that a Singaporean historian had been invited
to the battalion’s reunion lunch and came up to share brief recollections of their
personal wartime experiences. One veteran walked and stood at a distance to
illustrate how dispersed the men of the battalion were in their dug-in positions when
the Japanese attacked. He recalled that the “the British divisions were on the other
side of the island and here we were two Australian battalions. There was nothing
behind us [while] everything was on the other side!” And when the Japanese attacked
the Australian side, another described the battle on the night of 8 February 1942, as
“a stew”. 504 Some former POWs of the 2/20 Battalion Association described that
after the war they recognised the potential of investing in or operating new
businesses in post-war Singapore and Malaya. With the accrued pay and leave that
had accumulated from their time in captivity they ventured into business schemes in
Malaya and Singapore. 505 The process of rebuilding and reconstruction in Malaya
and Singapore had opened up many business opportunities to those with the capital
and an entrepreneurial spirit. However, when pressed for more details or to
participate in a formal interview to share their wartime experiences and their postwar years, the “Originals” all reacted in a similar way; after expressing that they had
little more to offer they parted company after a few words of encouragement.

Perhaps by 2006, the Australian POW narrative has been told and retold and has
become an established narrative in Australia, and there was very little else that
former POWs wished to add beyond what is already told. There were, however, the
exceptions of Stephen Jared and Patrick Darling who agreed to be interviewed. What
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they shared during their interviews and informal conversation included things that
went beyond their wartime experiences in Malaya and Singapore. For example, both
acknowledged that they still hold varying degrees of animosity towards the Japanese.
Stephen Jared, for example, would in a larrikin manner take it out on Japanese
tourists by “sending them on [sic] the opposite direction” 506 when they asked for
street directions. He still beamed with satisfaction whenever he retold the story.507
Not buying Japanese brands and Japanese made products was one common attitude.
After the war, Jared and his wife had only item in the home that was Japanese made
– their family Toyota car. Their story was a familiar one; many former Australian
POWs families would have preferred not to buy Japanese cars if it had not been for
their cheaper prices. Patrick Darling proudly showed this researcher his souvenir
from the war; an old samurai sword that he kept by his bedside. 508

Stephen Jared went on further to offer his assistance to pass on invitations to other
veterans he was still kept in contact with to be interviewed. One invitation arrived at
the home of a former Australian POW from the 8th Division’s 2/12 Field Company
but it was the wife who replied on behalf her husband writing, “I feel my husband’s
health is such that long interviews cause depression and much silence,” 509 and
politely declined the invitation. The interest and enthusiasm that led to the strong
response to Nelson and Bowden’s research has waned. The question is why?

Rosalind Hearder, when discussing the methodological challenges facing a historian
interviewing former Australian POWs in the Pacific War, suggested factors like the
lack of documentation, trauma and memory suppression, and “mythologies of
captivity” 510 would influence the men’s responses. Considering Thomson’s work,
there was some truth in her observation about the difficulties to be negotiated
between myth and an individual’s experience. Yet, she also raised one key factor that
she did not fully acknowledge. When she asked one of her former Australian POW
506
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interviewees after a three-hour long interview what he thought about her writing his
story, he replied, “Girly, you’ll never get it right!” 511 As a female historian, her
gender had an influence on the responses she received during her interviews. For this
researcher, nationality could have influenced the expectations and willingness of
former Australian POWs to share their wartime experiences.

It is possible that a historian from Singapore reminded some of the former POWs of
the events and strong emotions they experienced in the aftermath of the Fall of
Singapore. One could be notions of betrayal that permeated the ranks of the 8th
Division in the immediate aftermath of the Fall of Singapore; the locals had put their
faith in the British and Commonwealth Forces to defend Singapore but were let
down when Singapore fell to the Japanese. 512 Yet despite their defeat, the former
POWs were quite surprised to find that they were not shunned or shamed by the local
people. The official history of the Australian 4th Anti-Tank Regiment, for example,
recorded that upon the regiment’s arrival in Changi, the anti-tank gunners were
“depressed, astonished and even ashamed of the disaster which had befallen
them.” 513 Yet, the history also recorded the reaction of the locals during the march to
Changi; “on the way Eurasians and Chinese, risking Japanese retaliation, gave the
[Australian 4th] anti tankers water and food”. 514 Patrick Darling and Stephen Jared
also recalled that the local people of Singapore did not treat them differently despite
their defeat. Jared commented that the locals remained “sympathetic and gave us
food whenever they could, which was a brave thing to do because if they were
caught they could be killed by the Nips.” 515 Darling recalled that most of the locals
remained decent to them and “on the march to Changi, they tried to give us water and
things like that”. 516 Despite the decades, he has never forgotten “this lady who lives
in Mt Pleasant [in Singapore] who was very kind to us” 517 . Her family name was
Lee: “nah the locals were good,” 518 he concluded.
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After the war, a war crimes tribunal in Singapore would establish the extent of
Japanese brutality towards the local population of Singapore; seven ranking Japanese
officers were convicted of supervising mass massacres of the local Singapore
Chinese. It is possible that a student from Singapore may have caused some
discomfort, for the men knew of the massacres and that those massacres had
followed the defeat of the men sent to protect them from the Japanese. A
Singaporean inquiring about their wartime experiences in Singapore could have
brought back the feeling of hopelessness that came with defeat and a lingering sense
that the Japanese war atrocities would have been prevented if only the war in
Singapore had unfolded differently. Ray Brown had already shown a sense of this
during his interview for the ABC’s Four Corners program on the Fall of Singapore
in 2002. Brown was first asked to describe how the locals treated the Australian
troops as they came through the country during the fighting. A second question was
asked later in the interview concerning the locals; “what about the local civilians
[after the British surrender]? How did the Japanese treat them?”519

Brown’s

response to both questions was characterised by one event. He remembered the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Batu Pahat because the battalion on occasions
played tennis against a team from the Chamber. “And they treated us very well,” 520
he said. During the Japanese Occupation however, Brown claims that the Japanese
had massacred members of the Chamber. He believed that the Chamber had been
specifically targeted by the Japanese because of their friendliness with the A.I.F
battalion before the war.

Beyond the “Originals”

Over the years, the number of “Associates” in the 2/20 Battalion Association has
grown and they now significantly outnumber the “Originals”. With the numbers of
“Originals” declining, the question of leadership was raised in its 2006 Annual
General Meeting. Traditionally the position of president of the 8th Division
Association was held by an “Original” but with few “Originals” left on its
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membership roll to take on the role, the association was considering whether an
“Associate” could be appointed to that position. Ron Ferguson, secretary for the 8th
Australian Division, put the question before the 2/20 Battalion Association during its
2006 Anzac Day general meeting because the division association wished to know if
the battalions would endorse a move to permit an “Associate” to take up an
appointment traditionally held by an “Original”. Frank Baker, the battalion
association president was supportive and he took the opportunity to ask members of
the battalion association to consider the future leadership of the 2/20 Battalion
Association. He suggested that, as the “Originals” were “getting long in the
tooth”, 521 a young “Associate” member should take over the role as president of the
battalion association. Interestingly, the “Associates” were the most vocal in the
discussion and most were apprehensive about the possibility of an “Associate” taking
up such an important and symbolic role in the battalion association. They argued that
an “Original” must lead the battalion association to ensure continuity, and were
concerned that a non-veteran heading a battalion association whilst there were still
veterans within the association could cast doubt on its status within the RSL. The
“Associates” wanted to maintain the status quo, not only to honour the sacrifices of
the “Originals” and the battalion, but also to maintain its status within the RSL and
hence its links with Anzac. But there was also the element of discovering Dad’s
history at play. The continuity of the battalion association was important to the
“Associates” because the culture of interaction with fellow “Associates” enables
them to collect and exchange stories of the men to remember their fathers’ wartime
experiences. In the event, the battalion association voted against both Baker’s and the
8th Division Association’s suggestion and affirmed that an “Original” must lead the
association as long as they could do so. 522
Running behind the issue of leadership in the 8th Division Association, and 2/20
Battalion Association, were the changes to the traditional Anzac Day marches
proposed by the RSL New South Wales State Branch in 2006. 523 That year a
contingent of about 100 descendants of the First World War veterans marched as an
official unit at the rear of the Sydney march. It was a first for Anzac Day. The RSL
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expected descendants of Second World War veterans to follow suit in 2007. 524 Even
though the number of veterans was steadily declining, for the RSL, the veteran
remains the focus for Anzac Day commemorations: 525 – Anzac and veterans were
inseparable and exclusive. RSL Chief Marshal, Ian Callaway believed that veterans
of the Second World War would eventually be “honoured in the same way as the
Boer War and WWI veterans and be represented by a WWII Memorial Horse.” 526 He
also claimed that “generally veterans do not want descendants to march with them,
because of their rapidly increasing numbers, which were beginning to demean the
significance of the [Anzac Day] march.”527 The RSL State Council agreed, stating
“that in future descendants will participate at the rear of the march.” 528 To facilitate
the changes, it created a “Descendants of World War Two Veterans Association” to
organise a marching contingent for all descendants of Second World War veterans.
The RSL was keen to repeat the success it had with the “Descendants of WWI
Veterans Association” in the Anzac Day march in 2006.

The response from Second World War unit associations was mixed. Some battalion
associations were supportive of the RSL’s proposals for segregation. The Rats of
Tobruk Association was concerned that the inclusion of descendants and nonveterans in Anzac Day marches would destroy the meaning of Anzac. 529 Others were
more concerned over the seemingly changing nature of the Anzac Day march. The
secretary of the 26th Infantry Brigade Association expressed his disapproval over the
Anzac Day marches becoming infused with a “carnival atmosphere” with “kids
running around cheering”. 530 Another battalion association raised the concern that if
more non-veterans participated in the marches, the commemorative Anzac Day
march was “in danger of becoming an American style celebratory parade.” 531
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Battalion Associations of the 8th Division, however, had a very different view.
During the 8th Division Association’s annual memorial service on 15 February 2006,
it had already made its stand clear over the RSL’s suggestion to segregate the
veterans and their descendants on Anzac Day. The division association’s honorary
life president, Rowley Richards, spoke to the ABC about continuing the tradition and
memory of the division. “What’s happening is we’re dropping off the twig and our
kids are coming along and they keep them up, you know, the numbers going”, 532 he
said. For Richards, the best way to continue the memory of the 8th Division was to
encourage the descendants to be part of their father’s legacy by marching with him
on Anzac Day marches as long as their veteran father could do so. When all the
veterans in the division and battalion associations have died, it would be the
descendants who would carry on their legacy. The 8th Division battalion associations
rejected the RSL’s plan for the children of the men in the 8th to be segregated in a
single contingent at the rear for the Anzac Day march. On Anzac Day in 2006, the 8th
Division battalion associations ignored the RSL and the descendants marched with
the “Originals” as they did the following year.

In 2008, the Vietnam Veterans Association unexpectedly joined the debate. The
association’s president, Ron Coxon questioned the RSL’s plans to segregate
descendants of veterans at the rear of an Anzac Day march,

[The RSL] got a situation now where there’s no one left from World
War I, but you’ve still got unit flags…why can’t they be carried by the
next of kin of the blokes who actually won the honour?…I think we’ll
lose the [Anzac] tradition if those unit flags aren’t out there and I can’t
see any reason why the next of kin couldn’t carry them. 533

The Vietnam Veterans Association spoke out in support of Second World War unit
associations in their row with the RSL because any RSL protocol established that
affected Second World War veterans would eventually be applied to them. And the
strong
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Association

was

probably

understandable; they were stating their position on the matter before the RSL created
a “Descendants of Vietnam War Veterans Association” for them.

In the run up to Anzac Day for 2008, “Associates” of the 2/20 Battalion Association
were initially unsure if they could march with the “Originals”. In the event, the
association was, according to its official magazine Thumbs-Up, “true to form… [and]
came out of the woodwork to defy the RSL.” 534 The Anzac Day March, according to
the 2/20 Association secretary James Keady, was a “hum dinger” 535 – seventy
“Associates” representing their fathers marched “ten abreast behind twelve original
2/20th members” 536 rather than at the rear. The 2/20 Battalion Association was not
alone. All battalion associations of the 8th Division were “singing from the same
hymn book when it came to families wishing to march” 537 on Anzac Day. According
to Ian Huntley, president of the 2/30 Battalion Association, the association’s 600
members felt that marching on Anzac Day with the association was “very important
to them.” 538
The RSL took the 8th Division’s battalion associations to task during a meeting on 14
October when discussing plans for the 2009 Anzac Day March. The chairman of the
meeting chastised the committee representatives of the 8th Division’s battalion
associations for allowing descendants to march with the “Originals”. They belonged
in the rear. Within minutes, Keady reported in Thumbs-Up, the objections were so
strong that the chairman of the RSL was “fighting a rear guard action” 539 and his
suggestion was voted down for the 2009 march. Other associations may well have
caught the 8th’s virus. In December 2008 during a meeting between the RSL and all
Second World War army veteran associations, 70 per cent voted in favour of
allowing the descendants of veterans to march with their fathers’ unit association. 540
It was a victory for the 8th Division’s battalion associations. Yet, the RSL was not
persuaded. According to Keady, however, the chairman of the meeting ignored the
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vote and claimed instead that the descendants of Second World War veterans had
agreed to march as one contingent at the rear of the Anzac Day march. 541 Keady also
reported that the secretary for the 8th Australian Division, Ron Ferguson, attempted
to correct the erroneous statement but was ignored. 542 Irrespective, the president of
the 8th Division Association, David Ross, issued a directive that the division
association “would march with their descendants as usual”. 543 The 2/20 Battalion
Association ratified the division’s directive on 4th February 2009 and affirmed that
“the descendants of the 2/20th Battalion will march as usual with the Battalion”. 544
Internal squabbling began to spill into the public arena. According to Keady, the
RSL was prepared to contact popular Australian personalities like Dick Smith, Ray
Hadley and Alan Jones for their support to segregate the descendants from the
veterans in Anzac Day marches. 545 Hadley and Jones commanded a large listening
audience in Sydney where the issue might prove to be contentious whereas the
majority of the 2/20 battalion “Originals” reside in regional New South Wales. The
latter two personalities were highlighted by Keady because they are famous radio
broadcasters, yet he also noted that perhaps Jones would be sympathetic. After all, he
had launched the battalion’s official history. 546 In 2009, “Associates”, representing
their fathers, once more marched with the “Originals”. The issue has yet to be
resolved.
The RSL and the 8th Division unit associations had not been on the same page
because both had different interpretations of tradition. The RSL insists that
descendants who wish to represent their forebears from the First or Second World
War have to march at the rear of the Anzac Day March because veterans should be
the focus of Anzac Day commemorations. The RSL was concerned with passing the
traditions of Anzac from one generation of Australian veterans to another generation
of Australian veterans. However, for certain Second World War unit associations,
like the 8th Division unit associations, Anzac is a personal legacy that they want to
pass from one generation of Australians to another.

541

ibid.
ibid.
543
ibid.
544
ibid.
545
ibid.
546
ibid.
542

122

To the unit associations of the 8th Division, it was not only just a different
interpretation of tradition that was at stake. Since the debate began in 2006, it also reevaluated the relationship between the veterans and their families. For the 2/20
Battalion Association “Originals”, the debate also provided them with the unique
opportunity to acknowledge not only their descendants’ place in their battalion
association, but also in their legacy. Their resistance to the RSL’s plans to segregate
them from their descendants in Anzac Day marches may be a form of apology from
the veterans to their family members over the decades of silence between them. The
“Associates”, ever since the issue of segregation was first raised in 2006, have
argued that they did not wish to be segregated from their fathers’ legacy during
Anzac Day. More importantly however, the voices of the “Associates” in the debate
suggest that the traditional role of the battalion association has expanded. The
association has become more than a point of contact for veterans to stay in touch or
organise reunions. Their families are now an important part of their activities. In
2009, an “Associate” of the 2/20 Battalion Association, Robert Brodie, suggested
that the association should have battalion scarves for the women in the same colour
as the battalion’s ties for the men. 547 The idea was well received and was taken up by
Annette Lynch, the second woman to be elected to serve on the battalion’s
committee. 548 Keady even suggested that the scarves may even “get some looks” for
the battalion on Anzac Day Marches and more importantly, “get up the noses of the
RSL” 549 This is indicative that that veteran unit associations like the 2/20 Battalion
Association have taken on a far broader view of Anzac; Anzac means more than just
the veterans. 550 What is becoming increasingly clear in the debate between the RSL
and the 8th Division unit associations is that the meaning of the Anzac Day March,
the iconic symbol of Anzac Day, is genuinely being contested.
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Chapter 6

History as Myth – Singaporean “Resistance Literature”

War and memory occupy unfamiliar territory in Singapore. Whereas in Australia the
Anzac Story contextualises war, memory and commemoration, the commemoration
of war in Singapore has no local equivalent traditional framework. This is not to say
that Singaporeans do not commemorate the war dead. Rather, the commemoration
of war in Singapore had been a difficult process and subject. The Fall of Singapore
marked the first time the local people of Singapore became intimately part of large
global conflict. 551 Victims of the Second World War were described by Singapore’s
first Prime Minister in 1967 as “hapless victims of one of the fires of history”.552
And that was essentially how the war has been interpreted and remembered in
Singapore; war had caught up with the British Empire in the region – the Battle and
Fall of Singapore is distinctively Singapore’s colonial history. Studies and literature
on the war in Singapore generally begin either with the policy of British Far East
Defences or the Sino-Japanese War in China, or both. Brian Farrell’s brilliant work
The Defence and Fall of Singapore traced the Battle of Singapore back to London in
the 1920s. Lee Geok Boi’s The Syonan Years incorporates both British and Chinese
perspectives. 553

However, there were those who, in the Singapore of 1941, perceived the war quite
differently. At the time when Singapore was still part of the British Empire, ethnic
heritage played a huge part in communal and self-identity. The Singapore Chinese
community in Singapore and Malaya, comprising mainly the local MalayanSingapore Chinese, and especially the Overseas Chinese, made their position known
quite clearly with their pro-China and anti-Japanese campaigns; their loyalty and an
551
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affinity was with China and the mainland Chinese, not with the British Empire.554
For them, the war against Japan was an extension of the Sino-Japanese War. The
Indian diaspora community in Singapore was more concerned with political
developments pertaining to India’s independence in their native homeland. 555 The
local Malays in Singapore during the colonial period were observed to be
“accustomed to being treated [by the British] the same as others” 556 and were
therefore generally indifferent to the British regime. 557

Local Narratives of the War

Chin Kee Onn wrote and published an account of his wartime experiences (one of
the earliest local personal narratives on the Japanese Occupation in Singapore and
Malaya) a year after the end of the Pacific War under the title Malaya Upside Down.
The book was written and published in the form of an empirical study of the local
conditions Chin observed and documented during the Japanese Occupation of
Singapore and Malaya. According to Ng Su Fang, Malaya Upside Down identified
reasons for the swift collapse of the Malayan defences – Malayan disunity, which
Chin later addressed in his fictional novel, Ma-rai-ee in 1952. 558 The main theme in
Ma-rai-ee was the concept of a “Malayan-Chinese nationalist subjectivity within a
larger multi-racial nation.” 559 Chin, however, would not be the first to emphasize
local unity for the purpose of resistance in Malaya and Singapore during the war
period. The Chinese community in Singapore had also been promoting the notion of
a collective resistance since the Japanese incursions into China, although this one
was specifically Chinese.
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Another of the earliest personal local war narratives of the war in Singapore was
based on the experiences of a Chinese volunteer, Major Hu Tie Jun. During the
Malayan Campaign, Hu was appointed deputy commander of a British sponsored
Chinese militia unit, known popularly in the Singapore Chinese community as the
Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army. Officially it was called Dalforce by the British.
He recorded his experiences of the war in three essays he wrote during and after the
Japanese Occupation; An Account of the War Fought by the Singapore Overseas
Chinese Volunteer Army, Memories of the Singapore Defence War and An Open
Letter to the Malayan Chinese Affairs Consultant. These were later collected and
featured in a 1945 book published locally in Singapore under the title War History of
the Singapore Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army. 560 Two years later in January
1947, the Singapore Chinese Community featured Hu’s writings in the publication of
a book titled The Great War and the Overseas Chinese. Hu was not the only survivor
who wrote about the war in Malaya and Singapore. There had been numerous
published writings on the war in Singapore. However, these were largely produced
by professional literary writers or novelists. Their works were not based on their own
experiences but rather an adaptation of popular wartime stories of the time or the
wartime experiences told by others. 561

The Price of Peace

Fifty years after the end of Second World War, Hu’s essays would again resurface
Singapore. This time, they would be found in a popular work on Singapore’s wartime
past published by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(SCCCI). In 1995, the SCCCI published He Ping de Dai Jia, which literally
translates into English as Price of Peace. The book features accounts of survivors
and stories of anti-Japanese resistance movements in Malaya and Singapore during
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the Second World War. It was published only in Chinese to commemorate the fiftieth
anniversary of the end of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore. 562

The Price of Peace was edited by the late Foong Choon Hon. Foong was trained as a
Chinese broadcaster and worked with several broadcasting stations from 1956 to
1981 before taking up a position as Controller of the Drama Unit in the Singapore
Broadcasting Corporation. He also served as the Senior Director of Cultural and
Community Affairs in the SCCCI. 563 In The Price of Peace, he was introduced as an
eyewitness to the Japanese Occupation with “the ability to depict scenes of the war
with a poignancy which evokes empathy and gratefulness for the heroes who
sacrificed their lives [during the war].” 564 This could explain why the book became a
bestseller and stories featured in the book went on to inspire the creation of a Chinese
television drama series that became immensely popular in Singapore. The television
series was first screened on local television in 1997 under the original Chinese title
of the book, He Ping de Dai Jia. At the height of its popularity in 1997, Singapore’s
prestigious media industry awards, the Star Awards, awarded best drama series to He
Ping de Dai Jia as well as awards for Best Actor, Best Actress and Best Supporting
Actress to the cast of the series. So popular was the series that ten years after it was
first aired it enjoyed a re-screening in Singapore in 2007.

An English translation of the book was published two years later by the SCCCI
under the title The Price of Peace: True Accounts of the Japanese Occupation. Clara
Show was the translator for the English edition. In a brief biography of Show in the
English edition, it noted that a year before working on The Price of Peace, one of her
major previous translation works was a popular local published war narrative, Force
136: Story of a WWII Resistance Fighter, which will be discussed in the next
chapter. The SCCCI may have wanted to capitalise on the success of the television
series in 1997 and published an English edition of the book to capture the Englisheducated readership in Singapore. The timing of the publication however, suggests
that there may have been other motivations.
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On 17 May 1997, The Price of Peace was officially launched with much fanfare and
endorsement from the Singapore government. But it was also timely in another way.
A few weeks earlier, the Singapore government had officially announced the launch
of a national policy to inspire Singaporean nationalism – National Education (NE).
The main thrust of NE was to “develop national cohesion, the instinct for survival
and confidence in our future.” 565 Reinterpretations of local history were one method
that the Singapore government hoped would achieve the aims of NE. When The
Price of Peace was published it was quickly linked to NE. Singapore’s then Minister
for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, who was also an ardent patron of Chinese
culture, 566 commended The Price of Peace as “very important for our national
education” because it presented the Fall of Singapore from a “Singaporean
perspective of what had happened.” 567 The Price of Peace was quickly positioned in
Singapore as an important piece of work on Singapore’s wartime past. It has found
its way into the National University of Singapore Library’s collection called “A
Sense of History: A Select Bibliography on the history of Singapore”, a list that also
included works by professional historians and scholars from other fields. In 2002,
Singapore’s Nanyang Technology University Library placed both language editions
of the book on public display in an exhibition that showcased the value of NE in a
national crisis. 568 The Singapore Ministry of Defence also cites material from the
book in their Internet articles about Singapore’s military past. In other words,
institutions in Singapore have made The Price of Peace an authority on the war in
Singapore – it is accepted as history.

The popular memory of Dalforce/ Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army

In The Price of Peace, Foong presents a narrative of the Overseas Chinese Volunteer
Army, or Dalforce, based on the original writings of its deputy commander
565

Speech by BG(NS) Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister, at the launch of National Education
at the Television Corporation of Singapore (TCS) TV Theatre, 17 May 1997
566
See J. Huang, and L. Hong, “History and the Imaginaries of ‘Big Singapore’: Positions the Sun Yat
Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall”, in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, National University of
Singapore, Number 35 (1), February 2004
567
Speech by George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts, at the launch of the book The Price
of Peace on 21 June 1997
568
NTU Library Bulletin, Vol 11, No. 2 & 3, November 2002, pp.6-9

129

mentioned earlier; Hu Tie Jun. Foong claims that Hu’s writings would “offer an
insight into the defence war the [Chinese] volunteer army fought in the front line
against the Japanese”. 569 Foong had faithfully reproduced the three essays that Hu
written in the original Chinese edition, and the later English edition, of The Price of
Peace. The titles of Hu’s three essays were presented as chapter titles and they
appeared in The Price of Peace in the chronological order, as listed earlier, in which
they were written. Since the English edition of The Price of Peace was published for
a wider readership in Singapore, the translated accounts of Hu’s essays deserve a
closer look.

Dalforce was raised after an agreement was made between the British and leaders of
the Singapore Chinese community during the Singapore Overseas Chinese AntiEnemy Mobilization Council meeting on 28 December 1941. The Commander of
Dalforce was the former Superintendent of the Malayan Police Special Branch,
Lieutenant-Colonel John Dalley and hence the name of the unit, “Dalforce”. 570 Hu
Tie Jun was appointed deputy commander of Dalforce with the rank of Major. With
the exception of Hu, British officers were appointed as unit commanders and Chinese
as non-commissioned officers. The Dalforce volunteers were given blue uniforms;
each volunteer had an additional triangular piece of red cloth tied around the right
arm and a yellow cloth tied round the head. 571 When Dalforce was first raised, as
much as the local Chinese community leaders wanted it to be a show of Chinese
solidarity against Japanese aggression, 572 it was never meant to be deployed as an
independent anti-Japanese Chinese army. It was originally intended to be placed
under the command of the III Indian Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir
Lewis Heath. 573 However due to a massive reorganisation and redeployment of
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troops in the days before the Japanese assault on Singapore Island, Dalforce
companies were instead distributed to different Allied units deployed at the frontline.

Hu’s writings describe in detail battles that involved two Dalforce companies, one
deployed at Jurong Road with the 44th Indian Brigade and another that was attached
to the Australian 2/20 Battalion at Kranji. He also briefly mentions another battle at
Bukit Timah.

Throughout Hu’s description of the Battle of Singapore, he would not call Dalforce
by its official British name, preferring instead to use the title “Singapore Overseas
Chinese Volunteer Army” or just “Volunteer Army” (VA). The noun “army” can be
misleading because in Hu’s narrative, he only mentioned operations carried out by
platoons and companies. This suggests that Dalforce was at best a battalion
formation. An army formation on the other hand is several levels higher than a
battalion. Hu may have been using a loose definition of “army” when describing the
volunteers of Dalforce or it may even be a problem with translation. The name of
most units in the Chinese military contains the suffix “jun” which can translate into
English as “army”. Therefore, a medical corps, a tank regiment or an artillery
regiment, each can be mistakenly called an “army” when their unit designations were
translated from Chinese to English. On the other hand, in military nomenclature,
regiments are part of an army. However, Hu’s narrative of Dalforce showed that it
could not simply be dismissed as a loose use of the term “army” or a case of
mistranslation.

In his essay titled We Fought at the Frontline Defending Singapore, Hu’s
descriptions of the British treatment of the VA resonated with what Robin Gerster
described as “big noting”. 574 Hu claimed that an officer from the British army
“placed the responsibility of protecting Singapore on the VA…[and] threatened to
hold us accountable for the fate of the island.”575 In another essay titled An Open
Letter to the Malayan Chinese Affairs Consultant, Hu claimed that a spokesman from
574
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the British army assured him that “both the VA and the British Indian Army would
be accorded equal treatment.” 576 However, Hu’s claims and his depiction of the VA
as an army of equal status to the British Indian Army was essentially part of his
requests to the Malayan Chinese Affairs consultant for post-war benefits; “the
[British] authorities gave us the assurance that we would be accorded the same
treatment as the British Indian Army…our requests cannot be considered new”. 577
Furthermore, and more importantly, in all of Hu’s essays on Dalforce, he inflated
size of Dalforce to an “army” and presented questionable descriptions of the actions
of the Allied forces. For example, Hu wrote that the VA, which in fact was a
company-sized unit, deployed at Jurong road was “flanked by the Australian Brigade
on the right”. 578 The company-sized Dalforce would have been supporting a much
larger brigade-sized unit on its flanks instead. 579 In another chapter, Hu would again
claim that a Dalforce Company was, “flanked by soldiers from Allied Forces, [and]
our comrades took on the enemy”. 580 This pattern and style of writing repeats itself
over and over again in Hu’s narratives. As a result, Hu would lead us to believe that
the VA was the core of Singapore’s defences with the British Malaya Command as
its supporting element.

Australian records indicate that volunteers from Dalforce had indeed been deployed
to the Lim Chu Kang area in Kranji but not in the manner described by Hu. The war
diary of the Australian 2/20 Battalion, part of the Australian 22nd Brigade, gives a
more accurate description of the deployment of Allied forces at Lim Chu Kang.
From 1 February 1942, a company of Dalforce volunteers came under the battalion’s
support arms strength which also included one artillery battery from the Australian
2/15 Field Regiment and one platoon from Australian 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion. 581
It was not a “300-strong Australian Brigade” that augmented the strength of Dalforce
as Hu suggests, but rather it was clearly the other way around.
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In one of Hu’s detailed narratives of a battle between a Dalforce Company and the
invading Japanese, he described the Chinese volunteers as having “assembled at the
Lim Chu Kang 16th milestone [Kranji area] and combined forces with the 300-strong
Australian brigade. [And] this greatly boosted our strength”. 582 It is interesting how
Hu alleged that the Australian Brigade was only 300-strong in order fit his claim that
a smaller Australian brigade augmented a larger Dalforce “army”. But his claim and
numbers do not account for the fact that the total reported casualties of this one
Australian brigade during the entire Battle of Singapore was 1,370. 583 If Hu’s
description of the Australian brigade was taken as face value the Australian brigade
in question would have been wiped out and rebuilt four times over in less than two
weeks during the Battle of Singapore. Official Australian records however, indicate
that the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade was deployed at Lim Chu Kang, and it
comprised of the 2/18, 2/19 and 2/20 Australian Infantry Battalions altogether with a
total reported strength of 107 officers and 2,365 other ranks. 584 On the other hand, it
was more difficult to establish with accuracy the total strength of Dalforce due to the
lack of official records. Historians have estimated the number of Chinese volunteers
in Dalforce to range from a low of 1,250 to an approximation in the region of 3,000
to 4,000. 585 In the Price of Peace, Hu reportedly stated that Dalforce was made up of
eight battalions. A typical infantry battalion would have four infantry companies,
each around 150 men. Dalforce would have had nearly 4,800 men. This would put
the strength of Dalforce on the upper range of most estimates. 586 However, this could
again reflect a problem with translation. According to Kevin Blackburn and Daniel
Chew, who analysed Hu’s original essay, Dalforce was organised into eight
companies, each roughly 150 men in strength. 587 This would put the strength of
Dalforce at the lower range of 1,200 men. However, according to a British Daforce
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trainer Frank Brewer, Dalforce had five companies, approximately 750 in total, 588
who were trained and deployed and “some of them probably never went up at all [to
fight the Japanese]”. 589 If Brewer’s numbers are accepted as accurate, one Australian
infantry battalion, like the Australian 2/20 Battalion with thirty-two officers and 757
other ranks, would already outnumber Hu’s volunteer “army”.

The size of Dalforce was not the only problematic issue in Hu’s version of
Dalforce’s operational history. He presents a rather confusing timeline of events.
Prior to Dalforce “combining forces” with the “300-strong Australian brigade”, as
mentioned earlier, Hu wrote that at Lim Chu Kang Road, on 6 February, a good two
days before the actual date of the Japanese assault on Singapore, a platoon of
Dalforce volunteers spotted five enemy rubber rafts and together with an unnamed
Australian brigade, they opened fired, sank three and forced the remaining two to
retreat. 590 After this victory, Dalforce volunteers quickly set up an ambush because
they claimed to have heard Japanese voices nearby. They then launched an attack but
the Japanese brought in timely reinforcements. Hu wrote that, “though we were
determined to resist to the end, we knew that the Australian brigade must have met
with trouble”. 591 Dalforce then attempted to move to fresh positions and in its
attempts “to break out of the enemy barricade (sic),” 592 both sides took heavy losses.

The first part of the narrative is problematic because Hu did not give the name of the
Australian brigade that was involved in the action. It would have been the Australian
22nd Brigade because it was deployed at Lim Chu Kang. The war diaries of the
Australian 22nd Brigade and the 2/20 Battalion, detailed as there are, did not record
such enemy encounters on the night in question. What was recorded in the war diary
of Australian 2/20 Battalion on 6 February was a patrol led by Lieutenant R. Homer
which “crossed Johore Straits to reconnoitre enemy positions”. 593 The war diary of
the Australian 22nd Brigade on 6 February confirms that report and also of another
588
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patrol launched from the Australian 2/19 Battalion’s position to scout enemy
positions and to locate enemy boats. 594 Neither spoke of any action against a
formation of five enemy rafts. The war diaries of the A.I.F in Singapore provide a
constant and detailed account of the war in Singapore. If there was indeed such an
encounter as described by Hu, it is highly unlikely that it would be left out in the
Australian war diaries. It is interesting that such an encounter only appeared in the
writings of the deputy commander of Dalforce.

Even if a platoon of Dalforce volunteers had engaged the Japanese in a coastal battle
on 6 February, it is unlikely that their training and weapons would have inflicted the
kind of damage and casualties described in Hu’s narrative. The volunteers only had a
few days worth of firearms training and each volunteer was lightly armed, according
to Brewer, with “hardly warlike weapons” – a shotgun with “seven rounds of
ammunition and two grenades each.” 595 A shotgun is essentially a short-range antipersonnel weapon with a slow rate of fire, popularly used for hunting game, but
hardly the kind of weapon suitable for patrol on coastal defences. The limited
amount of ammunition carried by the volunteers also meant that they could not put
down a long and sustained fire on the enemy. It is improbable that the volunteers
were capable of sinking enemy rubber rafts and killing its crew and transported
personnel. On the other hand, a typical Australian infantry platoon with its Bren light
machinegun would have had sufficient firepower to defeat such an enemy force, if
such an event ever took place in the first place. There is however, a more plausible
explanation for this otherwise extraordinary encounter. Kevin Blackburn’s research
on the Overseas Chinese legend of Dalforce suggest that during a retreat along
Jurong River, volunteers from this Dalforce Company and the 44th Indian Brigade
mistook each other for the Japanese which led to a case of friendly-fire. 596

Entries made in the Australian war diaries would challenge the second part of Hu’s
narrative. When the Japanese made their main assault on Singapore on the night of 8
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February, the Australian brigade had indeed “met with trouble” 597 One infantry
brigade group with its battalions dispersed over a wide area was resisting a
concentrated assault of two Japanese infantry divisions, a force more than three times
its size. The war diary of the Australian 22nd Brigade reported that sometime between
the hours of 2145 hrs and 2300 hrs on 8 February, the Japanese landed their main
invasion force in Singapore on the Australian 2/20 Battalion’s battlefront and a
Japanese force estimated to be one company strong “came in contact with Dalforce
and then moved [on] at jog trot [pace]”. 598 The volunteers of Dalforce may have
been “determined to resist to the end” 599 but according to detailed records, they
offered no determined resistance to the Japanese. The war diary of the Australian
2/20 Battalion would take up the story from where the 22nd Brigade left off.

After the Japanese had overrun Dalforce’s position, the Australian 2/20 Battalion war
diary records that at 0315 hrs on 9 February, 7th platoon from the Australian 2/20
Battalion and “a party of Dalforce”, both under the command of Lt. R. Cornforth,
was ordered by the battalion headquarters to take up a defensive position west of Lim
Chu Kang Road. Half an hour later, sixty Dalforce volunteers reported to the
Battalion Headquarters. They were immediately sent to reinforce Cornforth’s force.
At 0500 hrs, owing to heavy enemy pressure, the battalion ordered Cornforth’s force
to withdraw to the Battalion Headquarters’ perimeter. Similar orders to withdraw
were also dispatched to all of the battalion’s Companies to regroup at the Battalion
Headquarters. Two hours later battalion headquarters was informed that enemy
action was preventing Cornforth’s force from withdrawing. It was ambushed by a
Japanese force and took heavy casualties forcing it to move west away from the
battalion and towards the nearby Tengah aerodrome. At 0915, 7th platoon reported
that it had finally “clear up (sic) the ambush” and eliminated all enemy troops
stalking Cornforth’s force. 600 It did not mention Dalforce in this action. Either it had
been killed to the last man when they “attempted to break out of the enemy
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barricade” 601 as described by Hu or they had fled the battle, or had simply been
ignored. The former was unlikely because according to Hu, the VA would have
“three more encounters with the enemy as it retreated…and [later] combined forces
with the 300-strong Australian brigade.” 602 The Australian war diaries had been
faithfully recording the movements of Dalforce in its area of operations but in this
battle engagement, it records only the actions of 7th platoon and did not mention
Dalforce fighting to the last man.

These are only two examples of the problems in Hu’s depiction of Dalforce. They
follow a rather predictable pattern; Dalforce was the only armed force that did the
fighting and dying while the Allied forces were a liability to the defence of
Singapore. In Hu’s writings, the British and Commonwealth forces were depicted as
lacking in leadership and were inept at holding ground unlike the volunteers of
Dalforce. Hu constantly reminds the reader that unlike the Allied forces, volunteers
of Dalforce had the determination to defend Singapore to the last man. In his
summation and analysis of Dalforce he wrote that the volunteers,

Did not undergo formal military training, nor were they given
official postings, [but] they left behind a chapter, filled with blood
and tears, in the history of Singapore’s defence war. 603

Certain members of Dalforce, like its deputy commander, were given an official
military rank but Hu chose not to acknowledge it even to the extent of claiming that
the rank of Major was “not recognised by the British army”. 604 Hu may have done so
deliberately to mask his association with the British so that he could write a more
heroic account of his experiences with Dalforce. When it seemed that the role and
participation of Dalforce looked rather short when compared to the entire duration of
the Battle of Singapore, Hu simply changed the timeline and conjured up heroic
details of Japanese landings and skirmishes even before the Japanese launched their
invasion of Singapore to lengthen the otherwise short unit history of Dalforce. To be
601
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sure, some Dalforce companies did see action and suffered casualties on the battle
front. For example, one Dalforce company took part in the battle of Bukit Timah
where they earned the nickname “Dalley’s Desperadoes” 605 for their stubborn
resistance that effectively stopped the Japanese advance for some time. Frank
Brewer, a British Dalforce trainer spoke of one Dalforce Company that was deployed
to the main Australian defence lines at Lim Chu Kang where it met the main thrust of
the Japanese invasion on 8 February. Brewer remembered that only six volunteers
from this company, one officer and five other ranks, reported back to the Dalforce
headquarters. 606 Hu, however, chose to write about Dalforce differently. He pushed
forward the invasion of Singapore ahead by days so that he could demonstrate in his
own way that the Overseas Chinese volunteers of Dalforce played an important role
in the defence of Singapore. If one looked critically at Hu’s account of Dalforce’s
operational history, Dalforce volunteers had a field day in undocumented actions,
like sinking enemy boats and killing Japanese soldiers when the war diaries of units
under Malaya Command hardly mention any major engagements with the enemy.
Perhaps these missing days were indeed valuable to Hu because it gave him
something to write about in the otherwise brief history of Dalforce in the defence of
Singapore.
Entries in the war diary of the Australian 22nd Brigade and Australian 2/20 Battalion
on 8 February to 9 February have showed quite clearly that the contribution of
Dalforce at Lim Chu Kang was minimal at best. Their role with their new parent
units, as explained by Brewer, “was to be the eyes and ears of the main defence
forces on the perimeter of the island facing Johor.” 607 Brewer described it as being
on the fringe of Singapore’s defence arrangements – a scouting force at best to
provide early warning to the main Allied force of Japanese landings on Singapore. 608
With their lack of training, unit cohesion and inadequate weapons, it is questionable
if they could operate alone to mount an effective front against enemy Japanese
forces. Indeed, other sources also indicate that Dalforce volunteers made little impact
on the defence on Singapore. In his dispatches published after the war, commander
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of Malaya Command, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, mentions Dalforce as a
force of Chinese Irregulars who were given the task of patrolling possible Japanese
landing areas and who were also to act “as nucleus of fighting patrols sent to operate
on the mainland”. 609 However, during the Battle of Singapore, his dispatches did not
mention Dalforce in action against the enemy. War correspondent Ian Morrison, who
wrote and published one of the first accounts of the war in Malaya in 1942, noted
that while the Chinese volunteers “put up a good fight” they “not able to make any
difference to the progress of the struggle”. 610

The Price of Peace – a legacy of resistance

Despite decades of scholarship and research into the Battle and Fall of Singapore,
Foong did not correct the errors in timeline and geography in Hu’s three essays when
he featured them in The Price of Peace. It suggests that Foong had simply accepted
uncritically that any written or oral narrative left behind by any local survivor of the
war is historically accurate. Where in Singapore there is a tendency to treat any
printed work as authoritative, the errors found in Hu’s writings would not be
recognised by readers in Singapore as being problematic. Indeed, when considering
the brutality of the Japanese Occupation that followed the Fall of Singapore, Hu’s
narrative becomes a comforting one; the local Chinese did not give up fighting – they
sacrificed their lives but in vain. But there is a deeper reason as to why Singaporeans
today have rediscovered and endorsed a personal narrative and turned it into what
they consider to be history.

Research conducted by Blackburn and Chew suggests that Hu’s narratives featured
in Foong’s The Price of Peace may be part of a larger and persisting problem in
Singapore historiography. Both historians have identified that popular Dalforce
narratives in Singapore were following a style of writing that was typical of China’s
Kuomintang literary works. 611 It was a style that was not concerned with historical
accuracy. Rather, the genre features local war narratives that have been exaggerated
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and embellished, and fashioned into heroic legends. 612 In Blackburn and Chew’s
reappraisal of Dalforce’s history, they described the Dalforce narratives during the
war in Singapore as

A heroic legend…written into the history books by an Overseas
Chinese Community in Singapore that desired to see itself as united in
the struggle against Japan. 613

Popular narratives of Dalforce were a product of their times, created by the
Singapore Chinese community that reflected the powerful tradition of Chinese
nationalist-style writing. They saw the war against Japan “through nationalist
glasses…in the struggle with their comrades in China against an aggressive and
belligerent Japan”. 614 Hu’s description of the VA’s uniforms clearly indicated that
sense of identification. They were blue in colour; the volunteers were copying a form
of nativist propaganda from China that meant solidarity, camaraderie, and working in
harmony, displayed by soldiers of the Communist Eighth Route Army and New
Fourth Army when they donned the distinct blue uniforms of the KMT as they rallied
with the forces of the KMT under the banner of the National Revolutionary Army of
China to fight Japanese aggression. 615 In reality however, it was at best a symbolic
gesture to showcase “unity”. Leaders on both sides of the political divide continued
to scheme and plot the demise of the other. And the political divide was also played
out in Singapore. According to Blackburn, Dalforce was essentially raised with
Chinese volunteers of the Communist persuasion. 616 The Singapore Overseas
Chinese Anti-Enemy Mobilization Council, mentioned earlier, that led to the creation
of Dalforce, also created at the same time a smaller Chinese volunteer force that was
loyal to the KMT, the Guomingdang Overseas Chinese Guard Force.617 This was
because during the council meeting, neither the Communists nor the KMT desired to
fight under one banner. 618 And volunteers of the Guomingdang Overseas Chinese
612

ibid., p.237
ibid., p.256
614
ibid., p.235
615
P. Jowett, Chinese Civil War Armies 1911-1949, Osprey Publishing Oxford, New York, 1997,
pp.21-22
616
K. Blackburn & D. Chew, op cit., p.241
617
ibid., p.241
618
ibid., p.241
613

140

Guard Force made this distinction very clear by hanging up many KMT flags in
areas where they were stationed to make known their allegiance and identity during
the defence of Singapore. 619 Yet when China, and Singapore, faced a Japanese
invasion, unity was a desirable concept to promote as it encouraged cooperation in
the face of a crisis. And it is a powerful and familiar theme that Singaporeans leaders
returned to and appropriated decades after the war. It is theme that was at the core of
a highly popular and influential wartime literary genre in Malaya and Singapore.

“Resistance Literature”

According to Blackburn and Chew, the eminent historian on the Overseas Chinese,
Wang Gungwu, identified “an emotional style of writing that emerged [in China]
during the Second Sino-Japanese War” 620 that the Singapore Chinese community
adopted in the pre-Second World War years. In their study of literary trends in local
Malayan-Singapore literature from the late 1920s to 1941, literature scholars and
linguists in Singapore, Yeo Song Niam and Ng Siew Ai, identified two popular
trends, the Nanyanization movement and the pro-China movement. The former was
made up of (but not exclusively) Malayan-Singapore Chinese writers who envisioned
the creation of a local literary tradition – Malayan-Singapore literature. The latter
was essentially made up of Chinese writers who hailed from China and regarded
“homeland literature” 621 as the accepted literary tradition for the Chinese Diaspora
communities; the emphasis of popular writings should always be on China. These
writers and novelists brought a blend of nationalistic Chinese war literature to
Singapore that would have a profound impact on the Singapore Chinese community
and its sense of history.

Popular nationalistic Chinese war literature from China was characteristically a
literature peppered with patriotic and nationalistic tones and resembled war
propaganda. A good example can be found in a copy of a popular war journal called
China at War published by the Nationalist sponsored anti-Japanese movement in
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China in 1939. An article featured in the journal argued that anti-Japanese resistance
did not only mean armed resistance,

After the outbreak of war, the Chinese press immediately began a
crusade to educate the people to rise and save the nation. As the war
progressed, they have also tuned their tone with the Government policy
of armed resistance and national reconstruction. They have fired their
paper bullets with the most prodigious zeal. 622

The journal also referred in glowing terms the “army of Chinese journalists” who
“are fighting Japan with their pens and brushes no less earnestly than their comrades
at the front”. 623

The Japanese invasion of China transformed the development of the two popular
literary trends in Singapore. It was not long before writings and expressions of
resistance began to appear in the Singapore literary scene. Local Malayan-Singapore
Chinese writers became attracted to the strong popularity and demand for proChinese and pro-China literature, which at the time presented a guaranteed path to
success for a writing career. Many Chinese writers subsequently abandoned the
Nanyanization movement, began to identify with their mainland Chinese
counterparts and wrote literary works promoting Chinese patriotism and nationalism.
Their works became known collectively as “Resistance Literature”.624 Yu Dafu, a
prominent Overseas Chinese writer of the time and in Singapore, described what
“Resistance Literature” in Malaya and Singapore should achieve:

We have reached a stage that we should utilise all chances to lead us to
our final victory. We should develop the capability to fight in the
literary scene. More propaganda, both internally and externally should
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be produced… We, as writers should, as the war progresses, in the face
of harsh reality, build an anti-war force. 625

The term “anti-war force” may sound pacifist but what it actually meant was that
Chinese writers were protesting against Japan’s war on China. The literature
reflected popular ideas of its time in Chinese Diaspora communities in Malaya and
Singapore – a popular and collective Chinese response to the Japanese invasion of
China.

“Resistance Literature” gained tremendous popularity and a faithful following in the
Chinese Diaspora communities in Malaya and Singapore. However, when the
Japanese began to advance into Malaya, publication of “Resistance Literature” in the
region was also affected. During Japanese efforts to purge Chinese inspired antiJapanese elements in Singapore and Malaya, Malayan-Singapore writers who wrote
“Resistance Literature” were persecuted like their Overseas Chinese counterparts.626
Fearing for their lives, prominent local and Overseas Chinese writers began to leave
Singapore. The exodus continued until Malaya and Singapore came under Japanese
rule. Writers who remained in Singapore or Malaya discarded the pen for the gun as
they joined local armed resistance movements. Some however, took their own lives
when the British surrendered. 627 Wang Gungwu, a survivor of the Japanese
Occupation remembered that “the Japanese did not distinguish, when they shot and
arrested the Chinese,…it did not matter how long one had been away from China, or
whether one cared for China or not, all Chinese were at the receiving end of the war
and would be treated the same.” 628 A few continued writing clandestinely but most
writers took on new identities and jobs to avoid arousing suspicion over their
previous anti-Japanese stance. Yu Dafu was a case in point. During the Japanese
invasion of Singapore he fled to an island in the Riau Archipelago, changed his name
to Zhao Lian, purchased a local factory producing wine and sat out the rest of the war
as a business operator. Towards the end of the war however, Japanese took an
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interest in Yu and his business. Just days after the Japanese surrender, Yu was
mysteriously kidnapped and is believed to have been murdered. 629

Legacy of “Resistance Literature”

The two and half years of Japanese Occupation had a profound impact on literary
development in Singapore. Except for a small number of technical and medical
institutions, secondary and tertiary institutions ceased to exist altogether. 630 The new
emphasis was on primary education specifically the cultivation of the Japanese
language and culture in Singapore to allow them to absorb Japanese propaganda
efforts aimed at influencing successive generations of students into embracing the
new Japanese order. 631 All schools were closed during the early months of the
Japanese Occupation. English and mission schools in Singapore would later reopen
as Japanese language schools. Malay vernacular schools were the first to be reopened
followed by Indian schools and than finally Chinese schools in early 1943. Chinese
schools were not only the last to be reopened but there were also far fewer compared
with pre-war levels – twenty schools were reopened compared to the 369 during
British rule prior to the war. 632 Public education in Singapore, with the exception of
primary education, had essentially collapsed during the Japanese Occupation. Local
public education levels remained low until the 1970s. 633

The new Japanese regime had disrupted the education of young local Chinese more
than the rest of the Singapore population. Furthermore, during the Japanese
Occupation, the Japanese conducted massacres of Chinese male youths, traditionally
the most literate and educated group in the Chinese community. Compared to the
other ethnic communities in Singapore, the education and intellectual development of
the Chinese community was the most badly affected. As a consequence, the Japanese
Occupation of Singapore has been described as “the darkest era in the history of
629
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Singapore-Malayan Chinese literature.” 634 After the war, the Chinese community’s
memory of the war would be passed down either through oral tradition or by the
writings of educated survivors, like the deputy commander of Dalforce Hu Tie Jun,
who escaped the Japanese purges.

After the war, it appeared that there was an increasing preference for literature that
emphasised local traditions as the Nanyanization movement was revived. 635
Malayan-Singapore writers were perhaps the first locals to realise the pitfalls of
abandoning local culture in favour of a “homeland” culture; embracing the latter also
mean taking on enemies of the “homeland”. “Resistance Literature” had become an
obsolete literary genre. The new trend was the Nanyanization movement’s “Patriotic
Literature” – Chinese nationalism was replaced by local patriotism directed against
colonial rule. 636 Compared to pre-war years, there was less interest in mainland
Chinese writers in post-war Singapore. It was only in 1981 that local Singaporean
writers would again welcome writers from mainland China.637

Yet, when Foong reproduced Hu’s essays in The Price of Peace he revived a popular
genre. When the Singapore government wanted to promote a sense of Singaporean
national identity, it returned to a powerful and popular genre from the 1940s that
proved to be effective in invoking an emotive and nationalistic response from its
readers. The success of The Price of Peace, despite its questionable contents, is
indicative that “Resistance Literature” had quietly persisted in Singapore.

The re-emergence of “Resistance Literature” in Singapore decades after the war
suggests a larger problem. As Cohen discussed in the “History in Three Keys”, a
mythologised past sometimes overtakes the work historians in terms of popular
appeal because it involves assertions about past events, that once they enter the
minds and hearts of people, even if they do not coincide with what actually

634

S. N, Yeo and S. A, Ng, “The Japanese Occupation as Reflected in Singapore-Malayan Chinese
Literary Works after the Japanese Occupation”, in op cit., p.114
635
ibid., p.114
636
ibid., pp.114-115
637
Seah Khok Chua. Interview, National Archives of Singapore, Accession No.: 2761

145

happened, will eventually “acquire a truth of their own”. 638 These assertions begin
with what people believe, or want to believe, as true. The influence of “Resistance
Literature” as a powerful myth to tell wartime narratives in Singapore is also
reflected in Force 136, the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 7

Force 136 and “Resistance Literature”: Manipulating the Story

The re-emergence of an obsolete literary genre in Singapore in the 1990s to popular
acclaim, which characterised the Singaporean memory of the war, resembled the way
Kokoda had re-emerged in Australia and became the new focus of war
commemoration and national identity in Australia in the 1990s. In his assessment of
Kokoda as the focus of national commemoration in Australia, the Australian
historian Hank Nelson argued that once the associations attached to Kokoda today
become too far removed from the realities of 1942, future commentators will destroy
what they will call the myth of Kokoda; the “evocative word, Kokoda”, would not be
able “to support the burden of meaning now being loaded on it”. 639 As Cohen
argued, myths are constructed with a “one-dimensional view of the past, wrenching
from the past single characteristics or traits or patterns that are then portrayed as the
essence of past reality”. The power of myths comes from a “loose conception of
‘truthfulness’”; 640 they are linked with something real or at least something that was
real enough. 641 Myths are woven with selected fibres of truth found in past events.
They can be stretched but if cut off from the realities that anchor them the myth will
lose its appeal and cease to work. To use another example in Australian history, Ned
Kelly was a real person in Australian history but then there is the history of Ned
Kelly and also the myth of Ned Kelly – a local folk hero, rebel, outlaw, martyr, and
freedom fighter. 642 Each interpretation of Ned Kelly’s place in Australia’s history is
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taken from the history of Ned Kelly. The Ned Kelly Story, like popular Dalforce
narratives in Singapore, are examples of myths that overtook history in terms of
popularity. And as Nelson had raised questions over the myth of Kokoda, the
emphasis on the Singapore Chinese interpretation of the Japanese Occupation of
Singapore in the form of “Resistance Literature” raises a similar question in
Singapore – can the realities of the local anti-Japanese resistance movements in
Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation support the burden of
“Resistance Literature”?

The re-emergence of “Resistance Literature” in Singapore, and the problems it posed
in the narrative of Dalforce shown in the previous chapter, was also evident in the
popular history of Force 136. The myths found in the popular narratives of Force
136, however, are more problematic. In Singapore, Force 136 is remembered as a
well-known anti-Japanese resistance unit that operated in the jungles of Malaya
during the Japanese Occupation. It was unique in terms of its composition; it was
formed and led by the British, staffed by Chinese agents with loyalties to the Chinese
Kuomingtang (KMT) party in China, and it was deployed to work with Chinese
Communist guerrilla fighters in Malaya. In other words, its history is a rich and
complex one because of the different, and conflicting, political ideological beliefs
and motivations of the KMT and the Communists. Yet these conflicts have been
written out of the popular narratives of Force 136. They have been distilled and
simplified. The analysis of the history and myths of Force 136 in this chapter will
begin with the oral history left behind by its British officers, and it will be followed
with examples of how that history was manipulated to serve different purposes.

Force 136 – John Davis and Richard Broome

Force 136 was part of the effort in the Second World War to coordinate Allied
operations in Malaya with Allied forces in the rest of the region in the war against
Japan. It was formed by the British as part of the Indian Section of the Special
Operations Executive (SOE) in India. The Malayan operations of Force 136 were
J. McQuilton, The Kelly Outbreak, 1878-1880 : The Geographical Dimension Of Social Banditry,
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1987;
G. Seal, Tell 'em I died game: the legend of Ned Kelly, Hyland House Publishing, Flemington, 2002

148

directed by Basil Goodfellow from its headquarters in India. Field operations were
led by John Davis and Richard Broome. 643 Davis had escaped from Singapore before
the British surrender and arrived in Bombay (present-day Mumbai) via Ceylon
(present-day Sri Lanka). He was recruited by Goodfellow in Mumbai. According to
Davis, Goodfellow recommended him for the army rank of Captain, deemed to be
the equivalent of his rank in the Malayan Police Force – “three pips”. 644 The
recommendation was approved. Davis would be promoted to the rank of Colonel by
the end of the war. During Force 136 operations in Malaya, Davis was also the
appointed representative of Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander of
the South East Asia Command (formed in October 1943), which not only made
Davis the highest ranking officer in the field, but also the Allies’ representative in
negotiations with the local resistance groups. Davis also made it clear that he was
head of field missions in Malaya not the head of Force 136 itself. 645 Force 136
operated in several countries in what was known at the time as the British Far East.
Davis’ missions in Malaya were part of Force 136’s Group “B” (Colombo)
operations that made up the Malaya Country Section, the Anglo-Dutch Country
Section and the Islands Country Section. Group “A” (Calcutta) included the Burma
Country Section, the Siam Country Section and the French Indochina Section.
Together with Group “C” (China Coast Section), these made up SOE’s Force 136. 646
Hence, Davis’ team and operations in Malaya should be more accurately referred to
as Force 136 Malaya.

Joining these British officers of Force 136 Malaya in India was Lim Bo Seng, a
prominent Chinese businessman in Singapore who had escaped to India before
Singapore capitulated. Lim was known for his strong anti-Japanese views and his
leadership in anti-Japanese activities in Singapore. 647 He would have been wanted by
the Japanese and hence he left Singapore before it came under Japanese occupation.
Leaving his family behind, he reluctantly left for the safety India. There he was
recruited by Goodfellow into Force 136 Malaya. Force 136 Malaya had the resources
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and equipment to infiltrate Malaya but it lacked one crucial element; agents that
could blend in with the local population. European agents operating in Malaya or
Singapore would immediately raise suspicion; with all Europeans interned in prison
camps after the Fall of Singapore, few Europeans would be travelling freely amongst
the general population. The Chinese therefore were a good choice. However, despite
the large number of war refugees who made it to Ceylon and India after the Fall of
Singapore, Davis felt that, “they were not quite the type we wanted.” 648 Davis
needed agents who were literate to allow the preparation and sending of intelligence
reports, 649 and agents with demonstrated anti-Japanese sentiments. The nature of
Force 136 Malaya’s task meant that they could not just simply accept any Chinese
volunteer. With Lim, the British team finally found what they wanted. He had
considerable influence in China, especially with the KMT government, and using his
influence and connections in China, he recruited Malayan Chinese youths, who were
displaced from universities and schools in China when war broke out. Through Lim’s
influence in the Chinese community and his recruitment efforts, Force 136 Malaya
got the kind of Chinese agents that they wanted: they were literate and were “people
with hearts in the right place” 650 ; i.e. strongly anti-Japanese in sentiment. Lim
recruited over 100 agents in China, nearly all supporters of the KMT, who could
speak Malay, and they were known as “Dragons”. 651 Lim was a crucial element in
the establishment of Force 136 Malaya.

The original objective of Force 136 mirrored the European underground resistance
movements; conducting sabotage missions behind enemy lines. 652 The agents were
originally trained in handling explosives but priorities for Force 136 Malaya were
soon changed. Unlike the European theatre of war, sabotaging the local infrastructure
in Malaya would not have significant impact on the Japanese war effort. As Davis
explained, Malaya was “at least 2,000 miles from the nearest war front or nearest
fighting” and sabotage offered little benefit to the Allied war effort. 653 Force 136
Malaya’s mission was redirected instead to gathering intelligence and establishing
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contact with resistance movements in Malaya to prepare for the future Allied
invasion of Malaya. 654 Furthermore, Force 136 Malaya teams’ method of insertion
limited their capability to conduct sabotage missions in Malaya like the typical
resistance forces in Europe. With the lack of proper transport aircraft, insertion was
conducted via submarine, in particular by Dutch submarines that had survived the
Japanese invasion. This method was risky. The submarine surfaced at night and
remained surfaced while the agents got into collapsible canoes. The submarine would
then manoeuvre and point its bow to the shore to indicate to the agents on the boats
where the Malayan shoreline was. The agents would then paddle to shore while the
submarine was put into reverse gear and slipped away back to India. The submarine
would return to the same spot during pre-defined rendezvous times to pick up
anything that the field agents wanted to transport back to India, including
replacements for, and returning field agents. 655 The method of insertion and the
restricted space on the submarine limited the equipment that could be carried.

The training of Force 136 Malaya’s new Chinese agents took place at a training
school in the hills of Kharakvasla, in the western gulf near Poonah in India. 656 After
their field training, agents of Force 136 Malaya were organised into teams that
consisted of four to seven agents who were to be deployed into Malaya one team at a
time. Out of the total 107 agents recruited by Lim, only forty-six agents were
selected to embark on field operations in Malaya. 657 Neither Davis nor Broome
described in full detail the kind of training the agents received but it certainly
involved training the agents to be physically fit and basic weapons handling. Since
they were not supposed to engage the Japanese, Force 136 Malaya agents were
lightly armed. The agents were equipped with a typical kit issued to agents – a pistol
and a few grenades. 658 Communications with the headquarters and surviving in the
jungle took precedence over everything else therefore Force 136 Malaya agents were
also equipped with supplies of food, medicine, water, observation gear and parts of
wireless communications equipment to be assembled for use in Malaya.659 Quantities
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of forged paper currency also had to be smuggled into Malaya to finance a local spy
operation ring. 660

The success of Force 136 Malaya depended largely on establishing contact with any
existing resistance movements in Malaya. This was where Davis and Broome would
play a key role. During the Japanese invasion of Malaya in January 1942, Davis and
Broome were recruited into the British Special Training School (STS) 101 Tanjong
Balai in Malaya. STS 101 was tasked to train “stay behind parties” to conduct
sabotage missions behind enemy lines and later to form the nucleus of local
resistance movements. Most stay behind teams trained by STS 101 were made up of
Chinese Communists volunteers, and both Davis and Broome personally deployed a
number of these teams. They would lead them to the front lines where they would
hide. Davis and Broome would then leave the teams and retreat safely back to
friendly lines. After the Japanese had overrun the front the teams would emerge from
cover to begin their mission. 661 Davis and Broome knew little of the fate of these
Communist stay-behind parties after they escaped from Singapore. However, if
Davis and Broome were to return to Malaya, the possibility of linking up one of
these Chinese Communist guerrilla teams was quite high. Indeed, during the early
months of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, the Malaya Communist Party (MCP)
and its military arm, the Malaya People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) had largely
brought together most STS 101 guerrilla teams under one united anti-Japanese
resistance movement. It proved that British efforts in organising stay behind teams to
conduct a war of resistance behind enemy lines had been successful. However, the
presence of a strong resistance movement, inspired and led by the Communists,
would be problematic for the Chinese agents who made up Force 136 Malaya. As
noted in the previous chapter, the enmity between the Communists and the KMT in
China extended to the overseas Chinese communities. The problems this posed for
Davis and Broome, and the way this has been interpreted in post-war Singapore, are
discussed later in this chapter.
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Davis and Broome returned to Malaya in 1943 and after Force 136 Malaya
established contact with the MCP, negotiations began on an agreement for mutual aid
between Force 136 Malaya, representing the Allies, and the Communists. Davis
recalled, “[t]hat was one of the objects to going in – to make what arrangements I
could with them to further the resistance movement”. 662 Force 136 Malaya’s efforts
finally paid off on 31 December 1943 when Davis signed the Bukit Bidor Agreement
on behalf of the Allies, with the Chinese Communists. This agreement promised the
Communists that Force 136 Malaya would be the conduit between them and the
British in India to provide the necessary arms, munitions, training and even officers
and doctors to bolster the MPAJA. In return, the Communists would take directions
from the Allies and be part of Allied strategy in the war against the Japanese. More
importantly, the agreement ensured that Communist cooperation would be extended
“for such time as the [British] military was responsible for the government after the
war.” 663 This ensured that the British would not have to deal with a potential
Communist takeover of Malaya and Singapore immediately after the war.

The Bidor Agreement, however, suffered a serious setback three months after it was
signed. Word got out to the Kempetai about the presence of a strong local resistance
movement operating close to Force 136 Malaya’s base in Lumut, Perak. In March
1944, the Japanese started to round-up suspects. They also caught in their net Force
136 agents. Lim and four Force 136 agents were apprehended while on missions
away from the base camp and imprisoned in Ipoh, the capital of the state of Perak.
The arrests continued until June 1944 and of the twelve agents deployed in Malaya at
the time, seven were initially arrested, although one later escaped. Altogether only
five agents successfully eluded the Japanese crackdown. 664 Davis remembered that
morale was shattered and he could only offer a few words of consolation to the
remaining agents, “look, this is warfare, we got to sort of do the best we can.” 665
Force 136 Malaya suffered a further setback when the Kempetai raided their base
camp in the jungle. Most of Force 136 Malaya’s equipment and supplies were either
destroyed or captured by the Japanese, including their vital wireless equipment.
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Davis and Broome were not at the base camp during the raid because they were
seeing off two agents at the beach who would attempt to rendezvous with the Dutch
submarine to bring news of the arrests of Force 136 Malaya agents back to India.
They miscalculated the timing and Force 136 headquarters in India would not learn
of Davis’ losses until contact was re-established some time later.

Davis and Broome suspected that either the MCP or the MPAJA had been infiltrated
by the Kempetai. Davis was nearly correct. The identity of this Japanese spy will be
discussed in greater detail later. Meanwhile, the top priority for the Force 136
survivors was to re-establish contact with India to communicate to the British
requests from the MCP for weapons, supplies and training officers. Fortunately for
Force 136 Malaya, they had left a cache of equipment buried near their landing sites
on the beach. With assistance from the MPAJA, they recovered a wireless transmitter
that had been buried there earlier. However, the wireless transmitter could not work
without a power generator; the main generator had been destroyed in the Kempetai
raid. The MPAJA tried to help by providing a steam generator, but it could not
generate the correct current that could power the transmitter. The agents then
improvised with the spare parts they had and created a bicycle generator. When an
agent peddled on a stationary bicycle, a dynamo would begin to power the
transmitter. 666 It was on 5 November 1944 that Force 136 Malaya finally reestablished contact with India to deliver their part of the Bidor agreement.

After Force 136 Malaya re-established contact with India, the Allies began a massive
program from February 1945 to arm and supply the MCP. By early 1945, the the
Allies had access to more long range transport aircraft, and the massive loss of
Japanese combat aircraft in the Pacific campaigns against the United States, allowed
the British to airlift supplies to Malaya instead of relying on submarine transport.
Weapons, munitions, medical supplies and even trained specialists were parachuted
into Malaya to transform the MPAJA into a credible fighting force. Over 2,000
weapons were airlifted to the MPAJA and Force 136 Malaya agents later even had
special escort protection provided by six Gurkha Special Groups, each led by two
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British officers with 16 Gurkha soldiers. 667 During the entire exercise, Davis was
anxious that the MPAJA did not get too enthusiastic with their new weapons and
equipment and launch raids or sabotage missions against the Japanese that might
give away their strength and capability to the Kempetai. For Davis, the primary
objective was to keep the MPAJA “as quiet as possible” so that they would have a
bigger impact on the Japanese once the planned Allied invasion to recapture Malaya
was launched. 668 Davis also added that it was only after the MPAJA had been
transformed into a strong anti-Japanese resistance force that the emphasis of Force
136 Malay shifted from intelligence-gathering to warfare. 669 In the event, the
planned invasion was negated by the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945.

The Bidor agreement concluded with the MCP became crucial to the success of the
post-war British reoccupation of Malaya and Singapore. Singapore and Malaya did
not experience the violent nationalist independence movements that occurred in other
former colonies in the region in the immediate aftermath of the war. Although the
MCP was ready to carry out plans for the takeover of Malaya and Singapore to create
a Malayan Communist state, the Communists observed their part of the Bukit Bidor
Agreement. The MPAJA continued to operate under Allied command and in the
euphoria of the Japanese surrender, the new British Military Administration (BMA)
included the MPAJA in its victory celebrations and publicly recognised their antiJapanese resistance efforts and assistance to Force 136 Malaya. Victory parades were
held and medals were given to members of the MPAJA. However, after the
celebrations had concluded, the BMA was anxious to disband the MPAJA and
recover as much as it could the weapons and equipment that was given to the
MPAJA during the war. According to Davis, “the disbandment went well and
Malaya was comparatively peaceful for the next two and a half years.” 670 For a time,
the Bukit Bidor Agreement brought peace to post-war Malaya and Singapore, but
although disbanded officially, the MPAJA surrendered little of the weapons and
equipment gained during 1945. Davis also commended the British concentration on
efforts to disarm and accommodate the Communists instead of adopting “a more
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stupid attitude” by launching an anti-Communist campaign in Singapore and
Malaya. 671

Davis and Broome provided a clear and consistent account of what went into the
establishment and the operations of Force 136 Malaya. It was an Allied intelligence
gathering unit in Malaya, staffed by Chinese field agents and led by British officers.
Its objectives were to obtain field intelligence on the situation on Malaya for Allied
Command in India, and prepare the local resistance movement to aid the planned
Allied invasion to retake Malaya. 672 It was never to engage in direct combat, nor was
it a guerrilla force. 673 Indeed, the success of Force 136 Malaya was its invaluable
role as a liaison agency between the Allies and the MPAJA.

Force 136 – The Price of Peace

The opening two chapters of The Price of Peace featured a narrative of Force 136
based on transcripts of oral interviews conducted by the National Archives of
Singapore (NAS) with Davis and Broome. Interestingly, the editor of The Price of
Peace, Foong Choon Hon, and his assistant editor, Jane Thum, heavily edited and
paraphrased Davis’ and Broome’s interviews. Thum specifically acknowledged that
she had “re-written” 674 Broome’s account of his wartime experiences with Force
136. Foong and Thum used the oral narratives of Davis and Broom to spin a
narrative of Chinese unity and heroic guerrillas, written in the style of “Resistance
Literature”, reflecting not only the genre but also powerful local war myths.

The biggest problem that confronted Force 136 during its operations in Malaya was
the deep-seated political rivalry between the KMT and the Communists. The British
knew that problems could arise if agents loyal to the KMT government in China
were deployed in field operations to work with the MCP in Malaya. Measures were
considered to prevent a situation where after meeting the MCP in Malaya the KMT
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agents would declare, “No, I am not going to have anything to do with these
people” 675 and cost the entire SOE operation in Malaya. Indeed, as the unit’s field
commander, Davis was especially concerned. Davis remembered that he had asked
Lim, before his recruitment exercise in China began, to ensure that all volunteers
would be briefed on the possibility of working with Communist cadres in Malaya.676
Broome also shared Davis’ concerns and recalled that prior to the Chinese agents
embarking on their missions to Malaya, Lim was to brief them that they would very
likely be working with the Communists in Malaya. 677 In other words, there should
have been at least one occasion when the KMT agents were briefed over the need to
cooperate with their rivals, the Communists, who were the dominant Chinese
guerrilla group in Force 136 Malaya’s centre of operations. This understanding was
essential to the success of the Force 136’s missions to Malaya. It seems that Lim did
not brief the KMT agents at all. Davis and Broome remembered that the KMT agents
in Force 136 Malaya found the need to form a working partnership with their
Communist rivals in Malaya rather confronting. Tan Chong Tee was one.

In his autobiography, Tan claimed that he only discovered that he would be working
with the MCP after the first meeting with the Communist guerrillas. He claimed that
Davis had deliberately withheld this information from the Chinese agents in order to
get Force 136 operations up and running in Malaya. 678 Tan also claimed that he
warned the British officer that the MCP may not welcome the KMT’s presence in
their anti-Japanese efforts and that he had asked that the identity of the KMT men in
force 136 Malaya be kept secret and the results of the unit’s espionage work be kept
from the MCP. He also warned Davis not to give the “MCP any chance to betray or
have a hold over you.” 679 His response was a good reflection of the KMT’s attitude
towards the Communists. However, Tan also noted that the KMT agents had to put
“set aside our differences in ideology and prevent clashes with the [Communist]
guerrillas” 680 because he wanted to ensure that the interests of the KMT government

675

R. Broome, Interview. op cit.
J. Davis, op cit.
677
R. Broome, Interview. op cit.
678
C. T Tan, Force 136: Story of a WWII Resistance Fighter, Asiapac Books, Singapore 1995, p.90
679
ibid., p.90
680
ibid., pp.88-91
676

157

in China were represented in this British-MCP partnership. 681 Clearly, although
mistrust remained, the KMT did not want to be left out. Broome had a slightly
different view to Tan’s. He claimed that the traditional rivalry between the
Communists and KMT was not serious enough to derail their operations in Malaya
because his KMT agents were able to “think over those differences and co-operate
fully, even with the Chinese Communists, for the joint purpose of defeating the
Japanese.” 682 But there is another explanation. The level of cooperation eventually
forged between the Chinese KMT agents of Force 136 Malaya and the Communists
reflected the fact that it was a British unit working under British command. The
KMT agents were responsible to officers appointed by the British, not to officers of
their own political persuasion or to officers in the MPAJA. Elsewhere, in Malaya the
intense rivalry between the KMT and Communists continued to be played out.

The MPAJA were not the only anti-Japanese resistance movement in Malaya. During
the Japanese Occupation, the MPAJA guerrillas dominated the west coast of Malaya
and the British needed their cooperation because any British plans to recapture
Malaya would involve landing and occupying this highly strategic area. 683 The KMT
also had a strong anti-Japanese presence in Malaya. Local guerrillas commanded by
the KMT had their forces concentrated in northern Malaya. Their combined armed
strength was estimated to be about 400 and they were organised under the banner of
the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army (OCAJA). These guerrillas were loyal to
the KMT government in Chongqing. Force 136 Malaya referred to them as KMT
guerrillas. 684 Force 136 Malaya often had its hands full whenever the KMT guerrillas
and the MPAJA were in the same area; clashes would always follow, 685 and Force
136 Malaya often had to intervene to separate the two. The turf war between the
KMT and MPAJA in the Krai-Merapoh area of Kelantan was especially bloody and a
case in point. The clashes between the two for control of the area had resulted in the
indiscriminate killing of local Malay civilians. Villages were razed simply on the
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suspicion of helping the other side. 686 The clashes only ceased when Force 136
Malaya was used to intervene to force the KMT guerrillas to leave the area, while at
the same time threatening the MPAJA that the British would cut off all arms and
supplies if it refused to withdraw their forces back to their traditional stronghold in
neighbouring Perak. 687

Davis and Broome were also subject to political pressure from the leaders of the
MCP who questioned them about the political future of Malaya and Singapore once
the war was over. As Davis recalled, their orders were clear: “as far as dealing with
the Communists, we were never to discuss politics. We were never to discuss what
was going to happen in post-war Malaya.” 688 Broome recalled a conversation with
Chin Peng, the MCP’s liaison officer with Force 136 Malaya. When Chin Peng
raised the issue of Malaya’s political future, he added, “You must realise that our
ultimate aims are very different from yours.” Broome replied, “We are quite agreed.
But meanwhile, let us do what we can together until that time comes”. 689 And that
time came three years after the end of the Pacific War when the MPAJA recovered
caches of concealed and leftover Allied weapons and supplies from the war and
morphed into the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA). Chin Peng went
on to lead the MCP in the Communist insurrection of Malaya during the Malaya
Emergency while Broome was appointed chief secretary of the Defence and Internal
Security Department in Singapore. Indeed, political beliefs did matter at the time and
the success of the coalition depended on how well each side stayed clear of them.

In his interview, Davis summed it up this way,

Provided one was honest with oneself and stuck to one’s gun, kept out
of politics and said, “All of us, all our best, our job is to fight the
Japanese and nothing else,” then there immediately became common
ground on which we could trust each other. 690
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When Foong featured Force 136 in The Price of Peace, he paraphrased Davis closely
but changed the emphasis. Foong wrote:

In Malaya at the time, there were Chinese communist elements,
Koumintang members from China, and the defeated British among
others. All of us worked together for a common cause. For us, as long as
we were true to ourselves and to the cause, our political beliefs did not
matter. Our collective mission was to defeat the Japanese and nothing
else. This provided the basis for mutual understanding and reliance. 691

Whist Davis acknowledged the reality of political divisions between the Communists
and the KMT, insisting that both groups find common ground in defeating Japan, in
Foong’s interpretation, political divisions were forgotten for the sake of a collective
mission to defeat the Japanese. In other words, an accommodation made to meet a
short-term goal was transformed into evidence supporting one of the main themes of
“Resistance Literature”: Chinese unity; and simply overlooked the evidence of
division clearly seen in the clashes between the Communists and the KMT.

From intelligence agents to guerrillas: Rewriting the history of the Chinese and
Force 136 Malaya

In The Price of Peace, Foong transformed a covert intelligence unit into a Chinese
united anti-Japanese fighting force, contradicting his source material. For example, in
their interviews, Davis and Broome were clear as to the purpose of Force 136 Malaya
and the attributes they required for their agents. Foong, however, distorts their
explanations in The Price of Peace, by claiming that the “responsibility for gathering
intelligence behind enemy lines rested solely on the Chinese”. 692 Foong distorts it
further when he quoted Davis as saying that Force 136 Malaya urgently needed any
Chinese volunteers to be trained as spies to work behind enemy lines. 693 If this had
really been the case it would have been far easier to recruit from the pool of Chinese
691
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war refugees in India. Lim Bo Seng would not have needed to travel to China to
recruit the agents Force 136 Malaya needed. In his efforts to privilege the Chinese
above any other resistance group during the war, Foong ironically, reduced the
importance of the role and contributions of Lim, the most important Chinese leader
in the organisation.

The Price of Peace also inflated the number of Chinese in Force 136 Malaya in
typical “Resistance Literature” style to emphasize for its readers that the Chinese
played an important role in the war against Japan. According to Foong, Force 136
Malaya had “hundreds of anti-Japanese Chinese youths.” 694 However, as noted
earlier in this chapter, the number was far smaller and even fewer went on field
missions. Broome estimated the pool of volunteers at about 100. 695 Lee Kim Chuan,
an agent in Force 136 Malaya whose narrative was also featured as a chapter in The
Price of Peace set the number of agents recruited to just over 100, corroborating
Broome’s account. 696 Officially, a total of 107 Chinese volunteers were accepted into
Force 136 Malaya. 697 Indeed, considering the nature of Force 136 Malaya operations,
the unit had to be kept small. Unlike a combat unit where hundreds of volunteers
may create a formidable force, “hundreds” of Chinese agents would have been a
liability for Force 136 Malaya.

The exaggeration in numbers reflected another shift in the interpretation of Force 136
Malaya in The Price of Peace: it was reinterpreted as a Chinese guerrilla fighting
force rather than a British intelligence gathering unit. While Davis and Broome
consistently referred to the men of Force 136 Malaya as “agents” because Force 136
Malaya was essentially an intelligence field unit, the Chinese volunteers preferred to
call, and depict, themselves as “guerrilla fighters”. For example, during a rendezvous
operation with an Allied submarine off the coast of Malaya, a Chinese agent
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explained to the crew of a fishing vessel, “We’re guerrilla fighters from Sumatra.” 698
There is no proper translation in the Chinese language for “intelligence agent” and
veterans of Force 136 could likely have chosen “guerrilla fighters” as a substitute.
However, descriptions and depictions of Force 136 Malaya by its own fraternity are
indicative that this was not a problem with translation. Tham Sien Yen, a Force 136
veteran, claimed that in addition to “food, medicine and clothes”, they carried “the
Sting gun, revolver and grenades” 699 while on missions in Malaya. Tan Choong Tee,
claimed in his autobiography that members of the force were “armed with machine
guns” 700 and were prepared to use them to fight off enemy patrol boats when
infiltrating Malaya. 701 Tham could have mistaken a spear gun for a “Sting” gun
because the latter is a fictional weapon popular with comic book heroes. Considering
the nature of its missions and method of insertion, the weapons described by these
former agents would not have been part of Force 136 Malaya’s inventory. As noted
earlier, the restricted space on the submarines meant that any types of small arms like
submachine guns or rifles would have been too cumbersome. Besides, they were not
essential in convert intelligence-gathering missions. This is indicative that some
veteran agents of Force 136 Malaya were negotiating their memories to
accommodate a past that has been created for them; they were guerrilla fighters in
the war against Japan.

Chinese veterans of Force 136 Malaya preferred the reinterpretation of their war
experiences as “guerrilla fighters” because it suggests the action that one would
expect from an anti-Japanese resistance movement. But some Force 136 Malaya
veterans, like Lee Kim Chuan, have been uncomfortable with this view of their
contributions to the war effort. Lee felt that his role in the unit did not live up to
popular depictions of Force 136 when he summed up his experience this way:

I was the least outstanding. Not only did I not have the chance to
shoot Japanese soldiers, I never came face to face with one.
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Hence I do not think I deserve to be honoured as an “antiJapanese resistance fighter”. Perhaps it was out of respect my
comrades regarded me as one. 702

Lee had to negotiate his personal experiences with the popular stories written about
him in Force 136 Malaya. It is not an unfamiliar phenomenon as Alistair Thomson
showed in his study of veterans of the First A.I.F in Australia. 703 The
mythologisation of Force 136 Malaya by its own fraternity, however, was only one
example of the rewriting of the history of Force 136 Malaya, which suggests an even
larger problem in the writing of war history in Singapore, one clearly seen in the
autobiography of Tan Chong Tee, Force 136: The story of a WWII resistance fighter.

The title of Tan’s autobiography clearly shows how the history of Force 136 Malaya
had been recast in the popular mind in Singapore by 1995; he was now a “resistance
fighter”. But his book also reflected popular post-war sentiments in Singapore which
argues that after the Fall of Singapore, the status of the British as a colonial master,
and the status of the Chinese as a subordinate population, was questioned and
challenged, inspiring a more egalitarian society in post-war Singapore. In Force 136:
Story of a WWII Resistance Fighter this found expression in Tan’s portrayal of
Davis.

Tan’s autobiography is replete with tales of him taking Davis to task for his colonial
attitude towards the KMT agents. For example, during his training in India, he stood
up for his fellow Chinese agents when he expressed his unhappiness over their
treatment. He told Davis, “Excuse me for making a blunt request, but since we’re
here to fight a common enemy, I sincerely hope that the British officials will treat the
Chinese trainees as team mates, not servants. After all, we’re comrades-in-arms,
aren’t we?” 704 Davis apparently made no reply. Tan even implored Lim Bo Seng, his
702

K. M Chuan, ‘My Mission With Force 136’, in Foong, C. H., The Price of Peace, True Accounts of
the Japanese Occupation, Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Asiapac,
Singapore, 1997, p.160
703
A. Thomson, ANZAC Memories: Living with the Legend, Oxford University Press, Melbourne,
1994. See also A. Thomson, “Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice In
Australia”, in Perks, R. and Thomson, A. (eds.), The Oral History Reader, (second edition),
Routledge, London, 1998.
704
C. T Tan, op cit., p.48

163

close friend “to persuade Davis to change his autocratic ways and not treat us as
mercenaries”. 705 Later in Malaya, he chided Davis, “Mr Davis, we’re a team and
should share weal and woe.” 706 Interestingly, Tan’s choice of words to present
colonial attitudes of the time reminds one of Rudyard Kipling’s works decades
earlier. As already noted, Tan claimed that Davis had deliberately withheld the
information that KMT agents were to be working with the Communists and advised
him of the dangers of doing so. The portrayal of Davis is that of a reserved, secretive
man who stubbornly refused to listen to Chinese colonials. Although light in detail,
Tan also implied unfair treatment and racial discrimination on the part of Davis. He
and his fellow Chinese agents, for example, were also made to carry most of the
equipment required for the mission. 707 Yet, this would not have been unusual in a
military unit. It is common for enlisted men to do the heavy lifting in any army.
Furthermore, it is rare in the military command structure for privates to offer advice
to officers and even rarer for officers to acknowledge advice from privates.

One would be hard pressed to find evidence in Davis’ testimony that he treated the
Chinese agents like servants, mercenaries or colonial subjects. Rather, his
descriptions of the Chinese agents were complimentary and he added, on behalf of
the leadership of Force 136, “we were well satisfied and very pleased” 708 with their
work in Malaya. The “we” specifically included Lim Bo Seng, a Chinese and fellow
officer. Lim was not only seen by Davis as part of the inner circle of Force 136
Malaya, but there is also evidence that the men were friends. A photograph taken at
Bukit Bidor where the agreement with the Communists was signed features Lim and
Davis with Lim the more dominant figure in the photograph. In fact, Davis looks like
a subordinate to Lim. British officers at the time would seldom be photographed in
such a manner. Their natural posture and smiles are a clear indication of a close
friendship. 709 Tan’s work also contained evidence that contradicted his claims of the
subordinate status of the Chinese in Force 136 Malaya. Everyone at the base camp,
according to Tan, had “three meals a day with no special menu even for Davis.” 710
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And Tan himself was not immune to the sense of superiority he identified in Davis.
He was quick to protest, as an educated Chinese student, when he was bumped from
what agents regarded as the prestigious first team to infiltrate Malaya in favour of
“an uneducated mechanic”. 711 The “uneducated mechanic” remained in the first team
because he was specially chosen by team leader Davis as his bodyguard because of
his toughness. 712

Tan’s autobiography certainly reflects the themes dominant in Singapore’s postcolonial narratives, but his deep-seated animosity towards Davis was also based on
personal matters; betrayal, the death of a hero and a sense that his work with Force
136 was never fully recognised.

The death of a war hero

Despite strong suspicion that the Kempetai were monitoring their movements, Tan
and his fellow agents continued to operate in the towns of Perak outside the safety of
their base camp in the jungle. Tan was the first agent to be arrested on 25 March
1944 during the Kempetai crackdown. He was brought to the Kempetai headquarters
in Ipoh where he was tortured for information. Despite the torture Tan remained tiplipped over his identity and Force 136 Malaya. Lim was apprehended the following
day with more arrests made soon after. Tan strongly suspected betrayal and his initial
suspicion settled on Mo Ching who had been arrested with Lim. 713 Mo was not a
member of Force 136 Malaya but was a local agent who had been recruited by Davis.
According to Tan, Davis was so impressed with Mo that he offered to send him to
India for training, but gave way to pressure from the MCP to send a MPAJA
volunteer instead. 714 Lim and Mo were brought to Ipoh for interrogation and there
Tan overhead Mo’s voice in the interrogation room. He described it as a debriefing
session; Mo “was telling the Japanese some names and figures. He burst into
laughter several times”. 715 Shortly after, he wrote, he heard sounds of a beating and
Lim’s voice saying, “Since I am in your hands now, I have nothing more to say. I am
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prepared to die.” 716 Tan, Lim and most of the other captured Force 136 Malaya
agents were later transferred to the Batu Gajah prison. Interestingly, Mo was also
imprisoned along with his former comrades at Batu Gajah and was also subjected to
interrogation and torture. 717

Conditions at the Batu Gajah prison were appalling. It was an unhygienic place and
the arrested agents were given meagre food rations. They all soon came down with
dysentery. While in prison, Tan saw the slow deterioration of Lim as a result of
Japanese torture and interrogation to extract more information about the operations
of Force 136 Malaya; “he became thinner and more depressed as the days went by.
Even his voice turned hoarse… [Lim] was physically and mentally spent.” 718 On the
morning of 29 June 1944, Tan saw Lim lying motionless on his cell floor. At first he
thought Lim was in a deep sleep but he found out later from the prison warden that
Lim had died. He had succumbed to dysentery. Tan and Mo were immediately given
proper medicine and better food, which helped them recover from dysentery. Tan
believed that the Japanese Military High Command regarded them to be more
valuable alive than dead. 719 Tan, Mo and another arrested agent called Wu Beng
Chye were finally transferred from the Batu Gajah prison to the Tapah police station
on 18 August 1944. Security at this prison was more relaxed and Tan found antiJapanese sympathisers among the wardens to help him pass on messages to the
resistance movement outside. A warder also later informed Tan that Wu had turned
coat; he now wore a Japanese army uniform and carried with him a samurai
sword. 720 Just after Japan’s surrender in 1945, Tan made a successful escape during
a prison transfer. 721

Once free, Tan looked for ways to rejoin Force 136 Malaya. It was a frustrating
journey. Tan had little money with him and the British referred him from one
department to another. To make matters worse, during his search he could not apply
for British financial aid as a war veteran until he located his unit that held all his
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personnel records. 722 Tan’s search took him from Penang to Singapore. By the time
he arrived in Singapore, Tan was beset with hopelessness and loneliness. 723 When
Tan gave a description of Davis to the local Singapore branch office of the Malayan
Demobilisation Service Headquarters, he finally located information on Force 136
Malaya. 724 At the time, Force 136 Malaya and the MCP were celebrating the Allied
victory. Tan also found out that Davis had been promoted to the rank of Colonel. But
Tan was particularly bitter about the British attitude towards Lim’s arrest and death.
They were not interested in investigating Lim’s death or even in informing his
widow. Tan claimed that he was first to bring the news of Lim’s death to his widow
and children. 725

Tan’s bitterness and grievances over the events that unfolded during and after the
war clearly influenced the way he remembered and framed his personal experiences.
There was neither promotion nor a medal to recognise his service, nor any
immediate recognition for Lim Bo Seng and his steadfast loyalty to Force 136
Malaya during his time in prison. But above all, there was the matter of rescue. He
wrote,

Both Davis and Chin Peng were aware that [Lim] Bo Seng and some
other comrades had been arrested, but why did they not try to rescue us?
We risked our lives in prison to send word out about our plight and ended
up waiting in vain. 726

After the Kempetai’s crackdown of Force 136 agents, Davis made no attempts to
rescue them. A rescue attempt at the time was quite impossible. Davis and the
surviving agents were on the run fearing for their own safety and there was nothing
they could do to help those who were arrested. 727 In the months that followed the
Kempetai crackdown and the raid, Force 136 Malaya depended entirely on the MCP
for food and protection until they finally re-established contact with India in
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November 1944. Even after Force 136 Malaya was resupplied and reinforced by
India, no attempts were made to rescue the captured agents. This was standard
operating procedure for any intelligence unit during the war. Indeed, Force 136
Malaya agents like Tham indicated that every agent was well aware of the dangers of
capture and there was a contingency plan in place; each agent was given a poison pill
to be used as a last resort to safeguard military secrets in the event that an agent was
captured and tortured – it “would kill within seconds of chewing”. 728 If each agent
had been given a poison pill, it seemed that none of the captured agents saw that as
an option. Finally, Davis had no idea as to who was it who compromised his unit nor
did he want to find out. In his interview, Davis mentioned that he had seen reports
after the war that suggested why the Force 136 Malaya network collapsed in 1944
but he never followed them up. Davis, as an officer, still had a strong attachment to
his unit and agents; “I’d never probe too closely because a number of my own men
were captured. And I didn’t want to start probing individuals who served me so
well.” 729 He did not want to acknowledge that one or some of his men could have
betrayed him and his unit. Tan, however, who had been tortured, who had watched
his close friend die a slow and painful death in Batu Gajah prison, and who waited in
vain for rescue and, later, recognition for his war service, found in Davis the vehicle
for expressing personal animus in a war narrative that resonated strongly with
modern Singapore.

Persistence and Contradictions

After the war, Lim’s arrest and death became a well known story in Singapore and
Malaysia, earning him recognition as a war hero. It also made Tan an authority on
Lim and Force 136 Malaya. Contemporary works on Lim and Force 136 Malaya
have largely accepted, reproduced and even expanded on Tan’s views on Davis. In
post-colonial Singapore, few would challenge Tan’s depiction of Davis as a
questionable British leader whose seemingly poor judgement caused the death of the
nation’s war hero.
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In 2005, the NAS published a book on the Japanese Occupation called The Syonan
Years and it reproduced Tan’s claims that it was Davis’s questionable leadership of
Force 136 Malaya that led to Lim’s capture during the Kempetai crackdown of
March 1944. According to Tan, Lim was ordered to undertake a highly dangerous
operation to raise funds through his relatives and friends for Force 136 operations in
Malaya because Force 136 Malaya was “funded so inadequately by the British.”730
Clara Show, the translator for both The Price of Peace and Tan’s autobiography
further expanded Tan’s claim in her own published book on Lim Bo Seng’s life, Lim
Bo Seng: Singapore's best-known war hero. According to Show, with funds running
low, Davis ordered Lim to travel to Ipoh on a mission to “replenish stocks” for Force
136 Malaya. 731 Lim thus left the safety of the base camp in an attempt to make
contact with potential financiers in the towns of Perak. When Lim was in Ipoh, the
Kempetai moved in and arrested him and other Force 136 Malaya agents.

Davis, however, had a different explanation for Lim’s decision to leave the base
camp. Davis insisted this was done after consultation and, despite Davis expressing
concerns over this risky operation, Lim was “determined to go”; “there was no
question of orders” 732 said Davis. Broome corroborated Davis’ account. Lim had
discussed his plans with him and Davis for leaving the jungle to set up a local
financing operation in the towns. Confident that he could pull off the entire operation
Lim “insisted on going out although we didn’t want him to.” 733 But why was money
a problem? Force 136 was being supplied with copious amounts of forged local
Japanese currency to fund their local operations. These were based on a few local
Japanese notes that were captured during Force 136 Malaya’s first mission in
Malaya. 734 The British forgers were even meticulous enough to ask Broome as to the
number of whiskers on the tiger that was supposed to appear on the forged Japanese
notes. Broome and his agents took out all their local Japanese notes and counted,
“and every single one practically was different from the one before…so it doesn’t
really matter” he replied, “You can put as many whiskers as you like.”735 Even Tan
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felt that the mission had enough money to last the organisation for a year. 736 The
answer is found in hyperinflation and logistics.

During the Japanese Occupation the local economy was hit by hyperinflation. In
Singapore for example, five months into the Japanese Occupation, the average
monthly cost of living had nearly doubled. 737 When Force 136 Malaya’s agents first
infiltrated Malaya in May 1943, the average monthly cost of living in Singapore was
$346.10. By the time of Lim’s arrest in March 1944, it had jumped to $1,490. 738 It
continued to increase, reaching a height of $10,980 in May 1945. 739 And in 1944,
communication with Force 136 Malaya was still being conducted by submarines with
their limited carrying capacity. Even if the British had been able to print enough
forged currency to keep up with hyperinflation, delivery remained a problem. It was
likely that Lim had recognised the problem posed by hyperinflation and
transportation, and did not want the agents to depend solely on the forged money that
was being delivered to them from India. It would have been be far more efficient to
find local financiers in Malaya or Singapore to fund their field operations instead.
Lim’s arrest in March 1944 was therefore connected to the hyperinflation in Malaya
and Singapore. But the question remains, who betrayed him? Tan initially saw Mo as
the principal villain and it is likely that Mo had been working for the Japanese. But
Tan later revised his view of Mo, believing that Mo had become a double agent after
previous torture by the Japanese. 740 Perhaps for the Japanese, Mo had reached the
end of his usefulness, which was why he was incarcerated and even tortured in Batu
Gajah prison. Or it could be that the Kempetai had infiltrated the ranks of the MCP
and Mo, with his questionable loyalty, could jeopardise the Kempetai’s operations.

The Malayan Chinese Triads

The Chinese Triads began as a loose brotherhood of Chinese secret societies that
became increasingly notorious from the second half of the seventeenth century when
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they resisted Qing imperial rule in China. They adopted the popular slogan
“overthrow the Qing – restore the Ming”. 741 However, after the fall of the Qing
dynasty in 1911, these secret societies discarded the old imperial slogan and morphed
into powerful self-serving criminal organisations in China and in Chinese Diaspora
communities. Collectively, they were known as the Chinese Triads and they fought
for control over the monopoly of major criminal activities in Chinese cities and in
major Chinese overseas communities. 742

By the 1920s, major Chinese Triads in China had established powerful political and
financial ties with the Nationalist government in China which made them nearly
indistinguishable from each other. 743 When Chiang Kai-shek, the head of the
Nationalist government, began to purge the Communists, his Triad allies were sent to
attack Communist enclaves in Chinese cities beginning with Shanghai. 744 Bloody
turf wars between the Chinese Triads and the Communists became a common
occurrence in China’s major cities. 745 During the Japanese invasion of China and
Hong Kong, some Chinese Triads demonstrated the Triads’ self-serving tendency by
collaborating with the Japanese. 746 The story in Malaya and Singapore, however, was
quite different. Although the Triads often clashed in bloody turf wars, they became
thoroughly anti-Japanese during the war. Despite possessing neither a centralised
leadership in Malaya nor support from the British, they conducted successful raids
behind enemy lines. One raid on a police post in Selangor even liberated a group of
Australian prisoners-of-war. 747

Martin Booth claimed that Triad members were found on both sides of the KMTMCP political divide in Malaya. A number of KMT Chinese agents in Force 136
Malaya were members of the Triads, including Lim Bo Seng. It appears that Lim was
a senior Triad office-bearer. 748 Indeed, Lim’s confidence in setting up a successful
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local financing operation, despite the hyperinflation in Malaya, suggests that he
possessed a good understanding of Triad commercial activities in the country;
extortion rackets, prostitution rings, illegal gambling operations and the opium
trade. 749 Such criminal businesses were not only unaffected by war, they thrived
during the breakdown of public and social order that accompanied the Japanese
Occupation. Booth also identified a top Communist cadre in the MCP, the secretaryGeneral of the MCP, as a Malayan Chinese Triad member – Chang Hung, better
known as Lai Teck. 750 Lai Teck went by a number of aliases including Chang Hong,
Wong Sui Tong, Wong Kim-Geok, and Wright. 751 Lai Teck took part in the
negotiations with Force 136 Malaya in September 1943. Although the Malayan
Chinese Triads hated the Japanese, were active in the resistance movement, and
straddled the political divide between the KMT and MCP, they could hardly have
acted as a unifying force in the Malayan resistance movement. Not only were they
criminals, they also hated each other and their bloody turf wars for the control of
criminal activities and the elimination of the competition continued. And, when it
suited their purpose, members could serve as double agents. Lai Teck was one.

Lai Teck’s career as an agent began with the Comintern in the service of the
Russians. He also reportedly worked at one time for the French Sûreté, his task to
infiltrate the Indochinese Communist Party. He was recruited by the British
sometime between 1934 and 1935 as a spy for the Singapore Special Branch. In 1936
Lai Teck joined the MCP and quickly worked his way up the ranks becoming the
party’s secretary-general within two years. While leading the MCP, he built around
himself a cult of personality which proved crucial in maintaining his position in the
MCP in the years that followed. During the Japanese Occupation of Singapore, Lai
Teck was arrested in March 1942 when operating under the alias Wong Kim-Geok.
However, a month later he was spotted walking out of the Kempetai headquarters “a
free man with a bundle of dollars in his pocket.” 752 Lai Teck had secured his release
with promises to deliver the MCP leadership to the Japanese. On 1 September 1942
he delivered on his promise when he tipped off the Kempetai of a MCP and MPAJA
749
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executive leadership meeting at the Batu Caves near Kuala Lumpur. Lai Teck should
have been present at the meeting that day but he was reportedly “sitting peacefully
and contentedly in his own home in Singapore”. 753 He claimed that the car had
broken down. The entire executive leadership of the MCP and the MPAJA was
liquidated that day. Yet even at this point few in MCP had any suspicions about Lai
Teck. 754

During negotiations with Force 136 Malaya in September 1943, Lai Teck discovered
the identity of Lim Bo Seng, who at the time went by the alias of Tan Choon Lim.
Lim was wanted by the Kempetai and Lai Teck promptly alerted his handlers that
their man was in Perak. In the crackdown on March 1944, the Kempetai targeted
only Lim and his comrades; Lai Teck did not inform the Kempetai about Davis,
Broome or Force 136 operations in Malaya when he could have done so. 755 Lai
Teck’s betrayal of Lim, but not Force 136 Malaya, clearly showed that the Malayan
Chinese Triads were as self-serving as they were anti-Japanese. While the Malayan
Chinese Triads shared a common anti-Japanese agenda, it did not translate into unity
within the Malayan Chinese Triad fraternity.

In March 1947, Lai Teck left Singapore and absconded with all of the MCP’s party
funds. The MCP then contacted and requested the Chinese Communist Party in
China for assistance to hunt down the former secretary-general. In September 1947,
and with the help of the Thai Communist Party, Lai Teck was traced to a hideout in
Bangkok. Chin Peng, the newly appointed party secretary-general of the MCP was
later informed that the agents who tracked Lai Teck down had “accidentally choked
Lai Teck to death” 756 during a struggle. During the war, Lai Teck was all things to all
people but in post-war Singapore, he was best known as a triple agent for the British,
Communists and Japanese. The role of the Triads during the Japanese Occupation is
seldom mentioned in popular war narratives in Singapore. This may reflect the
escalation of Triad criminal activities in Malaya and Singapore which was only
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curbed in the 1980s. 757 But Lai Teck also sits uncomfortably within the rhetoric of
Chinese unity. Davis, as the representative of a colonial past, is easier to blame for
the betrayal of Singapore’s war hero.

Sins of omission

Contemporary narratives of Force 136 Malaya have clearly been influenced by postwar sentiments and popular reflections on the war in Malaya and Singapore. The
emphasis is on the Chinese, the dominant view is one of Chinese unity and there is a
touch of what Robyn Gerster described as “big noting” in his analysis of the
literature produced about Australian soldiers’ experiences in war; 758 i.e. a capacity to
rewrite history to inflate the achievements of a particular group at the expense of
other voices and uncomfortable realities.

During the Japanese Occupation, the Malay aristocrat class were noticeably amicable
towards, and cooperative with, the new Japanese administrators, which led the
Overseas Chinese to brand them and their community as pro-Japanese. 759 Yet the
Malays made up the second largest anti-Japanese resistance movement in Malaya. A
number of Malay anti-Japanese guerrilla groups were active in Malaya during the
Japanese Occupation with a collective armed strength estimated to be just under 500
(which made them larger than the KMT’s OCAJA in northern Malaya). Force 136
Malaya made contact with one of them in north Perak sometime in December 1944
and provided them with similar support they supplied to the MPAJA; arms and
training, and they were re-organised into the Askar Melayu Setia (AMS), or the
Loyal Malay Army. 760 However, despite having a common liaison agency, there was
little cooperation between the AMS and the MJAPA. Rather, Chinese animosity
against the Malays extended even to the Malay guerrillas; clashes between the
MPAJA and AMS as well as other groups of armed Malay partisans, reportedly took
place in north Perak, Kedah and in west Johor. 761
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The AMS does not appear in popular Chinese narratives about the war. Nor do other
anti-Japanese resistance groups in Malaya and Singapore, especially the roving
bandit gangs that sprang from the MPAJA’s attempts to rally the local Chinese to
resist Japanese rule. 762 In an attempt to mobilise more Chinese supporters, the
MPAJA organised, in villages, towns and districts, local volunteers as militia units.
They were called the “Ho Pi Tui”, or the Reserves. Most volunteers were Chinese
with “a sprinkling of Indians and Malays”. 763 Some of the “Ho Pi Tui” units were
also Chinese criminal gangs and local secret societies who had been persuaded by the
MPAJA to take up the armed struggle against the Japanese. Although the “Ho Pi
Tui” was inspired by the Communists, it was not led directly by Communist cadres.
Rather, local leaders like village elders and secret society chiefs were placed in
charge. As a result, most of these Reserves gradually became bandit groups that
looted, raped and terrorised the locals while claiming to be anti-Japanese. They
stained the reputation of MPAJA and even the KMT Chinese resistance
movements. 764 Like Lai Teck, they have been forgotten.

The popularity of the narratives of Dalforce and Force 136 in Foong’s The Price of
Peace, and Tan’s Force 136: Story of a WWII Resistance Fighter, by using forms
and themes stemming from “Resistance Literature”, are good examples of Cohen’s
definition of history as myth. They are linked with something real but are highly
selective in what they use from a past event. This poses problems for the
historiography of Singapore’s war. Elements that do not fit “Resistance Literature”
themes, like the unity of the Chinese in the war against the Japanese, are ignored,
forgotten or recast to suit the requirements of the myth. Moreover, they represent the
war as a hegemonic and characteristically Singapore Chinese experience. The
contributions and sacrifices of other communities during the Japanese Occupation
have no place in such a history. The re-emergence of “Resistance Literature” in
Singapore also suggests that when it comes to war and memory, rather than
reflecting the realities of what happened, the narratives are carrying the burden of the
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perspectives of the Chinese majority in Singapore. How this come about is the
subject of the next chapters.
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Chapter 8

The Experiences and Memories of the Singapore Chinese in the War
against Japan

In colonial Singapore the Chinese made up the majority of the island’s population.
But the Singapore Chinese community was not monolithic. There were three groups
of Chinese. One group were the Straits Chinese who are descendants of early
Chinese immigrants and local Malays. They retained their Chinese heritage but not
the Chinese language; they conversed in Baba Malay. 765 The Straits Chinese were
also British educated, were employed in government service and were known
colloquially in colonial Singapore as the “King’s Chinese”. 766 The second group was
the English-speaking Chinese, the Anglophile Chinese. They had extensive contact
with the British and were educated in English schools. Singapore’s first Prime
Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, hailed from this spectrum of the Singapore Chinese
community. His paternal grandfather was English educated and an Anglophile.
Despite not being a Christian, Lee’s grandfather followed the British tradition of
christening and gave Lee the name “Harry”. 767 Lee’s grandfather’s tombstone is of
typical Chinese design but it features Chinese and English inscriptions, a rare
practice in colonial Singapore. 768 The majority of the Singapore Chinese community
were the Overseas Chinese who were Chinese-educated and Sino-centric. Lee
remembered his experience of colonial Singapore where the majority Chinese led “a
separate existence and they were no more assimilated after the war then they had
been before it.” 769 This was because for the Singapore Overseas Chinese, according
to Lee, “their loyalty was to China”, 770 not Singapore. They had minimal contact
with the British authorities and perhaps only a little more with other ethnic minorities
in Singapore. However, it was the experiences of this group of Singapore Chinese
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that characterised Singapore’s popular memory of the war. Unless otherwise
specified “Singapore Chinese” used in this thesis refers to this group, the Overseas
Chinese and their descendants.

The way that the Singapore Chinese have characterised their memories of the war
since the end of the Japanese Occupation stem from the experiences of the Overseas
Chinese during and after the Japanese Occupation. And as noted in the previous
chapters, they supported China in its war with Japan during the 1930s. And there was
more to that support than “Resistance Literature”. They began to boycott Japanese
businesses in Singapore in protest against Japan’s annexation of Manchuria. 771 The
boycott was another way the Singapore Chinese could show their anti-Japanese
sentiment. By 1937, boycotts led by the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard
Corps would escalate to include all Japanese imported manufactured goods in
Singapore. Members of the corps would watch wharves and godowns (a type of
dockside warehouse typical in South and Southeast Asia) in Singapore and whenever
any Japanese cargo was found, its final destination in Singapore was traced, usually a
local business establishment. Chinese businesses stocking any Japanese imported
products were intimidated and labelled as “traitor merchants” 772 and their customers
were bullied to stop patronising them. The sale of Japanese imported goods
consequently fell progressively. 773 At the same time, the Singapore Chinese were
busy raising funds and contributions, almost on a weekly basis, for the war effort in
China’s war against Japan. The most popular and notable fund raising effort was
organised by the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee. 774 Other Chinese
organisations also conducted their own fund raising activities but colloquially they
were known collectively in Singapore as the “China Relief Fund” and the term was
synonymous with the local Chinese anti-Japanese movement. 775
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December 1941, for the Japanese and Chinese alike, was simply an extension of the
war in China. 776 Both sides had little love for each other. To the Japanese, the
Overseas Chinese in Singapore were no different to their brethren in China who for
years had been resisting Japanese rule in China. Moreover, it would have been
difficult for the Japanese to completely ignore the Singapore Chinese and their antiJapanese sentiments. They therefore treated the Singapore Chinese as a hostile group.

During the Occupation, the Japanese abolished all Chinese dialect and clan
associations and merged all Chinese organisations in Malaya and Singapore into the
Overseas Chinese Association (OCA). The new regime, unhappy with the activities
of the local China Relief Fund, demanded that the OCA carry out a “Voluntary
Contribution Campaign” to raise $50 million dollars in the local currency in two
months as a donation, and as demonstration of their loyalty, to the Japanese. 777 The
sum demanded was close to a quarter of the local currency in circulation in 1941. 778
To raise that amount of money immediately after the battle for Singapore was a near
impossible task. The Japanese invasion had displaced scores of people, destroyed
property and disrupted the economy. Yet the OCA met the demand and the deadline.
It pooled the contributions and resources of the Chinese community together and
raised a total of $22 million dollars. To make up the remainder, the Chinese took out
a loan from the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank at an interest rate of six percent. 779
The Singapore Chinese community remained heavily in debt during the rest of
Japanese Occupation. The event, however, that would become central to the
Singapore Chinese memory of the Japanese Occupation is the massacres conducted
by the Japanese during the occupation that have become collectively known as the
Sook Ching Massacres.

The Sook Ching Massacres

After the Fall of Singapore, the Japanese military launched what it described as a
standard mopping-up operation after a successful military campaign. They
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announced that locals were to be screened between 21 and 23 February 1942 to weed
out pro-Chinese individuals and organisations, namely members of the Overseas
Chinese volunteer forces, Communists, members of anti-Japanese movements,
Chinese sympathizers, ex-convicts and rascals. 780 The Kempetai (Japanese Military
Police) was in charge of the operation. Five locations were designated as screening
areas and all Chinese residents in Singapore were ordered to report to these
locations. 781

The original plan for each screening centre called for three checkpoints to be set up.
The first checkpoint was to be manned by local informants who were willing to
cooperate with the new regime. Their identities would be protected by ensuring that
they wore a hood. At the first checkpoint, everyone would pass in a single line and
the hooded informants would single out any suspicious individuals. These suspects
were then required to move to the second checkpoint where Kempetai officers would
take over the screening process. Suspects would be investigated and those seen as
innocent would be allowed to leave. The third checkpoint was reserved for suspects
who did not pass the second checkpoint and required further investigations and
detailed checks. Locals who passed the checkpoints were to be issued with a “good
citizen” card. 782

The reality was somewhat different. The screening took longer than the two days
allocated. The “good citizen” cards became a rare item in Singapore – the Kempetai
ran out of “good citizen” cards long before the screening operation was
completed. 783 The Kempetai resorted instead to stamping the red print meant for the
cards on the shirts, sleeves or on any part of the body of the locals who passed the
inspection. 784 This only served to fuel Chinese animosity against the Japanese – the
entire process resembled the inspection and branding of livestock. The three
checkpoint system became one. The operation was directed exclusively against the
780
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Singapore Chinese population, particularly young Chinese males. The Kempetai was
given only a matter of days to check the backgrounds of those seen as suspect rather
than a year that such a check could take. 785 Those detained by the Kempetai at the
screening centres were sent away for “severe punishment”. What that meant was
clearly seen in Major Satoru Onishi’s dispatches to his superior during the screening
operation. He had no objection to “severe punishment” but was concerned about due
process. He wrote, “in my opinion to impose ‘severe punishment’ immediately is
rather strong…it’s very inhuman to immediately kill them all.” 786 The mass
screening operation and the executions that followed was called “Dai Kensho” by the
Japanese, which means “great inspection”. 787 To the local Chinese, it was “Sook
Ching”, 788 which means “purge” or “cleansing”. 789 This term was first coined in
1946 but it was only in the 1980s that it became colloquial in Singapore after it was
used frequently by the Singapore National Archives’ Singapore Oral History
Department to refer to the massacres. 790

Accounts of survivors of Sook Ching

Survivors of Sook Ching remember the exhausting and arbitrary screening
operations. They remember friends and relatives who did not return from the
screening centres and who were never heard of again. Many did not know at the time
that those who the Japanese deemed suspect were usually brought to secluded
beaches and executed, often by machinegun fire. 791
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Neoh Teik Hong and his family received a notice informing them that all Chinese
males over the age of 12 were required to assemble at screening centres in the city. 792
He complied and went to a major road junction in the Chinatown district designated
as a screening centre where he waited for further instructions. 793 Neoh recalled the
anxieties of the people at the time,

There were people who did not arrive at the barbed-wired area on time.
And some of them tried to crush in by jumping across. The Japanese
opened fire, chased them, [and] opened fire…because we were told that if
we did not go to the area within a certain period, and if any male is found,
he will be shot or executed. 794

The actual screening process was conducted in a small building and the Japanese
authorities were, according to Neoh, assisted by “a few local people” 795 – he did not
mention if there were any Chinese collaborators. During the screening process, Neoh
was questioned over his pre-war occupation. He replied that he was a student. An
inspector then stamped on his T-shirt a Chinese character before he was allowed to
return home. As Neoh made his way out of the building, he noticed that there was a
lorry parked on the left side of the building. Neoh saw that those who had completed
the screening process would either be allowed to go home or they would be put on
the lorry. At the time, no one knew what happened to those on the lorry. It was about
a fortnight later that Neoh was told that those who were on one of those lorries
“would never come back.” 796

Heng Chiang Ki was another who passed the screening centres at Chinatown. He and
his family were instructed to report to a screening centre at Victoria Street. After
reporting as required, they were told to wait. On the second night, Heng’s parents
and sisters were allowed to leave. They were not screened. Heng remained at the
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screening centre and waited for another two days before he was screened, a clear
indication that the Japanese were targeting young Chinese males. He was brought
before a long table where a Japanese high-ranking officer and a few junior officers
were seated. Also at the table were some Chinese and Malays who Heng believed to
be informers. 797 Heng was questioned by a woman whom he thought to be
Taiwanese and “could speak English, could speak Hokkien and all that”. 798 Heng
suspected that she was around 25 to 26 years of age. She was dressed in a sarong
kebaya, a traditional blouse worn by local women in the Malaya, Singapore and the
Dutch East Indies. Heng recalled the interview process,

Lady: “Which school do you go? You speak English or you speak Chinese?”
Heng: “I speak English.”
Lady: “Malay?”
Heng: “Malay, yes, a bit.”
Lady: “Can you speak Chinese?”
Heng: “No.”
Lady: “Do you go to Chinese school?”
Heng: “No.”

She also showed a sound knowledge of the local districts, leading Heng to believe
that she could have been a resident in Singapore before the Japanese invasion.
Interestingly, Heng did not believe that the Chinese woman could be a local
Singapore Chinese. Heng noticed that the other officials at the table left all the
questioning to her. After the interview, a Chinese character was stamped on his arm.
He was then told to join a line outside. Even up to this point there was no indication
if one has passed or failed the interview. No one knew what the criterion was. It
could be just one wrong answer or simply because “the interviewer did not like their
face.” 799 Heng must have impressed the woman enough during the interview as he
was released soon after. Heng’s friends who joined a different queue after their
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interview were never heard of again. Nearly a dozen of his friends did not return
from the screening centre. 800

Ng Seng Yong and his family received instructions from Japanese soldiers to report
to a screening centre at the Telok Kurau English School. Ng went together with his
two sisters, and his nephews, nieces and an aunt. Ng was interned with some 50,000
Chinese men at the screening centre. The womenfolk who came with the men were
immediately released, again an indication that the Japanese were targeting a specific
group of people in the Chinese community – the Chinese male population. Ng and
his group were left to wait at the school compound to be screened. After four days,
the screening began. The Japanese simply broadcast an announcement, “Those
educated in Chinese, put your hands up.” 801 Ng saw that “quite a number” 802 had
their hands raised and they were led away by the Japanese. Although he had been
educated, Ng had been attending an English medium school and therefore did not
raise his hand. He and other remaining Chinese males continued to be held in the
school compound. Fearing for his own safety should he remain any longer, Ng
jumped the fence and escaped. He only realised later the he had placed his life in
unnecessary danger because his group was released soon after he made his escape. 803
Ng made the correct decision to not raise his hand that day. Had he done so, he
would have been brought to Siglap Hill where he learnt later that everyone in that
group was “executed there by machinegun fire”. 804 Ng had two nephews in that
group.

Another survivor from the Telok Kurau English School screening centre was Lee
Kip Lin who remembered that the screening process was anything but systematic. A
local policeman had approached each house in his district with Chinese families to
inform them that every male member of the household was required to report to
designated screening centres in the city. The order was only delivered to Chinese
households and none of the Malay families in the district received such orders. 805 At
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the Telok Kurau English School screening centre, what stuck Lee from the beginning
was how everything looked “random” and decisions were made

at the whim of the moment. If it happened to be an officer who felt that
certain things should be done this way, he just did it…there was, as it
appeared to us, no proper procedure or method or any pre-plan. 806

The crowd would first be separated into different groups based on their occupation
before the war. The Japanese went down a checklist, calling for business owners,
civil servants, hawkers and students. Lee and his brother were segregated from their
father as he joined a group made up of students. They were then moved and placed
under guard in a fenced compound where they told to wait for their turn to be
screened. As the day wore on, many in Lee’s group became thirsty. One of Lee’s
school mates volunteered to fetch some water for everyone. He was taken away by
the Japanese guards, who suspected he was trying to escape, and was “never heard of
again”. 807 That evening when the Japanese sentries left their posts Lim’s group
became unsure over what to do next. Unwilling to test the Japanese guards a second
time, they waited. An Indian police officer then approached and asked them why
they were still in the compound. The students replied that they had not been given
any further instructions and so they remained. A few tense moments later, the police
officer told them “you better go home.” 808 Everyone rushed out of the compound.
Lee found his way home safely but he found out later that others who were held in
similar compounds near the school had not been so lucky. They were transported
elsewhere and “were never heard of again”. On reflection, Lee felt that “if they [the
Japanese] had gone about it systematically, I think more people would have died.” 809

The 1947 War Crimes Tribunal and The Great War and the Overseas Chinese

After the war, the British began investigations into massacres of the Chinese in
Singapore during the Japanese Occupation. The Singapore Chinese community felt
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that, despite public knowledge that the Japanese had perpetrated war atrocities, the
British were slow to establish all the necessary administrative structure to carry out
the task of investigating, arresting and putting on trial Japanese war criminals. 810 The
war in Singapore officially ended on 12 September 1945 when Lord Louis
Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of the South East Asia Command, arrived at the
Singapore Municipal Hall to accept the official Japanese surrender of Singapore. The
British Military Administration (BMA) was established to facilitate the transfer of
colonial administration in post-war Singapore. The immediate concerns of the BMA
were the dismantling of Japanese fortifications and restoring essential public services
such as transport and sanitation which had been neglected during the Japanese
Occupation. 811 Investigations into Japanese atrocities against civilians in Singapore
would have to wait until February 1946 when the British appointed Colonel Cyril
Wild to head the war crimes investigations in Malaya and Singapore. 812 Wild was
fluent in Japanese and was captured as a POW after the Fall of Singapore. He also
had first-hand knowledge of Japanese treatment and atrocities committed on Allied
POWs and civilians in work camps in Burma and Thailand during the construction of
the Thai-Burma railway. 813 British war crimes investigations in Malaya and
Singapore went into full swing two months later with the establishment of its war
crimes liaison mission in Tokyo to arrest Japanese war criminals from a “wanted” list
of suspects that had been drawn up as early as September 1945. 814

From the end of the Japanese Occupation and the return to British colonial rule, the
Chinese community in Singapore had been pressuring the British administration to
convene a war crimes tribunal to prosecute the Japanese for the wartime atrocities
they had committed against the local Chinese population. 815 While the massacres in
Singapore were common knowledge, the number of Chinese killed was in dispute.
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According to the Japanese, the official number of deaths was around 6,000. 816 On 10
September 1946, during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)
in Tokyo, Wild was called to the witness stand to provide the court with information
on Japanese atrocities in Singapore and Malaya. When asked for an estimate of the
numbers of Chinese massacred in Singapore, Wild told the court that “the number
was definitely considerably in excess of 5,000 men.”817 Notes from his investigations
mentioned “hundreds, even thousands, of innocent [Chinese] civilians” 818 killed by
the Japanese military in Singapore. But at best, he could only establish with a degree
of certainty that there was a mass execution of 140 Chinese civilians at Changi beach
in Singapore and a “mass execution of large numbers of Chinese on several
successive days” near an island off the south coast of Singapore. 819 Had the British
war crimes tribunal accepted Wild’s figures as official, it would have been far lower
than the official Japanese estimates. A special committee established privately by a
Chinese millionaire after the war to determine the number of people killed during the
Japanese Occupation claimed that the figure was closer to 50,000. 820

In an attempt to set the record straight, the Singapore Chinese Relief Fund
Committee, in 1947, representing the Singapore Chinese community, published The
Great War and the Overseas Chinese two months before the Singapore War Crimes
Tribunal was scheduled to begin its hearing. It recorded both the Japanese massacres
and Chinese resistance to the Japanese, including the claim that the Overseas Chinese
Voluntary Army had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese. The timing of the
publication of the book suggests that it may have been politically motivated. The use
of the “Great War” may have been intended to suggest to Britain that the Singapore
Chinese saw the Japanese Occupation as their equivalent of 1914-1918. It would
remind the British authorities of the wartime sufferings of the Chinese community,
pressuring the tribunal to find in their favour. Without such a result, the recently
returned British administration could have had on their hands a disaffected Chinese
majority in Singapore who could have frustrated the Island’s colonial administration.
It established the Chinese community’s version of the Japanese Occupation and
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massacres of the Chinese in Singapore. 821 But the book may also have had another
purpose. It was published only in Chinese. The Singapore Chinese community had
an important and urgent story to tell. As in the publication of Australian POW
narratives discussed earlier in this thesis, there was a strong motivation for local
survivors in Singapore to publish their wartime experiences; to keep the tragedy of
the Singapore Chinese massacres in the public eye.

Despite the best efforts of the Chinese community in Singapore, the British
recognised the Japanese official figure of 5,000. 822 The British authorities believed at
the time that the Chinese had exaggerated their tragedy, 823 ignoring even the
affidavit of a Japanese military journalist in Singapore who claimed that the number
of Chinese massacred range somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000. 824 It is quite
likely that the Singapore Chinese community and the British authorities had different
purposes, the former wanted to establish the details of the crimes but the latter
wanted to determine the guilty. Ironically, during the trials, it was the Japanese who
took a greater interest in The Great War and the Overseas Chinese. The Japanese
defence team, defending the seven Japanese army officers on trial for conspiring and
supervising the massacres in Singapore, applied to enter the book as court evidence.
The tribunal was initially hesitant to allow it to be entered as court evidence. The
prosecutor, Major Frederick Ward informed the tribunal,

We do no know the standing or experience of the author, whether he
writes from hearsay, repute or his own knowledge. You, gentlemen,
must know that a book is liable to journalse (sic)…the press have a
certain amount of licence and liberty and even paint pictures according
to the readers’ tastes. 825

After long consideration, the court allowed the book to be tabled as evidence in the
trial to “avoid prejudice to the defence.” 826 It was entered as “Exhibit AK”. 827
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Exhibit AK became the Japanese legal defence’s key argument that the defendants
had not committed war atrocities on the Chinese population. Extracts from the book
that described the formation of the Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army, its
participation in major battles in Singapore and the heavy causalities it inflicted on the
Japanese army were read out in court. The book claimed that after the British
surrender of Singapore, remnants of the Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army became
the nuclei of various anti-Japanese resistance movements in Singapore. One in
particular was the Chinese anti-Japanese resistance movement, the Malayan People’s
Anti-Japanese Army, which according to an extract read out in court, “fought more
than 340 battles with the invaders killing or wounding over 5,500 Japanese
troops.” 828 The Japanese defence team claimed that the book judged the Chinese “out
of their own mouths.” 829 They argued that the book presented rather accurately the
chaotic days after the British surrender and what looked like a successful resistance
movement to the local Chinese was conversely a major menace to the Japanese army.
Hence a brutal military mop-up operation was launched in response to restore peace
and ensure the security of the new Japanese regime in Singapore. In the words of the
defence it was an “absolutely necessary [operation] in order to stabilise, as quickly as
possible, a fluid and dangerous situation…the necessity of war overrules the manners
of warfare.” 830 In other words, the Japanese defence argued that the Japanese did not
conduct massacres on the Chinese – it was a mopping-up operation, albeit a brutal
one, after a successful military campaign.

The prosecution countered that there was no evidence to suggest “that military
necessity was such as to justify departures from the rules of war.” 831 During the trial,
Ward pointed out that the Japanese defence had ignored their clients’ affidavits,
which mentioned that even before Singapore was occupied the defendants were
circulating lists of Chinese individuals to be screened and executed. 832 This
suggested that the massacres were planned well in advance and hence could not have
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been part of a standard military mopping-up operation. The question then remains,
who was responsible for the Sook Ching massacres?

Proceedings of the 1947 Singapore War Crimes Tribunal

Seven Japanese officers were put on trial in 1947 for massacres of the Chinese
during the Japanese Occupation of Singapore; three were ranking commanding
officers in the Japanese Army; Lieutenant-General Takuma Nishimura, Commander
of the Japanese Imperial Guards Division; Major-General Saburo Kawamura,
Commander of the Singapore Garrison and the Singapore Defence Force; and
Lieutenant-Colonel Massayuki Oishi, Commander of the Kempetai in Singapore.
The Straits Times reported the proceedings of the trials on 19 March 1947 in
detail. 833 It reported that the Prisoner of War Investigation Committee (PoWIC),
formed in Tokyo in September 1945, had recommended to the Singapore War
Crimes Tribunal that Kawamura held the greatest responsibility for the Sook Ching
Massacre. Japanese unit commanders in Singapore during the Japanese Occupation
testified in their affidavits for the tribunal that they had received orders from
Kawamura to screen the Chinese population for anti-Japanese elements. LieutenantColonel Tadashi Ichikawa, commander of a Japanese battalion in Singapore in
February 1942, for example, recalled that Kawamura had ordered his unit to make a
house to house search in a district to search for Chinese males “known to be hostile
to the Japanese”, 834 members of the KMT and anyone in possession of weapons. All
suspects were required to be cross-examined and those found guilty were to be shot.
Ichikawa told the court that his battalion had rounded up 300 Chinese males and
fourteen were found to be suspects. After interrogation, one was found guilty for
being a member of a Chinese political party and was executed. The remaining 13,
according to Ichikawa, were released. 835

In his affidavit, the commander of the Japanese Imperial Guards, Nishimura, recalled
that units under his command had received similar orders from Kawamura’s
headquarters to screen the local population for dissidents against the new Japanese
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regime. Nishimura’s defence claimed that he had no part in the subsequent massacres
in Singapore because he was not subordinate to Kawamura’s command and control;
Kawamura could not issue him with such orders. Nishimura, however, told the court
that this did not exclude the possibility that some of his units may have acted on
orders from Kawamura. According to Nishimura, although he was the division’s
commanding officer when his unit was performing garrison duties in Singapore, he
did not have effective and total command and control over all the units under his
command and could only account for the activities that were “the direct result of
orders issued by him.” 836 If units in his division had received and carried out
massacres on orders directly from the garrison commander, he had no knowledge of
“the place chosen for the shootings or the units who carried this out”. 837 Any
Imperial Guardsmen involved in the massacres were, the defence argued, operating
outside his command structure. 838

Commander of the Kempetai in Singapore, Oishi, however, had received direct and
written orders from Kawamura “to carry out the screening and scrutinising of the
Chinese population of Singapore”. 839 According to Oishi, lists of suspects had also
been passed on to him from the Intelligence Department to facilitate the task. Oishi
then passed on the list to two senior Kempetai commanders who were also on trial:
Lieutenant-Colonel Yoshitaka Yokota and Major Tomatatsu Jyo, with instructions
that “only the very bad men [on the lists] were to be killed.” 840 The two Kempetai
officers mobilised the Hojo Kempetai (army personnel seconded to the Kempetai) 841
to carry out the orders.

When Kawamura was questioned by the court, he testified that he was acting under
orders from his superior, Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of
the 25th Southern Army. According to Kawamura, his commanding officer had
stressed the importance and urgency of suppressing anti-Japanese elements in the
Singapore Chinese population; “this is not a private instruction, make a thorough job
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of it”, 842 Kawamura quoted Yamashita. His orders from Yamashita’s headquarters
were to “congregate all Chinese at certain collection points, screen them on 21
February, and dispose of the undesirables by 23 February”. 843 As Singapore’s
garrison commander, Kawamura duly carried out his orders. He estimated that
around 4,000 to 5,000 victims were shot in the town area. 844 However, he denied any
knowledge of the numbers shot in other divisional areas, such as in the east where
the Imperial Guards Division was garrisoned. He believed that about 1,000 victims
may have been killed in the divisional areas but this could only be confirmed by
those on the ground ensuring “the smooth-running of the operations”, 845 namely the
Hojo Kempetai.

Yamashita had been hanged for war crimes in the Philippines a year earlier in Manila
but the court had access to notes from Yamashita’s interrogation before his
execution. Yamashita claimed that it was normal practice for the Japanese army to
delegate the maintenance of order in occupied territories to the Kempetai. Therefore
in Singapore the Kempetai had full authority and was “entitled to kill bad characters,
such as robbers and those in possession of weapons.” 846 When Yamashita was
further questioned over the Kempetai’s chain of command i.e. who had the real
authority to order the Kempetai to out carry a massacre order, he replied the
Kempetai “did not need any orders but had full discretion and powers.” 847 In
Yamashita’s view, the commander of the Kempetai in Singapore bore sole
responsibility for the massacres. However, when Yamashita was asked to provide the
names of officers who could have played a part in the massacres in Singapore, he
could not produce any because, he claimed, his subordinates would not trouble him
“with such trifling matters”. 848 He also claimed that he had no knowledge of the
massacres: “Until today [28 Oct 1946] I had truly never heard of any of these
matters,” said Yamashita, “…on learning that Japanese soldiers did these things I
have been astounded.” 849 His interrogators seemed satisfied that the former Japanese
842
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commander had no previous knowledge of the massacres in Singapore. They were
unanimous that a ranking officer, and a celebrated one at that, “would be told nothing
of the behaviour of his troops towards prisoners and civilians and would consider it
beneath his dignity to enquire.” 850 Yet, Yamashita had anticipated that massacres
could occur: he issued orders to keep all combat units outside Singapore city after the
British surrender to prevent another Nanking. 851 And although Yamashita had
ordered the screenings and the disposal of “undesirables”, he had not specifically
ordered, as Kawamura claimed, massacres of the Chinese in Singapore. Even more
damaging for Kawamura, the PoWIC submitted to the tribunal that it had found no
formal written orders of the type Kawamura claimed to have received from
Yamashita. Instead, the PoWIC found that all orders and detailed plans for the
operation which began on 21 February originated from the headquarters of the
Defence Force in Singapore – Kawamura’s office. 852

Within a month, the tribunal was ready to pass judgment. The tribunal did not have
the luxury of time to investigate the massacres further. They were under pressure
from the United States government to hear and conclude all war crimes cases by
mid-1947 because the Americans were anxious to being the process of
“rehabilitation” in Japan as a post-war ally against the Soviet Union. 853 In addition,
the Chinese community in Singapore were becoming increasingly restless with the
seeming lack of progress with a war crimes tribunal investigating the massacres of
the Chinese in Singapore. 854 Any sign of justice being done was better than looking
like no justice was being done at all. 855

On 10 March 1947, all the defendants were found guilty by the tribunal. The tribunal
was satisfied that all orders for the massacres had originated from Kawamura’s
headquarters, the highest authority in Singapore, and passed down the chain of
command until it was finally carried out by officers on the ground. Every individual
that the order went through was deemed a co-conspirator even if he had not actually
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carried out the order. 856 The sentences reflected the part each of the accused played
in the operation. Kawamura was sentenced to death by hanging. Oishi, commander
of the Kempetai, the final recipient of the massacre orders and the man who
coordinated the massacres on the ground, was also sentenced to hang. Four other
Kempetai officers including Yokota and Jyo were sentenced to life-imprisonment.
Nishimura, the most senior officer on trial escaped the gallows because one young
British officer refused to vote in favour of a death sentence (the death penalty
required the unanimous decision of five British officers hearing the case). 857
Nishimura was sentenced to life-imprisonment instead. The trial was concluded on 2
April 1947.

While the Singapore Chinese community praised the work of the prosecution, they
protested immediately against the sentences. Leaders of the Chinese community in
Singapore organised a Singapore Chinese Appeal Committee which called for the
death penalty for all seven Japanese officers, and accused the tribunal of handing out
“inappropriately lenient” 858 sentences for the four given prison sentences. Speaking
on behalf of the committee, Tay Koh Yat said that “we will not be satisfied until
these Japanese have paid for their crimes with their lives.” 859 Popular sentiment in
the Singapore Chinese community expected the death penalty for all seven
defendants. They would get only three in the end: Kawamura, Oishi and another
Kempetai officer, sentenced to death for war crimes in Malaya. His trial was
unrelated to those in Singapore but he was brought especially to Changi to be hanged
in order to placate the Chinese community. 860 On 26 June 1947, the executions of
Kawamura, Oishi and the former Kempetai officer brought from Kuala Lumpur were
carried out concurrently. The British allowed representatives from the Chinese
community to be present and witness the executions. The day after the executions,
however, the Straits Times reported that the Singapore Chinese community were “far
from satisfied with the executions.” 861 Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 1947
Singapore war crimes tribunal would linger, but the acceptance of The Great War
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and the Overseas Chinese as court evidence not only publicised the Singapore
Chinese version of the Japanese Occupation but, more importantly, lent the book
historical authority, clearly evident in the fact that stories from that book appeared
again in The Price of Peace.

The fact that stories featured in The Great War and the Overseas Chinese have
reappeared again in The Price of Peace suggests that the Singapore Chinese
community did not acknowledge the outcome of the 1947 Singapore war crimes
tribunal. The outcome of the 1947 Singapore war crimes tribunal would be a pivotal
event in Singapore, influencing way the local Chinese community would remember
the war. Efforts to remember the victims of the massacres in Singapore in the
immediate aftermath of the war and through to the 1960s would reflect the
sentiments of the Singapore Chinese community after the conclusion of the 1947
Singapore war crimes tribunal; their grievance against the Japanese and the
massacres during the Japanese Occupation were unresolved.
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Chapter 9

The First Attempt at Building Singapore’s First WWII War
Memorial

According to Jay Winter, communities are reunited at war memorials where the dead
are symbolically remembered and the memories of war are ritualised and become an
accepted part of the language of commemoration. 862 Yet, the commemoration of war
is a political act and is seldom neutral. 863 Both were clearly evident in Singapore’s
initial attempts to build a memorial for the war dead where the politics of
commemoration revealed differences in attempts to meet a common goal, differences
based on race, ethnicity and a belief on the part of the Singapore Chinese that,
because they had suffered more than any other group during the Japanese
Occupation, their sacrifice should be privileged.

Within months of the Japanese surrender, the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs under
the BMA in Singapore had been receiving unsolicited public proposals for war
memorials in Singapore to honour victims of the war. An official at the Secretariat
for Chinese Affairs, H.T. Pagden, reported to his superior on 22 December 1945 that
public enquires had been received “from time to time about the erection of a
memorial to various Volunteer organisations who fought the Japs (sic) or were
members of Passive Defence Forces”. 864 His superior happened to be Colonel
Richard Broome who had been appointed head of Chinese Affairs Singapore under
the BMA. Pagden suggested a combined war memorial for the civilian and military
war dead in the form of “a central shrine with side chapels or shrines for various
services” 865 modelled on the “Melbourne War Memorial”. 866 He also suggested a
possible site for the memorial; Bukit Timah, a centrally located hill in the middle of
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Singapore Island that was also the site of a number of fierce encounters during the
Battle of Singapore. On 28 December, Broome forwarded Pagden’s suggestion to the
Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO) in Singapore, adding that “the idea of a
general memorial on the Bukit Timah site will meet with universal approval, and on
political grounds the Civil Government ought to get going on it as early as
possible.” 867 The BMA, and the civilian government that succeeded it, however,
would discover that approaching the issue of war commemoration in Singapore was
to tread a political minefield.

The BMA did not act on Broome’s recommendation. In early April 1946, Pagden,
now an advisor to the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, recommended that the BMA
raise, as a matter of “high priority”, 868 the matter of war memorials in Singapore with
the incoming civil government which was due to replace the BMA at the end of the
month. He suggested that a committee be formed to facilitate the project. Its
membership should consist of members who survived the Japanese Occupation in
Singapore and whose loyalty to Britain was without question. Pagden advised against
appointing a committee of community leaders because, he wrote, such a committee
would not “necessarily get the best people”869 to decide on the nature of the war
memorial. Community interests, rather than commemoration, would dominate
proceedings. And the biggest issue that would confront such a committee would be
the voice and mood of the local Singapore Chinese community.

The Singapore Chinese wanted an exclusive memorial for their war dead. According
to Pagden, a prominent Chinese leader by the name of Tan Kah Kee has been
championing the cause. Tan was a well known personality in Singapore’s colonial
history. He had contributed widely to public education in Singapore by founding
Chinese schools like the Singapore Chinese High School in 1918 and the Nan Chiao
Girls High School, founded after the war in 1947. He was also remembered as the de
facto leader of the Overseas Chinese community in Singapore during China’s war
against Japan. Tan was the leader of the Nanyang National Salvation Movement and
was twice elected in 1938 and 1941 to lead the Singapore Federation of China Relief
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Fund of the South Seas, 870 an organisation that raised funds in Singapore for China’s
war effort in the Sino-Japanese War. In December 1941, with the Japanese invasion
of Malaya, Tan was elected by local grassroots Chinese leaders in Singapore to chair
the Committee of Mobilization of Singapore Overseas Chinese, a committee that
organised the Chinese anti-Japanese resistance movements in Singapore such as
Dalforce. The British even recognised, and supported his appointment to the
committee, believing that Tan would be the person who could unite the large
Singapore Overseas Chinese community in the war effort. 871 Tan fled Singapore on 3
February 1942. His position as de facto head of the local Chinese resistance
movement made him a wanted man by the Japanese. Tan went to Marang in East
Java, Indonesia, where he not only successfully avoided the Japanese, he also wrote
his memoir, “Memoir of Nanyang Overseas Chinese”. 872 He returned to Singapore
after the war and was appointed chair of the Federation of South Seas China Relief
Fund Committee representing the Singapore Overseas Chinese to raise funds for the
reconstruction of post-war China. 873 Always the ardent Chinese patriot, Tan
campaigned strongly for a separate and official war memorial for the Chinese war
dead in Singapore. Tan rejected even the possibility of a combined war memorial on
the grounds of “conflicting religious interests” with other ethnic communities in
Singapore. Pagden advised the BMA that Tan would “probably object to all [other]
proposals for the sake of publicity”.874

The War Memorials Committee

At the end of April 1946, a civilian colonial government had replaced the BMA. On
18 July 1946, in response to the popular demand for a war memorial, the Governor of
Singapore, Franklin Charles Gimson, recommended the establishment of an “ad hoc
committee” to make recommendations to the Government “as to the form which such
870
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memorial should take”. 875 The Colonial Secretary of Singapore, P.A.B. McKerron
was instructed to form this committee, known later as the War Memorials Committee
(WMC).

Instructions from the governor to the colonial secretary clearly spelt out the
composition and objectives the WMC. The membership of the WMC “should be
English-speaking” 876 and chaired by a ranking government representative, like the
Commissioner of Lands. The committee was to be advised by a professional
architect. Membership would include one representative from each of the veteran
organisations, namely the Tan Kah Kee Mobilisations Corps (Dalforce), the Straits
Settlements Volunteer Force, the Malayan Anti-Japanese Army, and the Passive
Defence force. 877 Non-Singapore armed services were specifically excluded. Ethnic
communities in Singapore were allowed one representative each, except for the
Chinese community; the governor felt that the Chinese were already well represented
by the veteran organisations. 878 On 25 July 1946, the first meeting of the WMC was
officially convened.

The chair of the WMC appointed by McKerron was T.W. Ong. The Secretary for
Chinese Affairs, E.C.S Adkins, was appointed to the WMC as vice-chair to assist the
committee because the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs had been receiving and
managing memorial proposals from the public. The advisory architect was Koh
Chong Yam, an architect from Swan & Mclaren. The Malay and Indian communities
were represented by N. Mallal, the Eurasian community was represented by John
Eber, and R. Burns represented the European community in Singapore. 879 After the
first meeting, a representative from the Malayan Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve was
later co-opted to the WMC. Despite the earlier belief that the Chinese community
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was already well represented, members from two highly influential civilian
organisations in Singapore – the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee and the
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC), were also co-opted. 880 There
may have been little choice when it came to the co-option of representatives from
these Chinese organisations.

Although, according to Adkins, Tan had been “stalled off temporarily because it was
thought that there should be one memorial for the whole of Singapore”, 881 Tan had
continued to agitate for “a special shrine of (sic) the Chinese civilians who were
massacred after (sic) the Japanese occupation” 882 and he had support within the
Chinese community. The government could not afford to ignore the Chinese voice in
Singapore, not when they made up the majority population of Singapore and held
considerable political and economic clout in colonial Singapore. 883 The success of a
war memorial project in Singapore rested on political grounds – the Singapore
Chinese community had to be on board. Hence the co-option of representatives from
two of Singapore’s most influential organisations.

From Memorials to Memorial

There was another faction in Singapore determined to influence the type of memorial
the WMC should erect. The governor’s instructions to McKerron on the formation of
the WMC had clearly stipulated that the Singapore war memorial should be “purely a
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Singapore memorial.” 884 It was not to be an imperial memorial, nor one that
honoured the combatant arms of the Imperial services that had fought at Singapore.
McKerron reinforced the point in a response to a letter from the Headquarters of the
Allied Air Command of South East Asia. In July 1946, they informed McKerron that
the Air Ministry was considering erecting Royal Air Force memorials overseas
where members of the RAF had lost their lives in the Second World War, and sought
clarification of the WMC’s plans for Singapore. On 6 August 1946, McKerron
replied, on behalf of the WMC, that the committee would only consider plans for
“strictly a Singapore war memorial, rather than an imperial one.” 885 He added that
the Air Ministry’s queries were raised during the weekly Singapore District
Conference, chaired by Major-General L.H. Cox, Commanding Officer of the
Singapore District forces, and that Cox had volunteered to co-ordinate proposals for
a possible separate inter-service memorial in Singapore. If McKerron had thought
that his reply was the end of the matter, he was mistaken.

On 19 August, Cox met with representatives from the Royal Navy and Royal Air
Force. He wrote to McKerron the following day informing him that “it appears to all
of us, including your Under Secretary [H.P. Bryson], that any War Memorial erected
in Singapore should cover all Services and all caulties (sic)” 886 in the war against
Japan. Cox also told McKerron that the Services “should be allotted the finest site
available” in Singapore to ensure that “such a Memorial could be made more
impressive.” 887 Cox also added that the Services would be “very pleased” 888 should
the civil government approve their request and hand the entire project over to the
Battle Exploits Memorials Committee in London. “This committee”, Cox explained,
“deals with all War Memorials connected with the last war.” 889 Adkins, as vice-chair
of the WMC, would have none of it.

On 30 August 1946, Adkins sent a memorandum to Bryson, arguing that what Cox
and the Services were proposing in Singapore was undesirable. Adkins argued that
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Singapore was primarily two entities in the British Empire – it was a British colony
and the capital of South East Asia. 890 There was room for two memorials at best; a
“South East Asia memorial at some commanding point” and a “Singapore Colony
memorial” in a park near the town. 891 If an inter-Services memorial was included in
that list, the war memorial landscape in Singapore would “be rather swamped.” 892
And while Adkins indicated that he would raise the issue of an inter-Services
memorial with the WMC at its next meeting scheduled for 6 September, he was
fairly sure that he could “prophesy what their decision”893 would be. And it would be
something that the Services would not like.

When Cox’s proposal was put to the WMC, even the representatives of the veteran
organisations on the WMC rejected it. Instead, they stood with the WMC and the
objectives set out by the governor. The WMC believed that it would be difficult to
accommodate a Services Memorial with the civilian focus evident in the governor’s
instructions. It also decided that it was time to send a strong message to the Services.
It informed Cox that the WMC “might depute a representative to attend committee
set up by the Services.” 894 That was to be the extent of the cooperation that the
WMC was going to make with the Services – Singapore’s Second World War
memorial would be strictly a civilian war memorial. And to reinforce its position
against the Services, the WMC cleverly made an official and public appeal for
suggestions and ideas on what form the war memorial might take.

The war memorial proposals

When the call for proposals was officially announced, the press was quick to pick up
on the colonial administration’s intention to erect a civilians’ memorial in
Singapore. 895 On 14 September, the Straits Times reported that a committee had been
set up by the government “to consider a suitable war memorial or war memorials in
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Singapore”. 896 Suggestions were to be sent to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs no
later than 7 October. The paper reported the ideas that the WMC had been
considering: it was not to be just “a monument” but projects like “a public park, or
the foundation of special funds for scholarships and financial assistance to distressed
dependents.” 897 The Malaya Tribune also ran the public appeal on the same day
covering much the same ground but added that the memorial had to be inclusive:

Apart from the 5,000 Chinese massacred by the Japanese soon after
Singapore fell in 1942, there were thousands of others who died as the
result of enemy action, being killed in air raids, and many who lost their
lives either on active service or through atrocities committed during the
occupation period. 898

The response from the public was largely positive, reflecting the mood of the local
people of Singapore. In all, no less than twelve proposals were received by the
WMC. They came from various organisations as well as from private individuals and
their proposals ranged from purely commemorative memorials to functional war
memorials. More than half of the proposals were suggestions for functional war
memorials.

The Singapore Association was one of the first to respond on 24 September 1946. It
suggested that the war memorial should take the form of a tuberculosis hospital and a
sanatorium, maintaining that public funds should not be “wasted on an impressive
stone memorial”. 899 The Singapore Kiaw Thong Exchange similarly proposed a
tuberculosis sanatorium in addition to a “Victory Magazine”. 900 The War
Department Civilian Staff Association of Singapore submitted a proposal for a
memorial of an even larger scale to be dedicated to the general population of
Singapore: a Free Hospital “with a suitable monument erected at the entrance to the
hospital”. 901 A private individual by the name of Tan Phek Tin, submitted his
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proposal for an extension to the Medical College in Singapore, or the creation of
scholarships in the name of the college. The strong desire for hospitals and
sanatoriums may be indicative of the extent of the health problems in Singapore at
the end of the Japanese Occupation. The Singapore Social Welfare Council also
proposed a functional war memorial in the form of a community centre fully
equipped with theatres, classrooms, libraries, study rooms, handicraft workshops,
music rooms, art studios and restaurants where “all races can meet for the pursuit of
cultural ends”. 902 A joint submission from the Singapore Federation of Trade
Unions, Singapore New Democratic Youth League, MPAJA Ex-Services Comrades
Association and the Singapore Women’s Federation suggested financial relief for the
families of victims, a home for the destitute and free schools for children orphaned
by the war. 903 Their proposal also included a commemoration book in various
languages with the names of those who lost their lives during the war, and the
construction of a monument to house this sacred book. 904 M.P.D. Nair recommended
that the war memorial could take the form of a clock tower constructed at the
northern gateway of Singapore city at Newton Circus and the establishment of a
Reformatory School to “reclaim boys who learnt bad habits during the Japanese
Occupation”. 905

Two proposals for functional war memorials deserve a closer look. C.H. Burnie from
the Burlington Hotel proposed an “Association of all people of Goodwill’ to spread
goodwill from Singapore to influence people from the rest of the world to create a
more peace-loving place. The American Vice-Consul in Singapore recommended the
creation of three trust funds to fund scholarships for free education and training in
trade schools, free compulsory education for Malay citizens who survived the
Japanese Occupation, and scholarships for university education. 906

These

contributions to public education with the trust funds would, in the spirit of
American ideals of liberty and anti-colonialism, “prepare the citizens of Singapore
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for self-government”. 907 They made no mention of honouring the war dead. These
two proposals came from a rather specific stratum of Singapore society, the
European community, and suggest a new perspective on the part of Europeans in
Singapore. As Paul Kratoska noted, the vast majority of the British who “returned” to
Singapore after the war “had no prior experience of the country.” 908 For example,
former British civil service officers who returned to their appointments in the
colonial government in Malaya and Singapore after the war made up a minority of no
more than 24%. 909 If this was indicative of the European colonial population of
Singapore after the war, then Singapore’s European population would have been
comprised largely of those who had newly-arrived. Their perspectives did not align
with popular local sentiments where the prevailing mood was to erect a memorial
that would honour the memory of the dead and victims of the war.

The proposals for functional memorials carried the common theme of inclusiveness;
the emphasis was on the community. Most proposals for traditional commemorative
war memorials, however, came specifically from organisations and individuals
within the Singapore Chinese community and they lacked the inclusiveness evident
in the proposals for functional memorials. Mary Wong, for example, suggested that
the names of the victims of the war be commemorated on a traditional memorial and
was ready to contribute five hundred dollars in memory of her two sons. 910 A local
writer by the name of Chu Lu Chih proposed the construction of a pagoda, a
traditional Chinese structure commonly found in temple compounds. 911 Tan, on
behalf of the South East Asian Federation of China Relief Funds, 912 submitted a
proposal that was essentially still an appeal for an exclusive Chinese war memorial
and followed it up with a personal letter to the WMC on 4 October 1946, setting out
the reasons for a separate Chinese war memorial.
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“The news of the Jap (sic) massacre of Chinese civilians in Malaya”, Tan’s letter
began, “sends a shrill through my spine from which I had (sic) never fully
recovered.” 913 Tan believed that if the massacres of the Chinese in Singapore was
Japanese retaliation for anti-Japanese activities conducted by organisations that Tan
had previously been connected with (namely the Anti-Japanese mobilization
Council, Dalforce and the China Relief Fund mentioned earlier in this chapter) he
felt that was “partly responsible” 914 for the deaths of his fellow countrymen.
Therefore when the families of victims approached Tan with the idea of erecting a
memorial to them, he promised them that he would do his “utmost”. 915 Tan also
reminded the WMC that the Singapore Chinese community practised ancestor
worship. A Chinese memorial would represent “the creed of ancestor worship” and
the site of the memorial would be like an ancestral grave that “had a bearing on [the
descendants’] posterity”. 916 Therefore the issue of a specific memorial for the
Chinese was “too deeply rested and prevalent” in the Chinese community to “permit
quick eradication” 917 by the colonial government. Tan had no objections to a
combined war memorial as a “concrete manifestation of racial harmony” in
Singapore. He reassured the WMC that the erection of a Chinese memorial would
“not encroach in any way on that of the Inter-racial Memorial” but he remained
adamant that there was “sufficiently important grounds to justify for a separate
Chinese Memorial on the part of victims families”. Interestingly, Tan found it
necessary to reassure the WMC that his community’s desire for a separate war
memorial should not be interpreted as an expression of Chinese national sentiment –
“I would like to dismiss any probable misapprehension that this idea [for an
exclusive Chinese war memorial] is fraught with national sentiments as quite
groundless and ridiculous.” 918 But, as will be discussed later in this chapter, it was.

Tan’s argument for a Chinese memorial rested on two key points that he reiterated
midway in his letter. First, he claimed that the “creed of ancestor and superstition of
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grave siting (sic)” was “radically different or absent in that of other races.” 919 He
argued that if offerings of pork were made during commemoration services, it would
offend the Muslim community in Singapore and “may give rise to Sino-Malay
clashes”. 920 “We must as far as possible,” Tan wrote, “avoid creating another
Wailing Wall”. 921 And although he had expressed support for a combined war
memorial earlier in his letter, he cast doubt on the proposal later in the letter: “the
motives…behind an inter-racial Memorial may appear ideal now but heaven knows
how the trend of history will develop and how posterity will interpret it 100 years
from now.” 922 Second, Tan claimed that the Chinese community had the right to
erect their own memorial because the number of Chinese victims “top the list out of
all proportion to that of other races.” 923 “The most disgraceful part of this brutal
barbarity” Tan continued, “is these victims were not even remotely connected with
Dalforce, Mobilization Council, or China Relief Funds” but were “arbitrary picked
for slaughter presumably in retaliation of Dalforce, etc.” 924 Massacred victims of
other races by the Japanese, according to Tan, “may have died under totally different
circumstances and their families may want to remember them in a different light.” 925
The Chinese community would prefer a separate memorial for their war dead to
serve as “a grim reminder to posterity of the senselessness of Jap atrocity and
warning against its repetition.” 926 He then turned to the matter of a site for a Chinese
memorial.

Tan noted that he had already requested the Colonial Secretary, McKerron, to grant
the Chinese community a piece of land atop a hill near the Ford Factory at Bukit
Timah where they could erect their own war memorial. Tan claimed that he had been
advised by “experts on grave siting (sic)” that this site was “ideal for posterity’s
future.” 927 He had also reminded McKerron that this site was significant for the
Chinese community because it “approximately marks the site where Dalforce offered
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the invaders their heroic but futile defence.” 928 Tan concluded his letter to the WMC
with a passionate appeal for a site at Bukit Timah to be allocated for a Chinese war
memorial that would meet the religious requirements of the Singapore Chinese and
acknowledge the fact that the Chinese had suffered more than any other group during
the Japanese Occupation. The community, he argued, was prepared to meet the cost
of building such a memorial. All he asked of the WMC was its endorsement of the
site at Bukit Timah. 929

The site suggested by Tan, however, was also significant in another way: it was the
site of a former Japanese war memorial. A Japanese shrine had been erected at the
site during the Japanese Occupation. Known as Syonan Chureito, it was constructed
using prisoner-of-war labour soon after the surrender of Singapore. It was the first
Japanese war memorial to be erected in Singapore to commemorate and intern the
remains of the Japanese war dead who fought in the Malaya Campaign. 930
Immediately after the Japanese surrender of Singapore in 1945, the shrine was
destroyed and the remains of the dead were “presumed to be re-interred in the
Japanese Cemetery Park [in Singapore]”. 931 Tan’s desire to erect a Chinese war
memorial over the site of a former Japanese war memorial reflected both his deepseated anti-Japanese sentiments and, perhaps, a sense of vindication with the building
of a Chinese memorial on the very site that had commemorated the Japanese war
dead; Tan wanted to metaphorically sow salt on the earth of his former enemy. The
WMC described Tan’s letter as an “ardent plea” 932 on behalf of the Singapore
Chinese Community and, when reviewing his proposal, it made special note of his
request for the site at Bukit Timah, but it did not reply directly to Tan.

The WMC was only half correct in assuming that Tan’s letter reflected the mood of
the Chinese community at the time. As the WMC reviewed the proposals, it received
a letter from the Chung Wah Football Club, a local Chinese soccer club. It informed
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the WMC that the club had organised a charity soccer match to be played on the
public holiday on Chinese New Year Day in 1947 and would donate all proceeds
from the event to the Singapore War Memorial Fund. The activities planned for the
day included a “fancy dress soccer match” 933 between teams representing India and
China, and an “exhibition of Miniature Soccer”. 934 The event was reportedly a
success and the soccer club proposed an even more ambitious sequel for 5 February,
a soccer match to be played at night in a stadium lit by floodlights, a first for
Singapore. 935 Proceeds of this match would also be donated to the Singapore War
Memorial Fund. The Chinese Athletic club also demonstrated support for the WMC
with its plans to stage a “Special Musical” 936 and a soccer match to be played
between a team made up by players from the club and the Services, against a team
from the Indian Football Association. Members of the WMC were invited to attend
this event and all proceeds would be donated to the Singapore War Memorial
Fund. 937 The event raised a total of $2,931 Malayan dollars. 938 The success of these
events suggests that Tan’s letter to the WMC did not necessarily represent the
collective mood of the Singapore Chinese community as the search for Singapore’s
memorial got underway.

Reviewing the proposals

The local press was not shy when it came to commenting on the proposals. The
Straits Times reported on 30 October 1946 that some ideas were either unacceptable
or too radical. Proposals for tuberculosis sanatoriums like those submitted by the
Singapore Association had been singled out as “anything but a happy choice”. 939 A
tuberculosis sanatorium was deemed to be an uninspiring suggestion and the Straits
Times remarked that the WMC should not exploit the funds and general mood of the
local people to take over health services that should be provided by the colonial
government’s General Hospital. 940 The proposal from the Singapore Social Welfare
933
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Council for a community centre with attached amenities was commended for hitting
the “right note for this new Singapore that has emerged from the surrender, the
occupation and the liberation” 941 even if, according to the Straits Times, its
multiracial concept was clearly well ahead of its times – “more like the Singapore of
2000 A.D than the Singapore we know,” 942 the paper editorialised.

The WMC met again on 29 January 1947 after it had carefully considered each
proposal to narrow their preferences on the form the memorial might take. It decided
that hospitals, tuberculosis sanatoriums and free education initiatives were
government and municipal responsibilities. 943 The WMC then nominated four
possible forms that the war memorial might take. They were a special relief fund and
scholarships for the dependents of victims; scholarships for higher education to
enable the people of Singapore to take part in the administration of the government; a
community centre; and a public park with a monument. 944 The first of these to go
was a special relief fund because the WMC believed that it would duplicate the work
and responsibilities of the Department of Social Welfare, the Education Department
and the Volunteer Forces Record Office. These organisations had been providing
financial relief and free or assisted primary education for dependants of victims of
the war. 945 Furthermore, the WMC noted that the Silver Jubilee Fund would soon be
available to provide further financial assistance to these dependants. 946 There were
adequate financial provisions available for victims of the war in Singapore. 947 The
next to go were the higher education scholarships.

The WMC had seriously considered war memorial scholarships for higher education
and viewed them favourably noting that

Since the war had been fought for freedom, scholarships to enable the
people of Singapore to participate in the higher administrative posts of
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the country, and thus advance more rapidly on the path to selfgovernment, would be a most appropriate form for a War Memorial. 948

But this proposal foundered in the face of the realities of post-war British colonial
policy. Although the British had declared their intention to develop and prepare their
former colonies for eventual self-government, 949 this did not necessarily apply to a
post-war Singapore. In January 1946, Singapore was separated from its traditional
economic and political hinterland of Malaya. While administration of the entire
Malay Peninsula had been reorganised under the Malayan Union in preparation for
eventual self-government, Singapore was administered separately as a British Crown
Colony with its own constitution, British governor and a nominated executive
council. 950 Although the British government did not preclude the possibility of a
“fusion of Singapore and the Malayan Union” 951 at a later date, the immediate future
of both dependencies had already been decided. As Albert Lau argued, “once
detached, it was not easy to re-attach the Island to the mainland”. 952 It seemed
unthinkable that on its own, and deprived of an economic hinterland, Singapore
could survive as an independent state. 953 The political separation of Singapore from
Malaya in 1946 thus hindered rather than accelerated its push for self-government
and independence. 954 And the proposal for scholarships for higher learning that
would educate the locals to advance Singapore towards self-government fell out of
favour with the colonial administrators. As the Singapore Sunday Times later

948

ibid.
J. Drysdale, Singapore, Struggle of Success, Times Books International, Singapore, 1984, p.5
950
D. G. E Hall, A History of South-East Asia, (fourth edition), The Macmillan Press Ltd, London,
1955, p.928 Singapore at the time had an elected legislative council, although only the unofficial
members were the ones who were elected. The colonial administration of Singapore after the
Japanese Occupation had remained largely and strictly a British affair
951
A. Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement, Times
Academic Press, Singapore, 1998, p.4
952
ibid., p.4
953
The question of an independent Singapore during the 1950s was often described within the context
of an independent Federation of Malaya. That is, Singapore’s independence was on condition that it
was part of the Federation of Malaya. The Federation of Malaya was however, suspicious and weary
over Singapore’s Chinese majority and was keen not to upset the racial balance in the Federation of
Malaya. In order to convince the Federation to accept Singapore as a member, it appealed to three
former British dependencies in 1961 to join the Federation; North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. See.
K.Y. Lee, The Singapore Story, Prentice Hall, Singapore, 1998, pp.402-409
954
A. Lau, op cit., p4
949

212

reported on 26 September 1948, “nothing has yet been done and there’s doubt if
anything will be done.” 955 The third proposal to go was the community centre.

The third proposal was based loosely on the proposal submitted by the Social
Welfare Council for a community centre. It was one that the WMC seemed to be
leaning towards. 956 Yet, it faced problems of cost. The British Council advised the
committee on the finer details and cost of the project. It recommended to the
committee that the scheme would cost too much if “borne exclusively by the
[Singapore] War Memorial Fund.” 957 The council also added that it was
“inappropriate” that a War Memorial include a community centre, which “would be
largely the concern of other organisations”. 958 Consequently, the committee
unanimously considered that it would create a war memorial park, complete with a
monument and the community centre “should be left to existing interested
bodies”. 959

After deciding the form the war memorial would take, there was still one last issue to
be settled; its location. The WMC laid down two criteria – the war memorial park
had to be within easy access of the city and, at the same time, the park had to provide
“a worthy setting for the War Memorial”. 960 The WMC had moved from a
preference for functional memorials to one more in tune with traditional national and
commemorative war monuments.

The limited availability of public land in, or close to, the Singapore city district for a
memorial park made selecting a location difficult. The WMC sought advice from the
Singapore Improvement Trust, the Land Office and the Municipality of Singapore.
Several sites were proposed by them and those that topped the list were parcels of
empty land within the Singapore city district at Ann Siang Hill and Tank Road. The
former, however, only had two acres of flat land available and while it was
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considered as “an admirable site for a memorial, it would be too small for a Park”.961
The latter, although proposed as a site as early as August 1946, 962 had since been
earmarked for the construction of the Van Kleef Aquarium and hence was
unavailable for the war memorial project. With no options left within the city district,
sites further away were considered. The WMC found an open space at the junction of
Serangoon Road and Macpherson Road but to their disappointment the land was
privately owned. 963 A site at Kallang was also considered, but Kallang was
Singapore’s airport. The government informed the WMC that the future of Kallang
Airport had not been decided and therefore the site proposed by the committee was
“out of the question”. 964

Other sites recommended to the War Memorials Committee were more problematic
and in some cases, potentially controversial. Two such sites were consecrated
ground; the Chinese Teochew cemetery in Orchard Road and site where the Japanese
war shrine and memorial Syonan Chureito once stood. The former, although located
within easy access of the city, was private property and there was also the added
“difficulties in the disposal of the graves.” 965 The latter was rejected because it was
deemed to be too far away and it was “unsuitable in view of its association with the
Japanese shrine and Japanese [war] dead.” 966 More importantly however, if this site
was developed into a war memorial park it would indicate that the WMC was
endorsing Tan’s and the South East Asian Federation of China Relief Funds’
political stand by erecting a war memorial over a former enemy’s sacred ground
dedicated to their war dead. Farrer Park was also recommended to the WMC as a
possible site for the war memorial. The park had been leased by the Government to
the Municipal Commissioners with a clause in a lease agreement stipulating that “no
buildings shall be erected there on.”967 This put in doubt the community centre that
the WMC was considering. But Farrer Park was controversial in another way. Two
days after the surrender of Singapore, thousands of the soldiers of the British Indian
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Army were marched by the Japanese to Farrer Park. There they witnessed the
inauguration of the Indian National Army (INA), an auxiliary arm of the Imperial
Japanese Army. The INA marched beside the Japanese in its attempted invasion of
British India. As the INA approached India via the eastern regions like Imphal,
Indians were not sure whether they should welcome the INA as liberators and
champions against British imperialism, or fight them as traitors to their own kind. 968
In India and Bangladesh today, veterans of the war, and their descendants, remain
divided over the formation, memory and legacy of the INA. Some see the INA as a
patriotic army raised to overthrow British imperialism in India, while others have
labelled it an army of Indian traitors. 969 But Farrer Park, as a site, was troubled by a
reminder of collaboration with the Japanese by one particular racial group in colonial
Singapore.

The WMC had also considered the land around the MacRitchie Reservoir but this
was strongly opposed by the Singapore Municipal Authorities. Located at a distance
north from Singapore’s city district, the MacRitchie Reservoir was Singapore’s main
water catchment area. The municipal authorities were concerned that any
developments near the rainwater catchment areas might contaminate Singapore’s
water supply and threaten the colony’s public health.970 Furthermore, the MacRitchie
site also shared the same problem as the site of Syonan Chureito. During the
Japanese Occupation, the Japanese had constructed a large shrine deep in the woods
of the MacRitchie Reservoir. This was a Japanese Shinto shrine called Syonan Jinja
and it was a significant site for the Japanese in Singapore during the war. 971 It was
completed on 7 December 1942 and a Japanese military spokesman of the time
commented that the shrine was “just the beginning…there would later be the addition
of a spacious park with recreation facilities, a stadium and a swimming pool” and
later it would “likely to be the focus of the new city which would naturally rise up

968

P. W Fay, The Forgotten Army, India’s Armed Struggle For Independence 1942-1945, University
of Michigan Press, United States of America, 1995, pp.1-10
969
ibid., pp.1-10 & pp.74-86. To date, Farrer Park is located in a district in Singapore known as
“Little India”. Despite the name, Singaporeans know little of the events that transpired there more
that sixty years ago
970
BMA/CA/81/45/(113), op cit.
971
G. B Lee, op cit., p.33

215

around it.” 972 Although the claims of a new city were Japanese propaganda, Syonan
Jinja was the centre of Shinto worship in Singapore and a showcase of Japanese
imperial power in the region. Thousands of Japanese travellers who visited
Singapore during the Japanese Occupation visited the shrine and were told of the
“victorious and glorious deeds of the Japanese military in the region.”973 And images
of the shrine had replaced the head of the British monarch on official postage
stamps. 974 Victims and survivors of the Japanese Occupation were only all too
familiar with this Japanese shrine. To the locals, Syonan Jinja was nothing more than
a symbol of Japanese brutality and oppression. 975 Although the shrine was
immediately destroyed after the war, its ruins still remain. 976 And after the war,
MacRitchie Reservoir had become a political symbol in the Singapore Chinese
language of war commemoration – Lim Bo Seng’s remains were repatriated and
buried with full KMT military honours at the site. 977

With its list of locations running short, the WMC began considering using land that
had been recently reclaimed from the sea. It, at least, would be free from controversy
and would fit the WMC’s criteria. Two parcels of recently reclaimed land were
recommended to the WMC: land reclaimed by the Raffles Reclamation project and
the Connaught Drive reclaimed land. The former, however, had already been leased
to the Royal Navy for two years for the construction of naval facilities.

The

reclaimed land at Connaught Drive on the other hand, was reportedly “going to
waste”, 978 although it did have one limitation; “it was not large enough for a Public
Park and a Monument”. 979 By January 1947 the WMC still could not decide on a
suitable site although it was quite clear that the Connaught Drive reclaimed land was
emerging as the favourite. Even though it had the same limitations in size as Ann
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Siang Hill, Connaught Drive had one advantage over Ann Siang Hill; it adjoined an
established memorial and park – the First World War Cenotaph which
commemorated the British war dead.

The Esplanade Plan

In May 1947, plans for Singapore’s official Second World War memorial were
finally announced to the public. On 22 May 1947 the Straits Times reported that “a
memorial to Singapore’s war dead was discussed and approved at a recent committee
of the Singapore Ratepayers Association.” 980 By this time, responsibility for the
project had passed from the WMC to the Singapore Ratepayers Association (SRA).
There are no records explaining the transfer of responsibility. Perhaps the WMC had
reached an impasse in its attempts to build a distinctively Singapore war memorial
that accommodated everyone’s views and the project was transferred to the SRA to
speed things up. The SRA’s scheme continued where the WMC had left off – the
location (Connaught Drive) and a memorial park remained unchanged. There was
however, one change. There would be no separate monument for Singapore’s war
dead. The Straits Times reported that the president of the SRA had produced a plan
that proposed a modification of the existing Cenotaph. 981 The Centotaph would be
expanded to include two granite urns, one to include the remains of an unknown
soldier, the other the remains of an unknown civilian. One side of the Cenotaph
would commemorate the fallen from the First World War while the other, victims of
the Second World War 982 and the new park would commemorate victims of both
world wars. Construction of the park and modifications to the Cenotaph were to
begin once all reclamation activities had been completed. The SRA now dubbed the
war memorial project the Esplanade Park Plan and Singapore’s Second World War
Memorial now looked well on its way to completion. Ironically, its centre-piece
would be an imperial and traditional commemorative war memorial.
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On 26 September 1948, however, the Singapore Sunday Times ran the headline, “The
Cenotaph Plan Shelved.” 983 According to the report, the proposed modifications to
the Singapore Cenotaph had been abandoned. Despite the promotion of the proposal
through the press and multi-language leaflets, public support was lacking. 984 Instead,
the years 1939 to 1945 would be added to the steps on the south side of the
Singapore Cenotaph to include the Second World War, mirroring the steps on the
north side that listed 1914 to 1918 for the Great War. The inscription at the top of the
Cenotaphh on the south side would match exactly that on the north side, ‘Our
Glorious Dead’. Nor had the park made substantial progress. Colonial Secretary
McKerron announced that the Singapore Public Works Department (PWD) would
simply plant as much turf as they could so that by Remembrance Day there would be
“a large area of green grass on the reclaimed land on the sea side of the Singapore
War Memorial.” 985 While footpaths would also be laid out in preparation for
Remembrance Day, the question of beautifying the grounds with ornamental gardens
would “have to be left to the Municipal Commissioners and the Government”. 986 It is
not difficult to explain the lack of public support for the Esplanade Park Plan. The
dates for the Second World War (1939-1945) and the choice of Remembrance Day to
commemorate the war dead would have hardly resonated with the people of
Singapore. Whereas five steps were sufficient for the years of the Great War (19141918), the years for the Second World War (1939-1945) would need seven steps. But
no extra steps were added. The last two years were instead inscribed on the memorial
continuing from the steps. If the years for the Second World War memorial began
with the year 1941, which reflects the local memory of the war in Singapore, five
steps have been sufficient. The decision to use 1939 as the starting point for a local
war memorial, and the choice of Remembrance Day for its dedication, is indicative
that the memorial was commemorating an Imperial war. The dates were Euro-centric
and had little resonance with a people whose war was centred around the years 1941-
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1945 and February, rather than November. 987 The emphasis had shifted back to the
First World War and imperial themes. And the incorporation of a Second World War
memorial into an imperial war memorial reminded the people of Singapore that
Singapore was still a British possession.

By 1950, the colonial administration in Singapore was putting the final touches to the
Singapore Cenotaph. All that was left was choice of words to be inscribed on plaques
to be added to the Cenotaph. It settled on “They Died That We Might Live” which
was inscribed in Malay, Chinese and Tamil on bronze panels. And as for the $2,931
dollar donation raised by Chinese Athletic club for the WMC in 1947 as part of its
Chinese New Year Day celebrations, it was transferred to the Straits Chinese British
Association (SCBA). The SCBA had recommended the transfer to the colonial
government because it believed that it could ensure that the money reached those
who would benefit most from this donation; the SCBA managed a Volunteer
Memorial Fund that provided financial support to widows of Chinese Volunteers
who were massacred by the Japanese. 988 The recommendation was accepted and the
donated money was transferred to the SCBA in 5 February 1951. 989

What had begun as a public and later government effort to remember Singapore’s
war dead had failed. The SRA had undone what the WMC fought to preserve and
ensure for the locals: a Singapore civilian war memorial. Instead, the
commemoration of Singapore’s war dead had simply become an attachment to a
military and imperial war memorial.

The WMC had to first fend off influential agencies like Tan’s South East Asia
Federation of China Relief Fund and the Services that wanted to hijack plans for a
memorial their own agendas. The WMC’s response was to invite the public to submit
their expressions of interests, effectively giving the public a stake in the war
memorial project. Public support for the project was strong and widespread, evident
in the events organised by local clubs to raise donations for the project and the
987
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proposals submitted. Proposals ranged from the traditional to the unconventional, a
further indication of the peoples’ acute interest in the project. And even as each
proposal was considered and subsequently dropped, the WMC had not rejected
completely many of the ideas behind those proposals. For example, it recognised the
value of scholarships for higher education in a post-war Singapore. And while it was
not ready to fund the construction of a community centre, the committee was keen to
create a memorial park, and kept alive the option of a community centre in the near
future. Although the WMC’s efforts had been popular, it had attempted something
that is apparently unattainable when it comes to war memorials; a neutral war
memorial free from political messages. And as it continued to deliberate on its plans
and mission, the project slipped from its grasp. Public interest and support for the
war memorial began to wane after the SRA announced that there would be no new
memorial in whatever form that would distinctively be a Second World War
memorial for the local people of Singapore. The fate of the project was ultimately
sealed by something that the WMC discussions had stalled over, the choice of the
memorial’s location.

Discussing memorials built after the First World War, Winter argues that
remembrance is part of the landscape. The search for a site by the WMC bears him
out. Although the WMC was charged with finding a site that was within access of the
town and a worthy setting for a memorial, it had to be untainted land. The sites
recommended to, and subsequently rejected by the WMC, resonated with potential
political and communal controversies. In the end, the WMC settled a site reclaimed
from the sea that would appear to have been free of controversy. But while the
reclaimed land was neutral enough, what was adjacent to this site would prove to be
problematic and controversial – the Singapore Cenotaph. Combining a Second World
War memorial with a war memorial of the First World War was acceptable practice
in Europe and Australia but it carried different connotations in post-war
Singapore. 990 The First World War did not affect the local people in Singapore as it
did the peoples of Europe, and the allies who fought for either side, like Australia
and Turkey. For the local people of Singapore, the Singapore Cenotaph was a
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memorial that commemorated an imperial war. If the Singapore Cenotaph was
incorporated as the centrepiece of a Second World War memorial park, it would
privilege a colonial past and render the local experience and memory of the war
secondary at best.

Race, commemoration and Tan Kah Kee’s legacy

The support given to the SRA’s Esplanade Park Plan by the colonial government
may have been a deliberate move by the British to ignore the thorny issue of race in
Singapore. It had no desire to recognise one race above another in commemoration,
nor to encourage overt expressions of nationalist sentiment inimical to colonial rule.
Amongst the twelve official proposals submitted to the WMC, none had demanded
specific recognition for a particular group. They were universal in their approach.
Tan Kah Kee’s proposal was the exception. In post-war colonial Singapore, due to
his contributions and leadership in the Singapore Chinese community, Tan was
widely regarded as the “Confucian model of the father” 991 in the community and
wielded considerable influence and authority. With the war just recently over and as
the Singapore Chinese mourned and counted their losses suffered during the
Japanese Occupation, Tan’s proposal for a Chinese memorial would have garnered
popular appeal and approval among many in the community, but not all.

Tan and his proposal represented a traditional view of the Chinese since the time of
Imperial China. The relationship between the Han Chinese and other minority groups
in China has been characterised as “a relationship between a superior Han culture
and inferior minority cultures.” 992 And since war memorials have a tendency to
“express a sense of indebtedness”, 993 a war memorial dedicated to the Singapore
Chinese alone would construct and carry the political message that they were setting
an example for the other, and in their traditional view, inferior ethnic communities in
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Singapore that their war dead had died a martyr’s death, that Singapore somehow
‘owed’ the Chinese community. More importantly, Han Chinese identity stemmed
from an acute awareness of ethnic and cultural identities vis-à-vis other ethnic
minorities. 994 Interactions between the Chinese and other ethnic minorities in China
had been characterised to a large extent by “attempts of the Han Chinese to ‘civilize’
the minorities by inculcating them with Han Chinese national culture”, 995 a sentiment
that resembles nationalism. Tan’s appeal to the colonial government, and his
assurance to the WMC in his letter of 4 October 1946 that building a Chinese war
memorial was bereft of nationalism, was indicative of the Han Chinese cultural
mindset had came with Chinese migrants to Singapore. Tan’s argument that the
Chinese memorial would not reflect nationalist sentiment was, at best, disingenuous.
And the coolness accorded Tan’s appeals suggests that the British in colonial
Singapore were already suspicious of the voice of the Chinese community, especially
when the voice resonated with national sentiments that did not reflect imperial
loyalties.

Chinese war memorials erected in neighbouring post-war Malaya indicate that the
British had good reasons to be concerned over the voice of the local Chinese
community when it came to the issue of war commemoration. In post-war Malaya
between 1946 and 1948 Chinese communities exhumed and recovered the remains of
victims of massacres committed by the Japanese during the occupation of Malaya. 996
Private and communal memorials were erected to commemorate their civilian war
dead, some featured distinctively Chinese nationalist symbols of the time. The
official war memorial in Malacca, for example, features a round sun with twelve
white rays on a blue background, the flag of the KMT in China. 997 Blackburn
observed that these Chinese war memorials were largely “shaped by Chinese
nationalism present in the identity of the Overseas Chinese.” 998 War memorials
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erected in Johor Bahru in the Malayan state of Johore with their distinctive pan lou
architectural feature, a three arched gateway, were highlighted by Blackburn as good
examples of Chinese memorials that clearly “reflected Chinese nationalism and were
[Chinese] communal places.” 999 With the Singapore Chinese constituting the
majority in the colony, the British colonial administration in Singapore would do
well to avoid erecting a war memorial dedicated exclusively to the Chinese
community. If Tan’s proposal had been accepted and a Chinese war memorial built
in addition to an inter-racial memorial, it would have privileged the Chinese majority
over ethnic minorities in Singapore during the Japanese Occupation in terms of the
massacres, and reinforced the Han Chinese identity in Singapore.

As noted earlier, Tan’s traditional view of Chinese Han culture was not accepted by
all the Singapore Chinese. The Singapore Chinese youth sport clubs supported
instead the WMC’s mission for a universal memorial in Singapore. It may have been
a generational matter. Tan and those of his generation were born in China but
migrated to Singapore – the Overseas Chinese. Their descendants, who were born in
Malaya and Singapore, experienced the Fall of Singapore and the Japanese
Occupation in their youth saw it differently. Chinese-educated youths, like their
parents or grandparents who were born in China, were largely more sympathetic to
the Chinese war effort during the Sino-Japanese war. But the Chinese youth educated
in English schools where sport was an important part of the curriculum, the Chinese
students there did not share such sentiments. Lee Kip Lin, who attended the AngloChinese School, remembered that his Chinese classmates kept themselves at an
arm’s length from the activities of the China Relief Fund; they raised funds instead
for Poppy Day (Remembrance Day) or victims of the First World War.1000 Heng
Chiang Ki was a student at the Singapore English School when Japan invaded China.
He remembered the activities of the China Relief Fund in Singapore but “had no
personal contact with them.” 1001 Heng also recalled that when local Chinese antiJapanese groups, like the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps, launched
their boycott of Japanese businesses in Singapore, the local Chinese stopped
patronising Japanese shops out of the fear of reprisals from the anti-Japanese groups,
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not because they supported their anti-Japanese activities. Neoh Teik Hon was
educated in an English school and he observed that “the overseas Chinese were very
patriotic, [and] took to the mother country” 1002 during their anti-Japanese
demonstrations in Singapore. After the war, there was no one collective voice
emanating from the Singapore Chinese community to remember the war dead in
Singapore; the activities of the Chinese youth sporting clubs supported the WMC
rather than the leader of their community. This suggests the views of Tan and that of
his generation and the Chinese-educated on Chinese Han culture, was not universal
in the Singapore Chinese community. The divided attitudes in the Singapore Chinese
community may partly explain why, despite their political and economic clout, they
did not go ahead with plans to erect and dedicate their own memorial to their war
dead –support within the community was split.

In 1949, Tan left Singapore to be part of China’s reconstruction efforts after the end
of the Chinese civil war. He returned to Singapore briefly in 1950 before departing
Singapore for good to resettle in China. In his final parting words to the Federation
of South Seas China Relief Fund Committee, he told them to “pursue the matter [of a
Chinese war memorial] further until their objective was achieved”, 1003 reflecting the
Chinese proverb “to a gentleman, revenge in ten years is not too late.” Tan would
have a small victory on 29 June 1954 when a marble pagoda memorial to Lim Bo
Seng was erected on the tenth anniversary of his death in the Esplanade Park not far
from the Singapore Cenotaph. The Singapore Chinese community was not going to
be denied a memory, or landscape, for their war dead within a space formally
dedicated to that purpose. 1004

Singapore’s initial attempt to build a memorial for its war dead began with high
hopes and popular support but faltered when confronted with the thorny issues of
imperialism, race, ethnicity and the demand by the Singapore Chinese for their own
memorial. The entire history of the project demonstrated that war commemoration
carried political messages. The final outcome of the project preserved an imperial
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message that was rejected by the local people of Singapore. It also showed that the
voice of the Singapore Chinese was one that could not be easily ignored in terms of
war commemoration. And if the local authorities thought that they had heard the last
of Tan, his notions of revenge and belief that the Chinese deserved special
recognition, they were in for a surprise in the 1960s.

An architect’s sketch of the proposed additions to the Singapore Cenotaph,
The Sunday Times, 18 June, 1948
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The Singapore Cenotaph today

North side of the Singapore Cenotaph dedicated to the fallen in the First
World War

Steps on the north side of the Singapore Cenotaph each one representing a year
in the First World War. The bronze panels are honour rolls.
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South side of the Singapore Cenotaph dedicated to victims of the Second World War.

Steps on the south side of the Singapore Cenotaph each one representing a year in the
Second World War. Note that it starts from the 1939, the year when the Second World War
began in Europe.
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Chapter 10

The Politics of War Commemoration in 1960s Singapore

Until 1967, the Singapore Cenotaph was Singapore’s official war memorial
dedicated to the fallen in the two World Wars. The last wreath to be laid there by an
official from the Singapore government was on Remembrance Day 1967. 1005 The
memorial still stands as a nearly forgotten reminder of the contested memory of the
war in post-war Singapore. Another war memorial not far away has overtaken its
place as the focus of commemoration in Singapore. The Memorial to the Civilian
Victims of the Japanese Occupation was erected in 1967 to commemorate the
memory of civilian victims of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore. The history of
this memorial was nearly as controversial as the first attempt in the 1940s to
commemorate the civilian war dead in Singapore.

In his study of war memorials in Singapore, Romen Bose noted in 2008 that
Singapore has a national monument rather than a monument “to mark the loss
incurred by the Chinese community and the various other races living on the
island.” 1006 A year earlier, Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, in his analysis of war commemoration
in Singapore, argued that political parties in Singapore did not use the memory of the
war to influence elections, nor did social groups “coalesce around their experience of
the war”, or feature in negotiations between the state and civil society, 1007 – the
Second World War “has gone missing in action from the politics of contemporary
Singapore”. 1008 Kevin Blackburn’s research on the “blood debt” movement of the
1960s has shown that memories of the Second World War in Singapore were
anything but “missing in action”. Blackburn discussed the way Singapore’s first
Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, appropriated the memories of the Singapore Chinese
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community to forge a Singaporean national heritage. 1009 This chapter builds on
Blackburn’s research but pays particular attention to the voice of the Singapore
Chinese community that Lee had appropriated. The Memorial to the Civilian Victims
of the Japanese Occupation may resemble a collective and national memorial that
Lee had envisioned, but a closer analysis behind the politics of the memorial will
show that it was one powerful voice that dominated the debate and creation of
Singapore’s official Second World War memorial.

The people of Singapore revisited the issue of commemorating the Second World
War in the 1960s. According to Blackburn, the motivation in the 1960s to raise a
Second World War memorial came from the discovery of numerous human remains
in mass war graves. In 1951, for example, a mass grave containing the remains of
some 1,300 victims was discovered in Singapore. 1010 It was located at a spot some
seven miles along the east coast road from Singapore in the Siglap and Bedok
suburbs “mostly in an undulating country site which had become known locally as
the ‘valley of the dead’.” 1011 According to Bose, The Times reported that the remains
of some 200 individuals from the mass grave were “the military dead” which were to
be “exhumed for interment at Kranji War Cemerery”, 1012 the official Commonwealth
war cemetery in Singapore. 1013 The rest of the remains, assumed to be civilians, were
reportedly exhumed but it was not known what was done with them. 1014

Eleven years later, in February 1962, the Singapore Straits Times reported that
sandwashing operations near an area off the 7½ mile Siglap Road had “thrown up
some human remains”. 1015 The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (SCCCI) immediately carried out an investigation and discovered five mass
graves nearby. The SCCCI believed these remains were those of Chinese victims of
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the massacres of civilians in Singapore during the Japanese Occupation. The Siglap
area was now officially dubbed the “Valley of Death”. 1016 Curiously enough, when
these mass war graves were discovered, the British High Commission informed
London that “this is not evidence of hitherto unknown [Japanese] atrocity.” 1017
However, the British government replied that “it seems highly probable” and referred
the High Commissioner to “the record of one of the Japanese war criminal trials”. 1018
The local belief and the British government’s views were accurate. The mass graves
contained the remains of victims of the Sook Ching Massacres.

The human remains discovered in 1962 were not immediately reburied in a local
cemetery, nor was the site converted into a war cemetery, nor was a local war
memorial erected at the site to commemorate the victims. This was because the
question of proper disposal or reburial of remains found in the mass graves
discovered in 1962 became a public issue. Normally such a task would have been
entrusted to a government agency or ministry. However, the SCCCI thrust itself to
the fore and volunteered to see to the proper disposal of these human remains. The
discovery of remains in 1962 also rekindled emotions of anger and grief in
Singapore’s Chinese community and motivated the SCCCI to mobilise its resources
to “gather the remains all over the island to find a place to bury them as a token of
remembrance”. 1019 According to the SCCCI, it believed that the people had entrusted
the organisation with the responsibility to “expedite the building” 1020 of a memorial
to rebury the remains. These remains provided the opportunity for the SCCCI to
continue Tan Kah Kee’s efforts immediately after the war to erect a memorial
dedicated to the Chinese war dead. The SCCCI was, in other words, revisiting the
1947 war memorial project, but this time with a new slogan.
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The “Blood Debt”

When the Japanese Director of the Higher Education and Science Bureau made a
stopover in Singapore in August 1958, the local Chinese newspaper Sin Chew Jit
Poh asked, “When can the ‘identification parade’ blood debt of 100,000 Chinese be
paid up?” 1021 The figure cited does not reflect the total number of Chinese who died;
in local speak, it means an uncountable sum. It is the term “blood debt” that interests
us; it has since become the SCCCI’s slogan to rally the Singaporean Chinese
community to remember the war dead in Singapore. 1022

The “debt” component reflects compensation sought for the “Voluntary Contribution
Campaign” conducted by the Japanese during the Occupation. As noted in Chapter 8,
the Japanese demanded a $50 million dollar donation from the Singapore Chinese
community as a demonstration of their loyalty to the Japanese. The Singapore
Chinese community could only raise a total of $22 million dollars before the deadline
and had to borrow the reminder from the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank. 1023 After
the war, the Yokohama Specie Bank reminded the Singapore Chinese that the
balance of the loan was still outstanding. 1024 The SCCCI responded in 1962 by
declaring that the amount had been paid in full along with a demand for a dollar for
dollar compensation of $50 million dollars from the Japanese. 1025 The “blood”
element referred to the Sook Ching Massacres. Since the end of the war, the Chinese
community felt that the Japanese had not done enough to acknowledge the bloodshed
they inflicted on their community during their occupation of Singapore. 1026 The
“Blood Debt” essentially demanded repayment in kind (money) and public Japanese
acknowledgment of the suffering they had inflicted on the Singapore Chinese
community between 1942 and 1945. It would become a powerful element in
Singapore’s politics between 1961 and 1963.
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Politics and Conflicts in the 1960s

The “blood debt” issue could have remained a minor matter in Singapore if not for
political developments, especially communal-based politics, in post-war Malaya and
Singapore. As noted in Chapter 9, the British introduced the Malayan Union scheme
in 1946 to merge all Malayan states in Malaya to form one protectorate, the Malayan
Union. Singapore was not included in this scheme and was administered instead as a
separate British crown colony. Citizenship of the Malayan Union was granted to all
persons born in territories governed by the Union, or in Singapore, and to immigrants
who had lived there for ten out of the preceding fifteen years. 1027 Immigrants who
arrived after the formation of the Malayan Union could qualify for citizenship after
five years of residence. 1028 It was easy for non-Malays to qualify for citizenship in
the Union. Although the Malays were the largest population group in the Union, they
felt threatened by these citizenship laws. The Chinese were the second largest
communal group in Malaya and the Malays were worried that the Chinese, along
with easy access to citizenship by immigrants, would tip the demographic ratio
against them, rendering them a minority in their own land, much as the indigenous
Fijians had become a minority in their islands. The Malays therefore rallied behind
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and its promise of “warding off
the devastating ignominy of race extinction. 1029 The British had not anticipated the
Malays’ reaction but quickly entered into talks with UMNO to placate the Malays.
The result was the Federation of Malaya which came into existence on 1 February
1948. Under its constitution, citizenship laws were toughened and the British High
Commissioner was charged with “the responsibility of safeguarding the special
position of the Malays.” 1030 On 31 August 1957, Malaya was granted independence.
Under its constitution, the Malays’ “special position” was affirmed, both politically
and through better access to education, public service offices, business permits and
licenses. 1031 The British debacle with the Malayan Union demonstrated that political
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power in Malaya rested in communal-based politics and satisfying Malaya’s largest
ethnic group, the Malays. And the Malays were determined that their rights and
special privileges as people indigenous to Malaya would not be endangered. This
was put to the test in the 1960s.

In 1959, Singapore had voted the PAP, under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, into
power. Unlike Malaya, the Chinese in Singapore made up the state’s majority
population. In 1961, the PAP and Malaya’s Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman,
held talks over the possibility and feasibility of a merger between Singapore with
Malaya to form a new federation. But the PAP was in political trouble by 1961.
Although it won a landslide victory in 1959 in the Legislative Assembly, it soon
faced challenges and its grip on power in Singapore was slipping. The most serious
challenge came in July 1961 when thirteen former PAP assemblymen left the party to
form a new opposition party, the Barisan Socialis (BS). The BS was a communally
based political party and, like its Malayan Communist Party (MCP) counterpart, it
was mainly Chinese in membership. The PAP claimed that the BS was proCommunist in its aspirations and planned to introduce a socialist government in
Singapore, copying the MCP’s long-term policy of a socialist government in
Malaya. 1032 The PAP also believed that the BS could definitively count on the
support of at least four assemblymen from other opposition parties to vote against the
PAP and feared that, if left unchecked, the BS could get enough votes from the
opposition and defectors to form government. Indeed, the PAP had good reasons to
be anxious. Of the forty-three seats the PAP won from a possible fifty-one in the
1959 elections, 1033 it only retained twenty-six seats in the legislative assembly in
1962 – only one seat kept the PAP in power. And that one seat was finally lost to the
BS on 3 July 1962 when the BS successfully convinced a PAP assemblywoman to
cross the floor to join their ranks. 1034 Singapore’s deputy Prime Minister at the time,
Toh Chin Chye, recalled that every day in the Assembly was a struggle with the
opposition continuingly moving motions of no confidence that put the government
“on the verge of being toppled”. 1035
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A merger between Singapore and Malaya had advantages for both PAP and UMNO.
If the merger was successful, the PAP could count on the UMNO government to
eliminate the BS; UMNO was right-wing and thoroughly anti-Communist. Tunku
Abdul Rahman also had reasons to keep the PAP in power in Singapore. If the BS
successfully toppled the PAP from power, there were fears that Singapore could be
transformed into a “little China”,1036 a satellite state of Communist China. Faced
with the possibility of Communist satellite state as his neighbour, Tunku Abdul
Rahman preferred to have a more moderate and amenable PAP in power. 1037
However, there remained the problem of race and the Malays’ privileged position if
the merger between the two states was to become a reality.

In 1960, the Malay population in Malaya numbered nearly 3.1 million while the
Chinese numbered some 2.3 million. 1038 If Singapore merged with Malaya, it would
bring the Malay population up to 3.4 million but the Chinese population would swell
to 3.6 million, overtaking the Malay majority in Malaya. In order to make the merger
palatable to the Malays in Malaya, former British territories in Borneo were offered
to merge to form the Federation of Malaysia. If they agreed to become part of a
Malaysian federation, the demographics would shift back in favour of the Malays;
there would be 4 million Malays against some 3.7 million Chinese. 1039 While this
arrangement placated the Malays, the Singaporean Chinese were confronted with the
same issue that caused anxiety for the Malays under the Malayan Union scheme: a
majority in Singapore, they would become a minority in Malaysia, a status they were
not ready to accept. Their anxiety did not escape the attention of the BS who, at the
same time, was well aware that they would very likely be purged in the event of a
successful merger.

In their bid to derail the PAP’s plans for the merger, the BS played the communal
politics card. They saw in the SCCCI’s “blood-debt” movement the opportunity to
represent the interests of the majority ethnic community in Singapore, which they
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then could use to position themselves better against the PAP. On 26 February 1962,
the BS announced that it would support the SCCCI’s efforts to demand
compensation from the Japanese government for the families of the victims of the
Sook Ching massacres. 1040 The SCCCI accepted and it publicly pressured the
Singapore government to “not shirk the responsibility of demanding compensation
from Japan.” 1041 The Singapore Communists had formed an unholy alliance with an
organization that was, ideologically, their antithesis. In the Singapore Assembly, the
BS raised the issue of the SCCCI’s “blood debt”, pressuring the PAP to seek
compensation from the Japanese government. 1042 Outside the Assembly, it spread
rumours that the Japanese atrocities “were the outcome of Malay collaborators with
the Japanese.” 1043 A successful merger with Malaya, the BS argued, would turn the
Chinese back into the status of a “conquered people”, 1044 or at the very least
“second-class citizens” 1045 in the federation. The BS had made their first and
calculated move, and one that placed the PAP on the back foot.

In March 1962, the SCCCI appealed, unsuccessfully, to the Japanese government for
compensation for the “blood debt”. 1046 The Japanese argued that under the terms of
the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951, all
Allied Powers and their nationals had waived all reparation claims against Japan for
the war. 1047 Britain, on behalf of the people of Singapore, had waived all pending
and future reparations claims against Japan. 1048 The SCCCI were infuriated by the
Japanese response. In order to respond to the BS pressure in the Assembly over the
“blood debt” movement and the rumours that the BS was spreading, the PAP took
1040
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the Japanese government to task with the “blood debt” issue in order to demonstrate
that the PAP government still held power in Singapore and still represented the
interests of the Singapore Chinese.

Compensation for the “blood debt”

The PAP approached the Japanese government in May 1962 on behalf of the SCCCI
over the “blood debt” issue. To give their effort traction, the PAP reinterpreted and
presented the “blood debt” issue as a national issue in Singapore that concerned not
just the Singapore Chinese but collectively all Singaporeans. 1049 This was to be a
bilateral issue to be decided between the two nations. Singapore’s deputy Prime
Minister, Toh Chin Chye first met with the Japanese consul in Singapore in May to
discuss the “blood debt”. The initial talks made some headway. The Japanese Consul
was ready to sponsor the construction of a park and memorial in Singapore as
atonement for the “blood debt”. However, he reminded the Singapore government
that under the 1951 Peace Treaty the Japanese government was no longer liable for
war reparations and this gesture should not be interpreted as such. 1050 Prime Minister
Lee weighed in on the issue and responded that the Japanese offer and conditions
were not good enough. The Japanese Consul, however, reminded Lee that the
Japanese government had discharged all its debts and reparations under the 1951
Peace Treaty. Lee retorted, “[Singapore] was under the yoke of a colonial power and
that the local Chinese had not received any of the material benefits of the Treaty.” 1051
His reasoning fell on deaf ears because whenever the question of war reparations
with Japan was raised, Japanese policy was to refer to the 1951 Peace Treaty. The
Japanese government would adopt the same line when faced with compensation
claims from former Australian prisoners-of-war and Japanese “comfort women”
during the 1980s and 1990s. 1052
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Lee took the matter directly to the Japanese Prime Minister, Hayato Ikeda, who
replied with his “sincere regrets” 1053 for the massacres of the Chinese in Singapore
and left it at that. Lee and the PAP did not make much headway with the Japanese in
May 1962 but their adoption of the “blood debt” issue proved to be a smart political
move for them; the issue was no longer owned by the opposition. It was a move that
paid dividends for the PAP in the upcoming referendum on the issue of a merger
with Malaya. After announcing the start of the referendum campaign on the form of
the merger with Malaya, the president of the SCCCI, Ko Teck Kin, pledged his
support for the PAP’s position. 1054 When the referendum was held on 1 September
1962, 71 percent of the electoral voted for the PAP’s proposals.1055 In one sense, the
outcome of the referendum reflects Albert Lau’s argument about the nature of
politics in Singapore and the PAP’s approach to wining elections. Since the
Singapore local elections of 1955, it had shown that, unlike Malaya, communallybased political parties in Singapore had little chance of winning power. 1056 The
Democratic Party, for example, was intensely Chinese and chauvinistic but won only
two of the twenty seats it contested in 1955. 1057 The PAP had emphasised multiracialism in Singapore and in the 1959 elections ran a multi-racial “Singaporean
Singapore” 1058 electoral campaign that won it an overwhelming majority of seats that
year. Yet, this does not mean that communal interests based on race were irrelevant.
The emergence of the BS, and the PAP’s adoption of the “blood debt” issue and its
negotiations with the Japanese government on behalf of the SCCCI, demonstrated
that communally-based politics presented a potential danger to a multi-racial party,
especially if the majority felt its views were being ignored. The PAP may have found
the formula for winning elections in Singapore with its multi-racial “Singaporean
Singapore” party line, but to stay in power, it needed amenable communal voices.

As the BS had feared, the Malaysian government quickly moved to crack down on its
activities and members in Singapore. What they did not anticipate was the swiftness
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of it all. On 2 February 1963, five months after the referendum for the merger was
passed, the Malaysian government carried out a massive purge of Communist cadres
and sympathisers in Singapore. The Internal Security Council launched Operation
“Cold Store” and arrested some 115 people suspected of having conspired with the
Communists to oppose the formation of a Malaysian federation. 1059 In the operation,
pro-BS supporters and anti-Malaysian activists from trade unions, the university,
Chinese clan associations and the press were arrested. Amongst those caught in the
net were twenty-four BS non-parliamentary leaders, crippling the BS at the
grassroots level. 1060 Only the BS cadres in the Singapore Assembly were not
purged. 1061 Lee still faced a dilemma. Despite winning over the SCCCI, he still
headed a “Singaporean Singapore” party. He urged the SCCCI to make their “blood
debt” campaign, especially its plans for a memorial for the remains discovered in
1962 that accompanied the campaign, “less Chinese and more national”.1062

The SCCCI responded slowly to Lee’s call. In March 1963, the SCCCI appointed
five non-Chinese representatives to its Fund Raising Committee for a memorial. 1063
Then on 12 April 1963, the committee held a mass meeting in the Singapore Victoria
Theatre. The SCCCI’s report on the meeting is worth noting. It reported that it was
“a mass meeting of representatives of registered organisations of all races”. 1064 The
meeting, according to the SCCCI, raised some $100,000 “on the spot” 1065 and
another $30,000 was raised from donations after the meeting for the construction of a
war memorial. But it completely omitted the fact that Lee had been invited to the
meeting and had made a speech. This was because in Lee’s speech, he simply
referred to the massacres as “an unhappy incident”. Lee reminded the audience that
the Treaty of San Francisco had legally “settled everything”, even if it had been
signed by a “colonial government that did not represent us”. He assured the audience
that the PAP was seeking to resolve the matter peacefully and quietly but touched on
the need to “be realistic”. The trade, technical co-operation and industrial
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development the Japanese could bring to Malaysia “would be out of all proportion to
any gesture of atonement they can make”. 1066 In other words, the “blood debt” issue,
although an important issue, could not be allowed to compromise the national
interest; Singapore’s industrialisation program. Clearly, Lee’s attempt to make the
plans for a memorial less Chinese and more national had failed to impress the
SCCCI.

As much as Lee had tried to play down the “blood debt” movement by making it a
less ethnically-charged issue, he acknowledged that “the problem was not going to
go away.” 1067 And neither was the SCCCI going to let it slide. By August, the
SCCCI was again pressing strongly for the PAP to resolve the “blood debt” issue
with the Japanese government before matters of foreign affairs were passed to the
Malaysian federal government. 1068 They did not want a repeat of the 1951 Treaty of
San Francisco when the interests of the Chinese would be subordinate to that of
another government. Lee felt that he “had to press” 1069 the Japanese government on
behalf of the SCCCI to demand the $50 million in compensation, despite being fully
aware that such a move could have consequences for Japanese investments in
Singapore. Predictably, the Japanese rejected the request. Lee knew that his second
attempt would fail. He was presenting a demand from a specific group in Singapore,
the Singapore Chinese through the SCCCI. Its failure might convince the SCCCI that
the “blood debt” issue would go nowhere as long as it was seen as a Chinese
issue. 1070 If that was his strategy, it worked. Recognising the “blood debt” issue was
not making any headway with the Japanese government if it remained strictly a
Chinese issue, Ko, the president of the SCCCI organised a mass rally inviting the
Malay, Indian, Eurasian and Sri Lankan communities to participate. This gesture
from Ko was what Lee needed for his government to support the “blood debt”
movement; a strong show of national solidarity from the grassroots level, mirroring a
“Singaporean Singapore”. Lee gave it his full support.
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The rally was held on 25 August 1963 on the Padang in front of Parliament House
and was attended by a crowd of over 100,000 people. Not surprisingly, the crowd
was overwhelmingly Chinese. Lee later revealed to his aides that he chose to support
the SCCCI at the rally at this juncture because he saw it as an opportunity to “contain
and control” 1071 the “blood debt” movement, and to prevent his political enemies
from using communal politics against him or the PAP. His experience with the BS
would have had a lot to do with this and the SCCCI’s August mass rally would prove
him right again. The BS may have been crippled by Operation “Cold Store” but it
was not yet a spent force. Just before the August rally, Lee had, on good authority
from the police Special Branch, that the BS and their sympathisers were planning to
hijack the rally to humiliate Lee with their claims that the successful referendum for
a merger with Malaya had betrayed the Singapore Chinese. 1072 For security, Lee
mobilised some 6,000 police personnel and soldiers from two Singapore infantry
regiments. 1073 He deployed his security force just out of sight and he appeared on
stage without bodyguards. Lee wanted the BS to make the first move. And they did.
Sensing an opportunity to upstage Lee, the BS quickly moved in and started a
ruckus. They jeered at Lee and chanted slogans loudly, preventing him from
addressing the crowd. Lee kept his composure and remained on stage. Once he was
satisfied that BS had made their presence felt, Lee gave a signal to a plain-clothes
officer. Powerful spotlights were turned on and beamed on the ringleaders.
Photographers and news cameramen quickly focused on the places where the
spotlights pointed. All the jeering and chanting immediately ceased as the ringleaders
scrambled to escape to avoid being identified and marked for subsequent arrest. In
their hurry to humiliate Lee they had forgotten to mask their faces with their
handkerchiefs which they often did to protect their identities during mass rallies. 1074
Lee then stepped forward calmly and delivered his speech to a more subdued crowd.
His security measures had sent a clear message that he was in charge. Lee’s speech
that day was in stark contrast to the one he had given a few months earlier,
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It is a pity that the present Japanese Consul-General is insensitive and
so prosaic in his approach to this [blood-debt] issue… For if the
Japanese Government were to be insensitive and unimaginative in their
approach, then they stand to lose a great deal in this part of the world.
We realise that the rate of our industrial progress may also be affected.
But that cannot be helped…I am not unhopeful that being a practical
people the Japanese will come to realise the wisdom of coming to terms
with the national representatives of the people of Singapore…let us
settle these legacies of World War II peacefully if we may, but
otherwise if we must. 1075

Lee went on to describe the Japanese as having “the cheapest of technical and
managerial skills” and while they were of a huge benefit to the industrialisation of
Southeast Asia, the PAP would not be committed to attracting them to Singapore
without a resolution of the “blood debt” issue. To further reinforce his point, Lee
announced that he had directed his government to carry out “resolutions of noncooperation, no more visas will be issued for more Japanese on new industrial or
commercial projects in Singapore.” 1076 This was what the SCCCI and Singapore
Chinese was waiting to hear from Lee. In one rally Lee soundly defeated his BS
opponents, but more importantly, he had contained and controlled the “blood debt”
movement.

Lee seemed to be taking a bold step at the August mass rally by rejecting further
Japanese investments until the Japanese government resolved the “blood debt” issue.
But he could afford to do so because of the successful referendum for a merger with
Malaya. Once the merger was completed, it would grant Singapore greater access to
the Malaysian hinterland, which according to Lee, “produces the rubber and tin that
keep our shop-window economy going…the base that made Singapore the capital
city.” 1077 In other words, he could the substitute Malaysian hinterland for foreign
Japanese investments. And, after Singapore’s merger with Malaya on 16 September
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1963, the “blood debt” issue would become a Malaysian matter: it was finally off his
hands. Japanese and Malaysian negotiations over the “blood debt” issue entered a
hiatus of nearly two years. It is quite likely that the Japanese government still
perceived the “blood-debt” issue as an ethnic Singapore Chinese issue, and with
Singapore now a state within the Federation of Malaysia, a matter that the new
government would not necessarily prioritise. Indeed, throughout 1964 and 1965, the
Japanese government managed to successfully stall any further negotiations on the
“blood-debt” issue. 1078

Singapore’s merger with Malaya lasted a little under two years. Ethnic violence and
tensions made it untenable for Singapore to remain in the federation. When
Singapore separated from Malaysia in August 1965 Lee recalled that there was
rejoicing in Chinatown as firecrackers were let off to “celebrate their freedom from
communal oppression.” 1079 The “blood-debt” issue was passed back to the PAP to
resolve with the Japanese government. This time however, Lee could not stand in
front of a mass rally and challenged the Japanese government the way he had in
August 1963. Lee had called Singapore’s separation from Malaysia a “moment of
anguish” because his vision of a “unity of two these two territories…connected by
geography, economics, and ties of kinship” 1080 was at an end. With Singapore out of
Malaysia, Singapore was no longer connected to the resource-rich Malayan
economic hinterland. Singapore’s industrialisation would have to depend on other
sources, including Japan, and that included the unresolved matter of the “blood
debt”. In order to resolve the “blood debt” Lee now had to walk a familiar and
delicate path, balancing the demands of the Singapore Chinese and maintaining
friendly relations with Japan to encourage Japanese investment in Singapore. 1081
This time however, with the BS purged from Singapore, the PAP and Lee no longer
faced challenges from party-based communal politics.
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The PAP and the Japanese government finally came to an agreement in October 1966
to resolve the “blood debt” issue. The Japanese government offered $50 million
dollars, half as a loan and another half as a grant. However, no official apology
would come with it. 1082 When Lee paid an unofficial visit to Japan the following year
in April, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato thanked Lee “for having resolved the
‘bones’ [the blood-debt] issue.” 1083 Lee then extended an invitation to Sato to visit
Singapore, which he accepted. In 1967, Sato became the first Japanese Prime
Minister to visit Singapore after the war. 1084 The “blood debt” issue, however, was
not entirely behind them yet. During a dinner hosted by Lee in Singapore, Sato
delivered a speech that referred to the Japanese Occupation of Singapore as “times in
the history of Asia when we had a number of unhappy incidents.” 1085 Lee wrote in
his memoirs decades later that he felt that Sato’s words were a “monumental
understatement” 1086 especially when they were uttered before someone like Lee who
had experienced the Japanese Occupation. Sato, however, was simply repeating the
same words that Lee had used in 1963 to describe the massacres of the Chinese; it
was “an unhappy incident”. 1087

Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation

With the politics of the “blood debt” virtually settled with Japan, there remained the
task that sparked the entire “blood debt” issue; reburying the human remains
discovered in 1962. The SCCCI had proposed the erection of a war memorial similar
to other Second World War Chinese memorials in Malaysia, a single pillar with
Chinese inscriptions on one side, 1088 to honour the dead. The remains discovered and
recovered at Siglap would be cremated, the ashes interned under the war memorial in
an underground vault. 1089 The PAP however, objected to the proposal on the grounds
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that the memorial did not reflect its multi-racial policy in Singapore. 1090 It was still
Sino-centric. It advised the SCCCI to come up with a design that would not resemble
typical Chinese war memorials in the region. 1091 In response, the SCCCI made a call
for expressions of interests, reminiscent of the War Memorials Committee’s efforts
in the 1940s. A week-long exhibition of the designs submitted for the war memorial
was held at the Victoria Memorial Hall. The design that was finally chosen featured
four tapering pillars converging at the base of a memorial. The firm of architects that
produced the wining design was Messrs Swan and Maclaren 1092 – the same firm that
had supplied an advisor for the WMC in 1946. Finally, the original aim of the WMC
had been achieved, a memorial that was inclusive. The four pillars represented the
collective sacrifices of the four major ethnic communities in Singapore during the
war. If the WMC had succeeded, such a memorial may well have been the centrepiece of its war memorial park. The PAP was pleased with the new design and it
even agreed to grant a large piece of land along Beach Road for the war memorial.
On 15 June 1963, Lee performed an official groundbreaking ceremony for the
memorial. 1093

The inclusive design of Messrs Swan and Maclaren’s war memorial was reinforced
by Lee in his speech during the memorial’s unveiling ceremony four years later in
February 1967. According to Lee, the memorial commemorated, “a common
destiny” where the “sharing [of] such common experiences that the feeling of living
and being one community is established” 1094 – each pillar joined at the base symbolic
of a common destiny. The Secretariat of the SCCCI affirmed that the four tapering
pillars joining at the base symbolise the “the merging of four streams of culture into
one which fits in the principle of unity of all races.” 1095 Institutions in Singapore
reinforce Lee’s interpretation of the pillars of the memorial. Singapore’s Ministry of
Defence, for example, describes the four pillars of the war memorial as
representative of “four races joined together at the base – signifying the unity of all
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races.” 1096 According to the National Library Board of Singapore the four pillars
symbolises “the shared ‘war experiences’ of the Chinese, Indians, Malays, and other
races.” 1097 It was a politically correct war memorial. And this time even the date was
correct: it was not a date of imperial significance, like Remembrance Day, this was a
month that reflected the start of Singapore’s war.

The SCCCI commissioned Pan Shou, a famous local Chinese poet and master
calligrapher, to pen the epitaph to be inscribed on the memorial. Pan wrote:

During the infamous Operation Clean-up, the invaders butchered group
after group of innocent civilians….nobody is able to provide the names
of the individuals who perished in the massacre. However, we do know
they represent loyalty, courage, humanity and righteousness. These
people were the first martyrs in Singapore’s fight for freedom…the four
elevated columns of the Memorial signify loyalty, courage, humanity
and righteousness. 1098

Operation Clean-up was what the Japanese called a standard mopping-up operation
but what the Singapore Chinese called the Sook Ching massacres. Pan was
privileging the Singapore Chinese community’s memory of the war. It echoed Tan
Kah Kee’s war memorial movement in the late 1940s noted in the previous chapter.
It did not fit the PAP’s multi-racial interpretation of the war memorial and was
banned from display in public spaces. The emphasis on Chinese sacrifices during the
war would mean that the original “never saw the light of day” in Singapore. 1099 Yet,
the SCCCI had merged Pan’s interpretation of the memorial’s four pillars with the
PAP’s rhetoric on national commemoration: “this Memorial…represents unity of all
races and symbolizes loyalty, bravery, benevolence and righteousness”. 1100 It is a
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subtle reminder of the moving force behind the proposal for the memorial and who
the memorial is meant to commemorate.

The memorial was unveiled on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Fall of Singapore
on 15 February 1967. Officially, it was called Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the
Japanese Occupation and it is not linked with Remembrance Day commemorations.
It is not imperial: it is, ostensibly, Singapore’s. Yet, twice the Singapore Chinese
community pressured the incumbent government in Singapore to act and recognise
their sacrifices. The first movement in the 1940s hinged on two issues; the Singapore
Chinese community had suffered more, and differences in Chinese beliefs were
incompatible with other ethnic minorities in Singapore, which, according to the
Chinese, made an exclusive memorial necessary. Instead, the memory of the Second
World War in Singapore was linked to another, and irrelevant war. The second
movement in the 1960s was inspired by the “blood debt” movement which was based
on Tan’s legacy. Although the Singapore Chinese would never have a memorial of
their own, and bent to the will of the incumbent government, Singapore’s memorials
plans were profoundly influenced by one voice.
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The four pillars of the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation
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The four pillars of the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Memorial
appearing above the tree line as seen from the Singapore Cenotaph, an indication of
the close distance between the two. However, the differences in height make it
impossible for the memorials to be photographed the other way round.
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Chapter 11

The Language of Commemoration in Singapore

From the end of the Japanese Occupation, the Singapore Chinese had campaigned
twice to have their war dead and memories of the war honoured and remembered
with a war memorial. They partly achieved that aim in 1967 with the unveiling of the
Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation because the dedication
of the memorial in 1967 rested largely on a condition that the SCCCI set down by
Lee Kuan Yew to make the campaign for the memorial “less Chinese and more
national”. 1101 When he unveiled the memorial in 1967, he reminded the SCCCI of
their compromise in his speech by emphasising what the memorial was not
commemorating: “We meet not to rekindle old fires of hatred, nor to seek settlements
for blood debts”. 1102 Instead, the memorial stood for the sharing of “common
experiences that the feeling of living and being one community is established”, a
common experience that would serve as a catalyst in “building a nation out of the
young and unestablished community of diverse immigrants.” 1103 Lee’s speech in
1967 made it clear that the PAP was keen to bury the “blood debt” issue and that the
memorial should serve a nation-building purpose.

As Blackburn has argued, Lee had appropriated the wartime memories of the
Singapore Chinese community to create the notion of “common suffering”, a
suffering that all communities of Singapore endured during the Japanese Occupation,
to reflect his “Singaporean Singapore” as a form of collective national identity. 1104
This chapter builds on that observation by arguing that although the Singapore
Chinese experience during the war had been appropriated, it did not mean that the
voice of the Singapore Chinese had been silenced with the unveiling of the
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memorial. Indeed, the language of commemoration in Singapore continues to be
distinctively and heavily influenced by the Singapore Chinese.

It is the SCCCI, not the Singapore government, that has organised the memorial
services on 15 February since 1967. No other community group uses the memorial to
privately or publicly remember or honour their war dead. Indeed, the official name of
the memorial, Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, suggests
that it was not going to be an entirely inclusive memorial because the name of the
memorial specifically honours the civilian victims of the war who died during the
Japanese Occupation. The victims were predominately Chinese. The event that the
memorial honours, and the emphasis on civilians, immediately excludes volunteers
who fought in the Battle of Singapore before the Japanese Occupation. The Malay
Regiment, the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force, and paradoxically, Dalforce are
excluded. However, at the 2008 memorial service, the SCCCI claimed that the war
“is in the distant past but it remains very close to us.” 1105 The language used is
pluralist, but at the same time it is also ambiguous – who is “us”? Indeed, the history
of Singapore’s language of commemoration reflects a complicated inter-relationship
between an embryonic form of nationalism promoted by the PAP, the appropriation
of commemorative rituals more common to military forms of commemoration as an
expression of nationalism than might be expected of a memorial for civilian victims
of war, resistance and accommodation.

Honouring the war dead the SCCCI way

As noted in the previous chapter, when the mass graves were discovered in 1962, the
SCCCI decided that the remains were definitively Chinese and, according to Chinese
funeral traditions at the time, they should all be cremated and reburied. The SCCCI
also believed that these remains only represented a fraction of the number of victims
killed during the war and therefore their reburial was at best a symbolic gesture to all
the victims. 1106 The SCCCI announced plans to have all the remains cremated and
reburied under a war memorial. However, other religious groups, especially the
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Catholics and those of the Islamic faith, raised objections. Not all remains had been
positively identified as Chinese and more importantly, cremation was not part of
their funerary practices. 1107 Indeed, even if all the remains had been Chinese, not all
Chinese in Singapore observe the same funerary traditions. In the end, the SCCCI
relented and claimed that “in order to maintain harmony of all races” 1108 the remains
would not be cremated but reburied on the memorial grounds instead. There were
indications, however, that the SCCCI was not entirely happy with the changes. It
noted that the change of plans had caused delays to the construction of the memorial
because they had to “do away with the underground vault intended for the ashes of
the remains”. 1109 The SCCCI also claimed that as a result of this, the costs of the
construction also “well exceeded the estimate”. 1110 Yet the SCCCI had
compromised.

Before construction of the memorial began, the SCCCI invited leaders of the InterReligious Organisation (IRO) 1111 to conduct religious rites to sanctify the grounds.
(The IRO was formed in 1949 as part of efforts by the religious leaders in Singapore
for mutual understanding. 1112 The spirit which the IRO was formed reflected what
Lee Kuan Yew wanted to promote in Singapore, his multicultural “Singaporean
Singapore” policy.) Incorporating the IRO as part of the SCCCI’s efforts to erect a
memorial in Singapore was clearly a concession to the PAP to make the memorial a
more national and less Chinese form of commemoration. According to the SCCCI,
while Singapore’s Prime Minister was conducting the ground breaking ceremony for
the memorial, religious leaders from various faiths “chanted prayers in the presence
of hundreds of guests.” 1113 When the memorial was unveiled in 1967, religious
leaders from the IRO were again invited to conduct prayers and religious rites for the
dead victims. The SCCCI would continue to engage the services of the IRO for its
annual memorial services at the war memorial. At the 41st SCCCI memorial service,
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as noted in the preface, religious leaders from the IRO were again invited to conduct
prayers for the dead. The incorporation of religious practices in war commemoration
services is not unique to Singapore. According to Winter, war memorials are
recognised as “places where people grieved, both individually and collectively” 1114
and grieving can be expressed through sacred or religious rites and rituals. It can be
said, however, that the compromise for the SCCCI was slight. The centrepiece of the
war memorial is a distinctively Chinese urn traditionally used to hold cremated
funerary remains. Normally, a traditional Chinese burial urn is not put on public
display. The four towering pillars of the war memorial may be ostensibly collective,
but its centrepiece is distinctively Chinese.

There are two elements to the ritual surrounding the memorial service conducted by
the SCCCI on 15 February. The first is the formal, or public, observance
accompanying the service, which will be discussed later. The second is the informal,
or private, observances that occur. Photographs of the SCCCI’s memorial services at
the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation held in the 1970s
shows Singaporean Chinese performing rituals of ancestor worship spontaneously on
the grounds around the memorial that are more commonly observed during Chinese
funerals; making food offerings, burning incense and performing customary bows
that one would perform in front of a tomb. This suggests that memorial functions like
a symbolic grave in popular Chinese traditions serving as a physical conduit between
the dead and the living, for religious rites and prayers to be carried out. 1115 By 2008,
popular Chinese traditions and Taoist rituals have become an integral and
institutionalised part of its memorial services. As noted in the preface, the SCCCI
designated a large space at the memorial and set up tables and temporary bins where
Chinese offerings and ceremonial rites like ancestor worship and the burning of
offerings could be performed. And, as noted in the preface, whilst the formal
observances were underway, a far larger crowd of Chinese were carrying out their
own rituals for the dead. And it was only the Chinese.
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In Blackburn’s analysis of the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese
Occupation, he highlighted the fact that mourning the victims of the massacres was
difficult and stressing for Chinese families in Singapore due to the absence of
graves. 1116 Winter noted how the survivors of the Second World War, and their
descendants, in Europe returned to the “sombre languages and forms which derived
from the memory of the Great War” 1117 to remember the dead. Commemoration in
Australia has followed the same pattern with Anzac. However, in Singapore, the
Great War does not evoke any responses. With no precedence of sombre languages
and forms of war commemoration in Singapore, the SCCCI turned instead to the
languages and traditions they were familiar; the cult of the dead, and popular beliefs
of the afterlife in popular Chinese traditions and in Taoism. 1118

Popular Singapore Chinese traditions and Taoism hold that the afterlife is intricately
linked to the living and vice versa. Proper rites and rituals need to be observed for the
dead to pass peacefully to the afterlife. It is important that the remains of dead are
properly reburied and their spirits honoured. The cult of the dead in popular Chinese
traditions is reflected by two Chinese festivals on the Chinese calendar deemed
important to the Singapore Chinese community; the “Zhong Yuan” festival, better
known as the Hungry Ghost festival, and the “Qing Ming” festival. The “Qing Ming”
festival, and to a certain extend the Hungry Ghost festival, has roots in the Chinese
practice of ancestor worship, which is an extension of filial piety in Taoism. 1119
The Hungry Ghost Festival is observed every year during the 15th month of the
Chinese lunar calendar. In the month-long festival, the Chinese believe that the gates
of hell are opened to allow spirit and ghosts to return to the living for a month.
During the entire month when the souls roam amongst the living, they “wander
around the world for food and other necessities.” 1120 Ritual offerings of food, joss
incense and the burning of paper money are made to the spirits of deceased relatives.
For spirits that have no descendants, Taoist practitioners and priests conduct the
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“Nourishment and Salvation Rituals” to ensure that these spirits are also “fed and
taken care of.” 1121 The popular interpretation of the festival goes that failure to do so
will cause the ghosts to harm the living.

The noun “hungry” in “Hungry Ghost” refers to more than just sustenance. In
popular Chinese traditions in Singapore, a Hungry Ghost also includes the souls of
those who suffered before dying or died a violent death. They believe that such souls
will not pass peacefully into the afterlife and will haunt the living as Hungry Ghosts;
they are hungry for vengeance. The more violent the death, especially if the body of
the deceased could not be recovered for proper burial and the performance of the
final rituals, the more malevolent the Hungry Ghost. 1122 For families and
descendants who know that a loved one had experienced such a death, the Hungry
Ghost festival is an especially important event for them. It provides them with the
opportunity to conduct proper rites and offerings to pacify the soul of their kin.

The Hungry Ghost festival occupies a central place with the Chinese in Singapore
and attracts plenty of interest every year. The highlight of the month-long festivities
is the Getai. It translates literally as “song and stage” and is a modern addition to the
rituals of “Nourishment and Salvation”. It consists of a staged performance of songs
and dances performed for an audience of souls; the first few rows of seats are
deliberately left unoccupied for any souls who might care to attend. It is widely
promoted in Singapore as a unique local attraction. The importance and popularity of
the Hungry Ghost festival is reflected in Singapore’s popular media. Singapore’s
most successful domestic feature film productions to date have the Hungry Ghost
festival as their settings: 881 and The Maid. The former was a comedy film about a
family’s foray into the Getai business. The latter was a horror film centred on a
migrant worker in Singapore who unwittingly broke a number of unwritten rules
observed during the Hungry Ghost festival and became troubled by Hungry Ghosts.
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If the Hungry Ghost festival reminds the Chinese of the importance of performing
rites to pacify the souls of the dead, then the “Qing Ming” festival reminds the
Chinese of their obligations to perform rites to honour their ancestors. Qing Ming
falls on the fifth of April every year and in Singapore the Chinese will visit ancestral
shrines and graves to perform customary rites to express gratitude by making
offerings of food and joss incense. The tombstone of one’s ancestors is cleared of
weeds and decorated with flowers. It is not uncommon to give it a fresh new coat of
paint. 1123 The name of the festival, “Qing Ming”, translates as “clear and bright day”
because the festival marks the 105th day after the Winter Solstice, which signals the
coming of spring. 1124 Despite being a Chinese tradition, it has only recently been
officially recognised as a national holiday in the People’s Republic of China but has
been a longstanding tradition and practice in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and
Singapore. 1125 The festival highlights the importance of burial and ancestor worship
in Singapore.

The popularity and reverence given to the Hungry Ghost festival and Qing Ming in
Singapore highlight the importance of burial, rites and rituals for the dead in the
Chinese Singaporean community. Both festivals also demonstrate that when it comes
to death and commemoration in the Chinese Singaporean community, it is a religious
and long affair: proper rites and rituals have to be performed and maintained even
long after the funeral is over.

Ancestor worship and filial piety may well be the true focus of the SCCCI memorial
service since it first began in 1967. Indeed, making offerings of food, joss incense,
the burning of offerings and customary rites performed to express gratitude translates
rather well as a language of war commemoration in Singapore since war memorials
also have a tendency to “express a sense of indebtedness”. 1126 Therefore, an
important part of the SCCCI’s annual memorial services today still includes allowing
religious rites and prayers for the dead to be conducted, even whilst the formal
ceremony is underway. It can be said that the SCCCI, in ensuring that the traditions
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associated with the cult of the dead were carried out, is also reinforcing its role and
interpretation when it comes to war commemoration in Singapore. And the private
has also spilled over into the public observation of the day. The SCCCI requires all
guests to take three bows towards the war memorial during the service.

The formal memorial service held in 2008 was conducted in Mandarin, followed by
an English translation, by representatives from the SCCCI. The fact that Mandarin
was the primary language used was an indication to the public of who holds central
place in the public commemoration of war in Singapore, because English is the
lingua franca of Singapore. Here is a clear example of the intersection between Lee
Kuan Yew’s “Singaporean Singapore”, apparent acquiescence by the Singapore
Chinese majority population, and resistance.
The Chinese term for “culture”, according to Kam Louie, also means writing. 1127
And in Chinese communities, colloquially to have culture means that one should be
educated in, and can write in, Chinese. 1128 The lack of writing or language ability
means the lack of culture. Therefore the education in Chinese language is an
important part of Chinese society because language is seen as synonymous with
culture. When the PAP formed government in Singapore in 1959, Lee Kuan Yew
wanted to make the English language the “language of the work place and the
common language” 1129 of Singapore to ensure that no ethnic community would be
privileged over another. Lee knew that the issue of language was an intense and
passionate issue for the local ethnic communities in Singapore. He recalled in his
memoirs that Chinese-speaking parents could not understand why their children had
to learn English after Singapore’s independence when previously during the British
colonial administration they were educated completely in Chinese. 1130 When
Singapore became an independent nation, the question of official languages in
Singapore was quickly raised by the SCCCI. The Treasurer of the SCCCI, Kheng
Chin Hock, impressed upon Lee the need to guarantee the Chinese language as one
of Singapore’s official languages because he argued that it was “used by more than
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80 per cent of the population in Singapore.” 1131 Lee, however, had no intention of
allowing anyone to exploit the Chinese language as a political issue or to “elevate the
status of the Chinese language.” 1132 On 1 October 1967, Lee announced that
Singapore’s four major languages, English, Malay, Tamil and Chinese, were “official
and equal.” 1133 Days later, Lee met with Singapore’s four chambers of commerce in
a meeting that was telecast to ensure that there would be no more issues with
Singapore’s official languages. English became the language of commerce and
Singapore’s lingua franca. Public signage is in English. The other languages are only
used in places where it might be required, like in the international airport, where
Chinese, Malay or Tamil translates the English signage, usually in smaller font. Yet,
at the SCCCI’s 2008 memorial service, as noted above, Mandarin was the first
language used and the SCCCI had put up two large bilingual banners that read The
41st War Memorial Service for the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation. The
largest characters were in Chinese; the English words were in smaller print size,
appearing below the Chinese characters.

The inherent tension between what was supposed to be a collective and national
commemoration of Singapore’s war dead envisioned by the PAP, and the special
place the Singapore Chinese feel they occupy in that commemoration, was also
reflected in the fourteen-page information pamphlet handed out to guests at the
SCCCI 2008 memorial service. The Chinese section comprised five pages while the
English section nine pages. To further indicate that each section was distinct from the
other, each section has its own set of page numbers and one section was printed
upside down to the other. There were also significant differences in the contents of
each section.

The Chinese section begins with a brief account by the SCCCI’s Secretariat of events
that inspired the construction of the memorial. This is followed by the speeches made
during the unveiling ceremony by Lee Kuan Yew (translated into Chinese) and by
the former president of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and chairman
of the Memorial Working Committee, Soon Peng Yam. In contrast, the English
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section begins with an English translation of Soon Peng Yam’s speech followed by
the SCCCI’s Secretariat account of events. Lee Kuan Yew’s speech is omitted. There
are also differences in the language used. The English versions of the Chinese texts
in the pamphlet are not a literal translation and material has been added and omitted.
Soon’s speech provides an example.

In the Chinese section, Soon’s speech simply states that the remains of victims that
had been discovered and accumulated in the last four years, about 600 sets of human
remains in total, 1134 had now been reburied beneath this memorial. His speech
concludes with him saying, “I wish that our departed comrades in heaven can finally
find rest and peace.” 1135 The translator for the English section changed those words
to read “Souls! Do Rest in Peace!” 1136 and this appears as the title of the English
section. The English rendition of Soon’s speech also contains material that does not
appear in the Chinese version. One is an explanation for the modifications made
during the memorial’s construction. The pamphlet explains that because there had
been strong objections to the SCCCI’s original plans to cremate the human remains
of those found since 1962, modifications were made “in order to respect the views of
the people of various religions”. 1137 Another is the phrase “The Singapore Chinese
Chamber of Commerce has fixed the 15th of February every year for its
representatives to lay a wreath to console the spirits of the departed ones.” 1138 The
English version of Soon’s speech is also peppered with hyperbole; the memorial
“marks the horror of war and shelters thousands of sets of remains” of victims “who
were ruthlessly slaughtered during the dark days of the Japanese Occupation” 1139 and
it is “not simply built out of bricks and cement, but it is in fact a mixture of love and
hatred”. 1140 This stands in stark contrast with a passage from Soon’s speech that does
not appear in the English translation:
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War is sinful while peace is sacred. Nations big, or small, need to
survive. All acts of aggression by one country on another must be
condemned and punished. The seeds of injustice should not be sowed
and hatred should be resolved. 1141

This paragraph came from Pan Shou’s banned epitaph discussed in the previous
chapter.

These discrepancies suggest that the SCCCI could be using language and translation
as a political tool. Statements carrying political messages could be added to the
translation or political messages that were in the original could be deliberately
omitted. The English translation matched the public rhetoric of a collective
memorial, yet it also ensured that the reader knew the significant part the Singapore
Chinese had played in the memorial’s history. And it used forms of language that
sometimes echoed the language of commemoration used in the English-speaking
world, like “rest in peace”. The omission of Pan Shou’s paragraph from the English
translation, but its inclusion in the Chinese version of the pamphlet, also suggests the
political nature of commemoration in Singapore. It is indicative that when it comes
to remembering the war dead in Singapore, the SCCCI still differs in its views from
the PAP. Finally, the discrepancy over the amount of information featured in each
section suggests that the SCCCI could have assumed that the Singapore Chinese
reader had prior knowledge of the events behind the construction of the war
memorial in the 1960s. Indeed, that would explain the banners. The 2008 banners
read The 41st War Memorial Service for the Civilian Victims of the Japanese
Occupation. The Fall of Singapore, of course, took place more than sixty years
before. Clearly, the banner was marking the forty-first anniversary of the unveiling
of the memorial in 1967, a memorial which owed its existence to the Singapore
Chinese community.

Despite the discrepancies in the language sections of the SCCCI’s information
pamphlet, one common theme straddles them – indebtedness. Both language sections
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contain the SCCCI’s Secretariat’s account of events in the lead up to the memorial’s
construction and dedication even if the English section is more detailed and lengthy
than the Chinese section. It described, for example, the SCCCI’s fund-raising
activities, the sum of donations received, the selection process that decided the
design of the memorial, and even lists of names of all committee members involved
in the memorial building project from 1962 to 1965. Both sections suggest that the
SCCCI has discharged its responsibility, showed that no expense or effort was spared
to honour the civilian war dead in Singapore and the simple fact that without the
SCCCI, the memorial would never have been built. Winter argued that in Europe,
the good works by men and women to build a memorial to remember the war dead
were often publicly acknowledged as a “pillar of local commemoration”. 1142 This
explains why the SCCCI chose 1967 as the start of commemorations associated with
the war, rather than a year like 1942.

As long as the SCCCI maintains its interpretation of the past, war commemoration in
Singapore will be caught in a continuous feedback loop; the “blood debt” issue
underpins the existence of the war memorial and the SCCCI’s memorial services.
The SCCCI’s memorial service in turn reinforces the SCCCI’s interpretation of the
“blood debt” issue. Unless the SCCCI begins to move on from the “blood debt” issue
of the 1960s, the language of war commemoration in Singapore is unlikely to
change. And until it does, the SCCCI and its annual memorial services will continue
to meet ethnic communal, rather than a national need. The memorial, then, is a
national memorial in appearance but a communal one in spirit.

A changing ritual

The Singapore local Chinese press carried a report on the SCCCI’s 2008 memorial
service a day after it was held. The news article quoted the numbers and visitors
reported by the SCCCI during the service; 1,400 students from 58 education
institutions, representatives from the ASEAN Veterans’ Confederation, various
Singapore uniformed organisations and representatives from the Chinese, British,
Indian, Australian and twenty-two other embassies and consulates. However, the
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reporter specifically emphasised that “staff from the Japanese embassy attended the
service”. 1143 This demonstrated the persistent voice of the SCCCI’s language of
commemoration in Singapore. This and the fact that the service is attended by those
of ambassadorial rank are perplexing; the SCCCI’s commemoration of the war dead
in Singapore privileges the Singapore Chinese, yet at the same time it has been cast,
with approval from the PAP, as a form of national commemoration. This may reflect
the complicated relationship between the Singapore Chinese demand for recognition
and the PAP’s attempts to build a sense of national identity in Singapore. Indeed, the
changing rituals surrounding commemoration in Singapore reflects that relationship.

The Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation began as a civilian
war memorial. When it was unveiled in 1967, the SCCCI records that the ceremony
was attended by the Prime Minister of Singapore, government officials, members of
the diplomatic corps, religious leaders, representatives of all races and what the
SCCCI recognised as the “representatives of organisations and members of the
various committees connected with the building of the Memorial.” 1144 Conspicuously
absent was any mention of the services, either the armed services or veterans’
associations. War memorial project committees since the 1940s had made it clear
that a national war memorial for the victims of the Second World War would be
strictly a civilian memorial. In the 1970s, commemoration services at the Memorial
to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation were simple affairs that involved
a simple wreath laying ceremony. Photographs of the service suggest that they were
organised and conducted like funeral services. 1145 By 2008, the rituals had changed.

The local element was still there. The memorial service included a segment where
the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) activated Singapore’s air raid warning
system, sounding the “All Clear” signal at a prearranged time during the service.
Except on rare occasions when the SCDF is testing the system, the signal is never
activated during peacetime. According to the SCCCI, the “All Clear” signal was
chosen to symbolise the end of the Japanese Occupation.1146 Historically, the last “all
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clear” signal sounded during the war would have marked the British surrender and
the beginning of the Japanese Occupation. Yet, air raid warning sirens were in a way
a universal reminder of the war in Singapore before the British surrender. Many
survivors of the war recalled Singapore Island being bombed by the Japanese with
impunity. At best, all they could do was to build makeshift bomb-shelters in their
backyards and try not to get killed during the bombing raids. Many, who could not
enlist as volunteers to fight the Japanese due to colonial policies and attitudes of the
time that feared the creation of an armed local populace, joined civil defence
agencies, like Air Raid Precautions Service.1147 Oral histories from survivors of the
war often spoke of their experiences during the bombing of Singapore, either as
hapless civilians or as Air Raid Precautions Wardens. 1148 These experiences were
quite universal in Singapore’s local wartime memories; the bombing was
indiscriminate and it affected nearly everyone in Singapore, regardless of ethnicity.
This was a reminder of a collective past.

But by 2008, the military, ignored in the unveiling in 1967, were present, as were
rituals that would have been familiar to those attending commemorative services in
Britain or Australia. Bagpipes and a bugler sounding the Last Post and Reveille, were
provided by the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Band. Men from the SAF Provost
unit were organised into an “Honour Guard” – a catafalque party for the service. The
“Honour Guard” observed catafalque protocols at the Chinese funerary urn. The
SCCCI publicly acknowledged and thanked the following uniformed organisations
for their participation:

1. Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)
2. SAF Veterans’ League
3. Veterans Confederation of ASEAN Countries,
4. Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF)
5. Singapore Police Force Gurkha Contingent
6. National Cadet Corps
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The recognition of the Singapore Police Force Gurkha Contingent could be seen as
an example of the inclusive nature of the PAP’s ‘Singaporean Singapore” policy.
Yet, the Ghurkas also reflect a colonial and imperial past. The British recognised the
Gurkhas as a “martial race” and had recruited and organised them into regiments in
the British Army. 1149 Three Gurkha battalions were deployed in the defence of
Singapore. Their modern successors in the Singapore uniformed services are the
750-strong Gurkha Contingent which guards key installations in Singapore like the
Istana, (the official residence of the President of Singapore and Prime Minister) and
are used as an “ethnically neutral” 1150 force in anti-riot roles. Indeed, the PAP may
have appropriated the imperial tradition of a “martial race” to be the baton of its
multiracial “Singaporean Singapore” policy.

The changes in the ritual of the commemorative service reflect a tradition of
commemoration that developed after the Great War, the cult of the fallen. An
imperial tradition has been adapted and has become part of Singapore’s
remembrance of the war dead. This suggests that these imperial traditions may have
a greater universality for any formal commemoration of war. Yet, when it comes to
remembering the dead, Chinese traditions have elements in common with imperial
commemorative traditions that allowed the elements used in the imperial traditions to
be transferred. As discussed earlier, the cult of the dead is central to Chinese
traditions. And the changes in the ritual also reflected the SCCCI’s tacit support for
the PAP’s defence policies which were part of its attempts at nation-building with the
citizen soldier as its focus.

In Europe and Australia, places of national significance that commemorate war, i.e.
national war memorials, often feature a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier where the
body of an unknown soldier fallen in battle was carefully selected and reburied to
stand for the collective war dead who did not return from war. 1151 In the British
experience, for example, after considering where to take the remains of a fallen
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soldier from a list of important battlefields like Ypres and the Somme, the body was
selected and repatriated on the French destroyer, the Verdun. 1152 The fallen soldier
was finally laid to rest in a coffin made of British oak from a tree that stood in the
grounds of the Royal Palace at Hampton Court and was buried in Westminster
Abbey. On the same day the French Unknown Soldier was brought to the Arc de
Triomphe for reburial. 1153 In Singapore, a funerary urn fills the same purpose. It
symbolises the collective war dead. And in Chinese tradition, only a fine line
separates civilians, war heroes and military commemoration.

In Chinese military historiography, war narratives have traditionally been centred on
war heroes who hailed from the civilian or common class rather than “warrior
aristocrats”, 1154 or in the modern context, military leaders or officers. This reflected
the formation of a unified China under the First Emperor, where a centralised
bureaucracy replaced the traditional warrior aristocracy. Mass conscript infantry
armies became the mainstay of the state’s military machine, replacing the “old
chariot- and horse-riding aristocrats”. 1155 The centralised bureaucracy in Imperial
China emphasised education which led to the creation of an intellectual class that
eclipsed the warrior aristocratic families. The new bureaucratic autocracy in China
ushered in a way of maintaining peace, order and security in China without
depending on the allegiance of a fickle warrior aristocratic class for security and
protection. This paradigm shift in political administration and philosophy also had
far reaching effects on Chinese military historiography. The warrior ethos and the
warrior aristocracy in China, according to Stephen Morillo and Michael Pavkovic,
was “systematically ground out of existence” to eliminate potential threats to the
ruling dynasty. 1156 Chinese dynasties throughout China’s Imperial history would
subordinate the military to civilian administration and made it no more than a “tool
of the state”. 1157 The archetype warrior hero, best depicted in popular Chinese war
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classics, was expressed in the form of “hero-commoners and even barbarians”.1158
The link between the two traditions lies in the notion of “hero-commoners”. 1159 The
Unknown Soldier was a commoner. And the “hero-commoner” is a major
characteristic of Australia’s warrior ethos, clearly seen in the Anzac tradition. And in
Singapore, the Chinese martial tradition occupies a rather central place when it
comes to nation-building in the country.

When Singapore achieved independence in 1965, defence was a priority for the PAP
government and was regarded as vital to Singapore’s future as a nation. Initially it
looked to military volunteerism, a theme that features predominately in English and
Australian ideas of nationalism where the civilian volunteer in a time of war is seen
as the ultimate expression of civic duty. In an attempt to motivate and inspire local
Singaporeans to volunteer for the defence of the Singapore nation, the PAP
government tapped into the legacy of volunteerism in imperial and colonial armies,
namely the Straits Settlements Volunteer Corps (SSVF). The earliest local colonial
volunteer army established in Singapore was the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps. It
was formed in 1854 by European settlers due to concerns over internal security and
protection for Singapore’s European community. It was renamed the Singapore
Volunteer Corps (SVC) in 1901 when membership was opened to other ethnic
communities in Singapore. In 1915 it played a key role in suppressing the Sepoy
Mutiny in Singapore. 1160 By 1922 together with similar volunteer forces in Penang
and Malacca, it had been reorganised as the Straits Settlements Volunteer Corps
(SSVF). Ethnic composition and membership to the SSVF was also expanded to
include other local ethnic groups. The 2nd Battalion of the SSVF, for example, was
formed entirely of Straits-born Chinese volunteers. 1161 During the war in Singapore
the SSVF was deployed in the role of coastal defence in Singapore’s Southern
Sector. A veteran of the SSVF during the war, Richard Middleton-Smith,
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remembered his posting at a machinegun pillbox at Keppel Harbour. In between
enemy air raids he was stopping locals from looting the wharves. 1162 Another
veteran, Ibrahim Surata, recalled that not once did he encounter the Japanese nor did
he fire a shot in anger. 1163 Indeed, the SSVF saw very little action during the Battle
of Singapore. Yet after the British surrender, volunteers of the SSVF were marched
into captivity and were treated like the other regular troops in prisoner-of-war
camps. 1164

The SVC was revived in 1949 and after Singapore’s independence it was renamed
the People’s Defence Force (PDF). The PDF remained a volunteer force while a
regular professional standing army, the Singapore Army, was created. 1165 Despite
members of Parliament and ministers of the PAP volunteering to serve in the PDF to
set an example, 1166 volunteers were not as forthcoming as the Singapore government
had expected. This was because the Singapore Chinese community at the time had a
saying, “good iron is never used for making nails, and good men are never made into
soldiers” 1167 – the Chinese seldom regard volunteering for the armed services with
any favour, whether it be for the militia or for a career. In response the PAP
introduced conscription in 1967. The PDF was reorganised into four infantry
battalions and like its predecessor, the SSVF, its primary function was one of internal
security. 1168 It was made up of conscripted men who were not selected to serve in the
Singapore Army – the army was still small. 1169 By 1971, the PDF was merged with
the Singapore Army as an infantry formation. 1170 The PAP was done with its
experiment with volunteerism for defence. The unwillingness of the Singapore
Chinese to volunteer for military service reflected Blackburn’s argument as to why
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postcolonial nations do not often ground their nation-building efforts in the memory
of colonial armies. 1171

Conscription raised a sizeable defence force for Singapore. Its success rested on two
elements: Chinese military traditions and linking defence with a sense of national
identity. Although the Chinese may have believed that “good iron is never used for
making nails, and good men are never made into soldiers”,1172 conscription was an
accepted part of their military traditions. It played rather well into the PAP’s policy.
The SCCCI, often at loggerheads with the PAP over matters relating to the “blood
debt” and a memorial that honoured the Singapore Chinese war dead, gave
conscription its full support. Linking defence with nationalism in Singapore rested on
reinterpreting the Fall of Singapore. During the parliamentary debates in 1967 over
the introduction of conscription, later officially called National Service, a Member of
Parliament described the Fall of Singapore in a manner that is worth repeating here at
length.

The total number of British, Australian, Canadian, Indian, Malay and
Gurkha soldiers totalled about 600,000…before the fall of Singapore,
our so-called protectors had claimed that Singapore would never perish.
On the contrary, the fact was they retreated and surrendered, leaving
Singapore in the hands of the Japanese. The enemy brutally slaughtered
thousands of our citizens, including infants and also raped many of our
women… We were living practically between life and death and felt
more dead than alive.

This argument, that linked notions of betrayal to the need for self-sufficiency in the
defence of Singapore, which in turn implied a commitment to the idea of Singapore
as an independent nation, became a staple in any debates related to Singapore’s
security. A year later in 1968, for example, when the Singapore government debated
the question of security concerns in Parliament, Singapore’s Minister for Finance,
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and the architect of Singapore’s National Service policy, Dr Goh Keng Swee,
recycled the argument:

Conscripts and regulars of other countries did not put up a
distinguished performance [at the Battle of Singapore]…but if at the
time, we had forty battalions of our own men, I have little doubt that
the Japanese army would have found the going a great deal harder. 1173

Goh’s words showed rather clearly that the PAP, in the 1960s, did not endorse
popular wartime stories in Singapore that were already casting the Dalforce
companies in that light. Three decades later during the opening ceremony of a
Second World War interpretative centre in Singapore on 15 February 2002, then the
Minister for Defence, Dr Tony Tan, reminded Singaporeans that

This day serves not only to remind Singaporeans of the tragedy that
could befall us if we cannot defend ourselves.

It also reminds

Singaporeans that we all have a role to play in ensuring that Singapore
continues to enjoy peace and security. 1174

It made sense, then, that in 2008, members of the services, both present and past,
who had been absent in 1967, were present at the SCCCI’s commemorative service.
Their presence affirms the PAP’s National Service policy, a policy underpinned by
appropriating the Chinese martial tradition. They also illustrated a shift in the
memorial’s original purpose.

Honouring civilian victims of war in a military themed memorial service transforms
the civilian war dead into a form of sacrifice that is more commonly associated with
the cult of the fallen: it elevates the civilian war dead to the equivalent of the battle
dead in Western tradition. The language used by the SCCCI to describe the civilian
war dead is strikingly similar to what Paul Fussell described as the “system of high
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diction” 1175 found in the imperial language of war commemorations. The Singapore
civilian war dead were not merely victims of a war, but as part of a larger struggle
for “eternal peace” and “prosperity”. 1176 As the dead rest “under the warm sunlight”,
the SCCCI exhorts that Singaporeans should “fight for peace and livelihood with
vigour and courage.” 1177 The civilian victims of the massacres in their deaths, like
the cult of fallen soldier, would, in the exhortation of the SCCCI, “stand guard over
this rising nation”. 1178 The SCCCI’s rhetoric falls neatly in line with the PAP’s
efforts at nation-building – the citizen soldier is the defender of the nation. And the
ritual also echoes what Seal has described as combining the sacred with the secular.

When discussing the quintessential Australian commemoration service, the Anzac
Day Dawn Service, Seal argued that the service combined the sacred in the secular:

The term ‘Dawn Service’ itself implies religion even though there may
be little or no formal religious observance or utterance at these events.
It is a ‘service’ that is not a service, yet is replete with observances that
resonate of religious commemorative forms, including wreath-laying,
the playing of the Last Post, and the one or two minutes of silence, a
prayer-like moment in which no prayer is uttered. 1179

The infusion of sacred elements in a secular service affirms the sacrifices of the first
A.I.F. The changing rituals of the SCCCI’s service, by adding martial elements to the
service, echoes the Anzac Dawn Service, suggesting the appropriation of nationbuilding techniques based on military history so clearly evident in postcolonial
nations like Australia. And, finally, the commemorative service in 2008 reflected an
accommodation of political interests in Singapore. The SCCCI’s endorsement of the
PAP’s policies on defence saw the PAP endorse SCCCI publications like The Price
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of Peace, the book that opened the discussion of the Singaporean memory of the war
in this thesis. When it comes to the language of commemoration in Singapore, the
two parties have found an accommodation that suits both their purposes.

A national language of war commemoration in Singapore – The Malay
Regiment

When the Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, launched the book The
Price of Peace in 1997, he said in his speech, “if we do not remember our heroes, we
will produce no heroes.” 1180 This phrase is now featured on a memorial plaque at a
war museum and memorial that, interestingly, had little to do with The Price of
Peace.

Five years earlier in 1992, a colonial-style mansion at 31-K Pepys Road, on a then
unnamed hill, on the Pasir Pangang ridge in Singapore, became a public issue when
the Singapore Urban Development Management Corporation published plans to
renovate the mansion and put it up for private rental. The members of Singapore
Malay community immediately expressed their desire to develop the mansion to
preserve and feature the history of the Malay Regiment. 1181 It was the site of a
forgotten battle. The Malay Regiment began as an “Experimental Company” in 1933
to determine if the Malays could undergo military discipline and “be made into really
efficient regular soldiers.” 1182 The trial satisfied the British. By March 1941, the
Malay Regiment was expanded to two infantry battalions – the 1st and 2nd Battalion,
Malay Regiment. 1183 During the Second World War, the Malay Regiment fought the
Japanese in a series of engagements on Pasir Panjang Ridge. “C” Company, 1st
Battalion Malaya Regiment, made a last stand during the war near the site where the
mansion stands. During the Japanese Occupation, the men of the Malay Regiment
were separated from their British officers and interned briefly with Indian prisoners1180
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of-war at Farrer Park. Most were released after a month to return to civilian life.
Some, however, were transported to Thailand and Indonesia as part of labour gangs.
Five Malay officers were summarily executed because they refused to serve under
Japanese colours or renounce their allegiance to the British crown and return to
civilian life. 1184 The history of the Malay Regiment is well known in the Singapore
Malay community but there had been no geographical landmark or physical space
that specifically commemorated the history and men of the Malay Regiment. 1185

The Singapore National Heritage Board (NHB) responded and developed the site and
mansion into a “World War Two Interpretative Centre” at the cost of SGD$4.8
million. 1186 It was officially opened in 2002 on the 60th Anniversary of the Fall of
Singapore. The centre is named Reflections at Bukit Chandu. Its naming reinforces
the intersection of the politics of accommodation and resistance between the SCCCI
and the PAP over the language of commemoration in Singapore.

The Malay Regiment battle honours refer to the battle on the hill as “The Battle of
Opium Hill”, reflecting the colonial identity of the location of the time: the colonial
government’s main opium-processing factory was located at the foot of the hill.1187
Roads on the ridge all bear British names, a legacy of British colonial times, like
Winchester Road, York Road and Canterbury Road. To the west there is a large
public space called Kent Ridge Park, named in honour of the Duchess of Kent and
her son, the Duke of Kent, during their visit in 1952. 1188 So why call the centre
Reflections at Bukit Chandu? “Opium Hill” translates into Malay as Bukit (Hill) and
Chandu (Opium). The naming could be seen as an anti-colonial exercise, an attempt
to indigenise a site surrounded by place names that are a reminder of a colonial past.
What is more interesting, however, is the rejection by the NHB of proposed names
for the centre, especially those that sought to link the site with the Malay Regiment’s
battle honours. These included “Tribute to the Malay Regiment”, “Last Defence at
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Pasir Panjang”, “Pasir Panjang War Memorial”, and “Bukit Chandu Battle Site”. 1189
And then there was the matter of the PAP’s multi-racial policy where all groups were
deemed to be equal, reflected in both Singapore’s language policy and the Memorial
to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation. To privilege the Malay
community with its own monument not only ran contrary to PAP policy but would
not sit well with the Singapore Chinese community, especially after it had
compromised after two decades of fighting for an exclusive Chinese memorial. It
could not be a memorial to the Malay Regiment. 1190 The NHB also explained why
“Reflections” appeared in the name of the centre. It envisioned the centre as “a place
for reflection – a place for the people of today”. 1191 But what were the visitors
supposed to reflect on during their visit?

A main feature in Reflections at Bukit Chandu is three Malay soldiers in bronze
manning a mortar. This was inspired by a popular photograph taken of the Malay
Regiment in action during the war. Its similarity to the iconic photograph of the
American capture of Iwo Jima and the American memorial that followed in 1954 is
striking. It pays homage to the event and emphasises the importance of the battle in
the nation’s history. The sculpture of the Malay soldiers is also a departure from
Australian and imperial depictions of infantry soldiers associated with war
memorials who are often at rest. This echoes the SCCCI’s exhortation mentioned
earlier that Singaporeans should continue to “fight for peace and livelihood with
vigour and courage”, 1192 a sentiment that reflect the Singapore Chinese community’s
memory of the war.

Another interpretation of the bronze statues of men immortalised in action was part
of efforts by the NHB to represent traits like courage and heroism. As mentioned
earlier, Brig.-Gen George Yeo’s words, “if we do not remember our heroes, we will
produce no heroes”, has been inscribed on a memorial plaque and featured with the
statues and associated with Reflections at Bukit Chandu. But the expression was
originally used to describe the Singapore Chinese featured in The Price of Peace.
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The battle stories told by those who witnessed the Malay Regiment in action are
etched on large panels of frosted glass in the centre, descriptions that evoke explicitly
the courage and heroism of members of the regiment. Inscribed on frosted glass
panels were also brief extracts from the next-of-kin of soldiers of the Malay
Regiment, reflecting on the sacrifices of their fallen kin. Also featured in the
commemorative centre was a narrative of a Chinese civilian whose family was
massacred by the Japanese and an Australian prisoner-of-war. 1193 But, as noted
earlier, despite the presence of Malay voices, this was not a Malay memorial. It was
a place of reflection that also included the voice of the Singapore Chinese and the
prisoner-of-war. And the Japanese Occupation was not a feature of the displays
provided by the centre.

In 2006, a group of secondary students from Fairfield Methodist Secondary School
organised an educational visit to Reflections at Bukit Chandu. As part of the
programme, they were required to paint a representation of what they had learned
after their visit to the centre. Twenty-five paintings were placed on public display
along the school’s main driveway. Their paintings give us an indication of what they
reflected on during their visit. Eleven paintings depicted the flag of Singapore, a
post-war construct that only appeared in Singapore in the 1960s. Of these eleven
paintings, nine of them featured, along with the Singapore national flag, the flag of
Japan; five were the Japanese Pacific war flag. Placing the latter with the national
flag of Singapore in a Second World War context is, of course, historically
impossible, but it demonstrates that the students have accepted and contextualised
the Japanese Occupation as a dark and bloody time in Singapore’s history as a
nation. Fourteen paintings depicted images of tombstones, skulls and blood to
represent the death and suffering that took place during the Japanese Occupation.
Nine paintings depict explicitly scenes of savagery committed by Japanese soldiers.
Two paintings had depictions of prisoners-of-war with Caucasian features. Two
paintings were devoid of any representations of death or the Japanese. Only one
reflected the history of the Malay Regiment. It featured a representation of
Lieutenant Adnan bin Saidi, a Malay officer who died while leading the defence of
Bukit Chandu. Although the Japanese Occupation was not the main focus of the
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centre, the students’ paintings are indicative that the popular memories of the war,
based on Chinese wartime memories centred on the themes of “Resistance
Literature” and the “blood-debt” movement, have become a hegemonic influence.

Since the war memorial movements of the 1940s, the language of war
commemoration in Singapore has chiefly reflected the concerns and interests of the
Singapore Chinese community. Persistent efforts by the SCCCI have ensured that its
rhetoric on war commemoration continues to have a prominent place in Singapore
today. And that continually returns to where it all began, the popular war narratives
that stem from a popular version of history that the Singapore Chinese want to
believe.
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The centrepiece of the war memorial, at the base of the
four towering pillars, is a distinctively Chinese urn
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Members of the Malay Regiment in action with their 3-inch Mortars

Bronze memorial dedicated to the Malay Regiment at the Reflections at Bukit
Chandu commemorative centre
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Conclusion
Languages of Commemoration and the Voices of the Fallen

February 15 is a date fixed and commemorated by a select group of Singaporeans
and Australians. The bugles will continue to sound The Last Post to commemorate
the memory of the Fall of Singapore in Singapore and Australia every year on that
day. Memories of 15 February 1942 have come to stand for different things in
Australia and Singapore. This thesis has shown that popular Singaporean and
Australian memories of the war in Singapore were often subordinated to communal,
popular or official interpretations of the war. The languages of war commemoration
in Australia and Singapore show quite clearly that when a mythologised past, i.e. the
Anzac story in Australia and “Resistance Literature” in Singapore, has become a
hegemonic influence in their societies, it has led to sins of omission, and more
crucially, the modification of memories and experiences that appear to be “fixed” 1194
in the past to accommodate or reinforce popular myths of the past.

The Forgotten Eighth
A veteran from the 8th Division interviewed for this thesis remarked that the 8th
Division should be nicknamed “The Forgotten Eighth”. 1195 Although the 8th Division
was briefly forgotten during the war in a sense that after it surrendered in Singapore
wartime policy from London had censored most public information on the men, it
was never entirely forgotten in Australia after the war. After the repatriation of
former POWs of the 8th Division, veterans wrote and published personal accounts of
their POW experience. Their efforts have unwittingly set up their wartime experience
to be one that is uniquely Australian, one that has resonance with Anzac, and secured
their place in popular Australian history. And it is through the popularity of former
Australian POW narratives that the men are not forgotten. They have a permanent
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place in Australia’s memory of the Pacific War. But that place does not always
match the veterans’ view of their place in history. The combat experiences of the
men has been largely eclipsed by their POW narrative and experience. This suggests
that there is a Janus characteristic to the division’s history, a division with two faces;
the personal narratives of the men after capitulation – the POW division, and the
official history of the division before capitulation – “The Forgotten Eighth”.
“Forgotten” also reflects the history of the 8th Division in another sense. As discussed
in Chapter 3, the story of former Australian POWs waxed and waned from the end of
the war until the 1980s when the POW experience came to represent Australia’s
Pacific War. During the 1990s, however, its place in the popular memory of the war
was challenged by the popularisation of Kokoda narratives. By the turn of the
century, interests in former Australian POW narratives had been pushed once more
into the background in popular Australian military history. Yet their memory has
endured. The battalion associations have acted to ensure that the 8th’s memory
endures at a private level where they are leaving the “Associates” with a legacy to
continue, even if it has led to acrimonious disagreements with the RSL over who has
the right to march on Anzac Day. The shift in emphasis from the POW experience,
Changi, to Kokoda, and the activities of the battalion associations, are examples of
the way Anzac is constantly subject to reinterpretation, the way it can be used for
political, public and private ends, the way it can both include and exclude and the
way it functions as Seal’s modern Australian dreaming.

War on Wheels in Singapore

In 2006, the old Ford Motor Factory at Bukit Timah in Singapore, the site where the
official surrender of Singapore took place on 15 February 1942, was opened to the
public after an extensive refurbishment. It was renamed Memories at the Old Ford
Factory and it is now a museum featuring a permanent gallery exhibition called,
“Syonan Years: Singapore Under Japanese Rule, 1942-1945”. The gallery documents
the experiences of the local people of Singapore during the Japanese Occupation.
The wartime experiences featured were inclusive. For example, it featured
controversial organisations and sites mentioned in Chapter 9: the Indian National
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Army, and the Japanese wartime shrine Syonan Jinja. The experiences of
Singapore’s minority communities were also mentioned, for example the Singapore
Eurasian community. The exterior and the grounds of the museum, however, were a
different story. A spot along the path where Lieutenant-General Percival walked and
led the British delegation to sign the instruments of surrender, features a Chinese
calligraphy sculpture with the Chinese characters for “Peace” and a granite stone
inscribed with a statement from the Chinese Emperor Tang Taizong titled “Taking
History as a Lesson.” Memories at the Old Ford Factory was opened to the public,
not on the anniversary of the surrender, butt on 16 February 2006. In his speech the
Singapore Minister for Defence, Teo Chee Hean, he explained why the date 16
February was chosen: “for the people of Singapore, it marked the beginning of dark
times, which was to last 3 years and 8 months.” 1196 The date and the Chinese
elements that had been grafted onto the museum, reinforces the discussions in
Chapters 6 and 7: the determination of the SCCCI to make the Singapore Chinese
experience of the war Singapore’s collective experience of the war.

From the end of the war, as discussed in Chapter 9, the Singapore Chinese
community was anxious to ensure that any form of commemoration in Singapore
must reflect and emphasise the Singapore Chinese war dead. This stemmed from an
anxiety that, despite their majority status, their memory of the war, and their war
dead, would be forgotten in post-war Singapore. The war memorial to the civilian
war dead, although collective in purpose, is also clearly Chinese, evident in the
funerary urn, and the fact that the SCCCI organises the service and the use made of
the memorial by the Singapore Chinese for funerary rituals. And the Singapore
Chinese community has colonised other local wartime memories in Singapore to
reflect their voices. The grafting of Chinese elements on to Memories at the Old
Ford Factory and at Reflections at Bukit Chandu mentioned in the previous chapter,
suggests that their anxiety has persisted. The visit by the students to Bukit Chandu
where the paintings emphasised the Japanese Occupation, suggests that the SCCCI’s
view of the war is hegemonic. Yet, the anxiety of the Singapore Chinese community
suggests a concern that its view of the war lacks a sense of permanency in Singapore.
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Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at the opening of “Memories at Old Fort
Factory”, the Singapore Ministry of Defence
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On 28 May 2009, the NHB organised an education programme called War on Wheels
to “bring history lessons out of the classroom.” 1197 The organisers, Yesterday.sg and
Heritage TV, took a group of fifteen year-old students from the Nanyang Girls High
School to visit former battle sites and sites of war commemoration in Singapore, and
documented their experience. The sites included the Japanese landing site at Kranji,
the Kranji War Memorial, the site of the Battle of Bukit Timah, Memories at the Old
Ford Factory, remains of the British defences at Labrador Park, and Reflections at
Bukit Chandu. The organisers of War on Wheels did not include a visit to the
Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, the most iconic war
memorial in Singapore. Clearly, War on Wheels did not focus solely on the Japanese
Occupation. However, the programme ran only for four sessions; the first was the
pilot programme with the Nanyang Girls High School and the remaining three were
organised in the month of November 2009 for the public as part of the NHB’s efforts
to promote Singapore’s museums to Singaporeans – this was not to be a long-term
public education programme. War on Wheels did not reflect a paradigm shift in the
commemoration of war in Singapore, yet the change in the direction and emphasis of
war commemoration promoted by the program is marked.

During a segment on War on Wheels, the students were brought to the Kranji War
Memorial and cemetery. 1198 After walking among the war graves, the organisers
provided paper for the students to make two poppy wreaths. The wreaths were laid at
the war memorial and the students observed a minute of silence. In an interview, one
student said that when making the poppy wreaths, it made her “feel that they were
doing something for them” because “they died because of us” and therefore “we do
our best to respect that by honouring them and remembering them so that they live
on in us.” 1199 This was remarkably close to the experiences of Australian pilgrims
commemorating Anzac Day at Anzac Cove reflected in Bruce Scates’ research;
Australian pilgrims at Anzac Cove were eager to remember “what they did for
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us”. 1200 It suggests that when it comes to commemorating the war dead, there is
indeed a tendency to return to, as Winter has observed, the languages, rituals and
symbols of the First World War” 1201 even when some of them are unfamiliar to
Singaporeans. The students at the Kranji War Memorial were following protocols
established for a Commonwealth War Graves site but the students were not informed
of the meanings behind those protocols. When asked to explain the meaning of the
poppy wreath, the student interviewed said, “a poppy wreath is symbolic of [short
pause], people do it a lot over there.” 1202 Despite the SCCCI’s efforts to position,
preserve and represent the voice of the Singapore Chinese community, the reflections
of students at Kranji show that its language of commemoration in Singapore can be
ignored – its is not as permanently anchored as they might wish.

Voices of the Fallen

This thesis has explored the meaning of a single event, 15 February 1942, in
Australia and Singapore. There are some elements in the language of
commemoration that both share: the use of imperial iconography and themes
associated with the cult of the fallen soldier, for example. However, the perspective
of each nation has been driven, and will continue to be driven, by popular memories
and influenced by broader themes like myths of the nation and national identity, and
nationalism. And this had also produced differences. Unique influences have shaped,
and will continue to shape the memories, experiences and myths of what 15 February
1942 means in Australia and Singapore. But, by understanding the influences that
shape the language of commemoration in Australia and Singapore we can also get a
better understanding of where myths, experiences and popular memories of the
Second World War sit in these two nations. Yet, when it comes to the language of
war commemoration in Singapore and Australia – the event, myths and memories –
the voices of the fallen are also echoes of empires.
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